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Abstract 
 
This study is built around two core questions. Firstly, what 
constitutes the formation of Kurdish identity in the Kurdistan 
Region-Iraq (KRI)? Secondly, what have the inner dynamics of this 
process been since 1991? Two major theoretical approaches are 
used to address these questions, namely ethno-symbolism and 
political discourse theory (PDT).  
 
These theories are utilised to approach the research questions on 
two levels: the cultural-historical and the political; and result in 
four major findings regarding the inner dynamics of collective 
identity formation in the KRI. Firstly, it is found that actors active 
in the process of collective identity formation are primarily 
nationalist political parties and intellectuals. Secondly, that Kurdish 
identity in the region forms around ‘Kurdish’ ethnic, cultural and 
historical features. Thirdly, that a large set of cultural and historical 
tools have been utilised to produce Kurdish identity in the KRI. 
Fourthly, that different forms of Kurdish identity have been 
produced in the KRI, meaning that Kurdishness in the region is 
split, fragmented, relational and crisis-ridden. 
 
This study also argues that the process of Kurdish identity 
formation in the KRI from 1991 to 2014 can be divided into three 
 II 
 
historic phases. The first of these stretched from 1991 to 2003 and 
saw the ambiguous development of a traditional Kurdish ethno-
nationalist identity; the second lasted from 2003 to 2009 and saw 
the development of an ambiguous Kurdish nationalist identity; 
whilst the third stretches from 2009 to the present and has seen 
Kurdish identity acquire a civic character in response to newly 
emerged political, social and economic conditions in the KRI. 
 
The study also combines the theoretical and methodological 
approaches of ethno-symbolism’s culturist approach and PDT’s 
social constructionism in order to develop an approach suitable for 
studying the complexities of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. 
The resulting argument is that whilst Kurdish cultural and historical 
features play an essential role in producing the Kurdish identity in 
the KRI, this identity is produced in the discursive realm by 
competing social and political actors, each of which seeks to 
hegemonise their own particular form of Kurdish identity.  
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CHAPTER ONE
 
1 Introduction 
This is a study of the long process of Kurdish collective identity 
formation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). According to 
dominant narratives, Kurds have long been positioned as a key 
unstable element in the geopolitics of the Middle East. However, 
developments in Iraq and Syria since 2003 have revealed this 
understanding to be a fallacy. Iraqi Kurds played a major role in 
the American led regime change process in Iraq in 2003; and are 
playing an equally crucial role in standing against the Islamic State 
(‘IS’, formerly, ISIS1) and other terrorist groups in the Syrian Civil 
War, which began in 2011. Indeed, at the time of writing, the Kurds 
are frequently considered key players in the ‘war on terrorism’ and 
are playing the role of ‘bulwark’ in the face of IS and other terrorist 
forces in the region. Therefore, the Kurds are now considered by 
many as the key to a stable, free and democratic Middle East. Thus, 
research into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is timely and has 
                                 
1 ‘The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham’, sometimes named ‘Islamic State 
in Iraq and Levant’ (ISIL). The corresponding Arabic acronym ‘Daesh’ is 
the abriviated form of the organization’s Arabic name (i.e. ad-Dawla al-
Islamiyah fil-Eraq wash-Sham). 
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significant importance in aiding understanding of current conditions 
and the possible futures of the Middle East more broadly.  
1.1 The story of identity 
On the 5th September 2013 the popular Kurdish website 
Penusakan.com carried a story headlined ‘Two Kurdish Lovers 
Astonish the World After Three Thousand Years’. The following 
story was accompanied by a photograph of two ‘kissing’ skeletons 
lying in a bin. They had been excavated in the ancient ‘Hasanlu’ 
site in Western Azerbaijan province in Iran – an area mostly 
populated by Kurds, who consider it to be part of Iranian Kurdistan. 
The ability to narrate this photograph (actually taken by members 
of the Pennsylvania University Museum’s excavation team in 1972) 
in such a way can be seen as an example of ‘crafting a national self’ 
(Houston, 2008, p. 5). The story of ‘Kurdish kissing lovers’ is 
indicative of the manipulative power of the nationalist discourse, 
which is able to invest in the past in order to re-construct the 
identity of the Kurdish nation in the present. Furthermore, the story 
also proves the importance of history (whether factual or fictional) 
in nationalist symbolic design. While there is no substantial 
scientific evidence regarding the identity of the ancient residents of 
the area where the skeletons were found – and whilst the area is 
also highly populated by Iranian Turks – Kurdish nationalists 
utilized this photograph to help form their identity. Indeed, it is 
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likely that these Iranian Turks would also claim the skeletons. The 
story, in other words, illustrates the fact that identity is far from 
objective, but is socially constructed, contested and contingent. 
The overriding characteristics of peoples’ identities are dictated by 
hegemonic discourses.  
The present study can be animated by the above analysis. In what 
follows, I sketch the theoretical and methodological methods 
utilized in this research. 
1.2 Why Kurdish identity? Why Iraqi Kurds? Why 1991? 
A further – and more macro-level – example of the imposition of 
identity can be seen in the approach taken by the USA and Britain 
following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They stated that Iraq should 
be reconstructed in a manner in which all, ‘regardless of their ethnic 
and sectarian background’ submit themselves to the ‘unified Iraq’, 
and see themselves as ‘just Iraqis’ (O'Leary & Salih, 2005, p. 33). 
The conflict-ridden history of Iraq, stretching back to its foundation 
in the early 1920s (in which the British were primary actors), was 
of little significance to them (O'Leary & Salih, 2005, pp. 16-17) The 
move also ignored the identities of Kurds in northern Iraq (or 
‘KRI’)2, who saw the land they lived on – which had been beyond 
                                 
2 The preferred term in this study is Kurdistan Region-Iraq (KRI). 
Kurdistan in its broader sense is the indigenous name, commonly used 
to refer to a broader geographical area. Today, this includes parts of 
northern Iraq, north western Iran, south eastern Turkey and northern 
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Iraqi governmental control since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 
– as part of Kurdistan. The impact of these twelve years of Kurdish 
self-rule in shaping the self-perception of the Kurds was not 
considered to be of significant relevance for the democratization 
and nation-building processes instigated by British and American 
policymakers. However, whilst the occupying rulers encountered 
significant militant resistance in central and southern parts of Iraq, 
they also faced resistance from their Kurdish allies in the north. 
This, however, was not of an armed nature. In short, the Kurds’ 
resistance manifested itself through their refusal of the identity 
imposed on the Iraqi society by the allied victors. American and 
British officials in Iraq were trying to pool the Iraqi ‘nation’ together 
in the best way possible. Arguably, the ‘best way possible’ at that 
time meant the re-integration of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan 
Region-Iraq into the refurbished Iraqi state. However, this was 
resisted by Iraqi Kurds during the reconstruction projects, which 
gained momentum before and during the early period of Iraqi 
invasion (O’Leary and Salih, 2005, p. 32). 3 Thus, American and 
British officials and analysts were left disappointed: their 
                                 
Syria. 
 3 The Iraq Study Group report, also known as Baker and Hamilton report 
(Baker, III & Hamilton, 2006) and the Iraq Commission report’ 
(Ashdown, et al., 2007), Each report produced by two different study 
groups assigned by American and British governments respectively, may 
exemplify the dominant discourse within American and British policy-
makers in post-2003 Iraq.  
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misperception and misrepresentation of the identity practices of the 
Kurds of the KRI resulted in resistance to their project.  
 
These failings can be related to dominant International Relations 
theories of democratization, nation-building and reconstruction; 
which fail to consider the role of non-state identities. Thus, 
International Relations theory can be implicated in the enduring 
instability in Iraq. This study seeks to contribute to the 
development of a more sophisticated understanding of Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI, with a focus on their development 
since 1991. This, it is hoped, will contribute to a superior 
understanding of Iraqi politics more broadly. 
1.3 The rationale 
As noted above, Kurds in general – and Iraqi Kurds in particular – 
have commonly been understood as a source of instability in the 
Middle East.4 Despite this understanding, the postulation above 
speaks to contested realities in the Middle East. States in which a 
large proportion of the population are either identified as or self-
identify as Kurds (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria) experienced 
enduring and frequently bloody conflicts between Kurds and central 
                                 
 4 Examples could include: The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf by 
Stephen C. Pelletier (1984); Kurdish Ethonationalism by Nader Entessar 
(1992); and The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970, by Edgar O’Bailance, 
(1973). 
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government (normally ruled by the majority ethnic group) 
throughout the twentieth century. This can partly be linked to the 
nature of nation-states in the region, which, as Abbas Vali (2006) 
notes, are products of a ‘perverted modernity’ resulting from the 
collapse of the great empires of the region and subsequent 
processes of nation-building. Those processes spoke the language 
of modernist state-building but failed to fulfill its goals: the 
homogenizing dynamics inherent in state-building made them 
notoriously exclusionist of identities other than their ‘core ethnic 
groups’ (O'Leary & Salih, 2005, p. 10; Vali, 2006, p. 56). Yet 
although this ‘perverted modernity’ provides important background 
to the situation in the contemporary KRI, a more detailed study 
needs to examine the history of the region from 1991.  
 
Whilst 1989 is frequently portrayed as a historic turning point in 
Eastern European politics, and as the dawning of a new global 
order; 1991 was an important occasion in the history of Middle 
East, and the events of that year have also left their mark on global 
politics. More specifically for the purposes of this study, 1991 saw 
major changes to the domestic political system in Iraq, culminating 
in historical reorientations of power relations along ethnic and 
sectarian lines. For Iraqi Kurds, 1991 thus marked a significant new 
chapter in their decades-long struggle for national self-assertion 
through obtaining a de facto status of autonomy from Iraq’s central 
 7 
 
government under Saddam Hussein. 
 
This was achieved after the new global order became more 
favorably disposed to non-state actors such as the Kurds. 
Combined with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, an unprecedented 
opportunity for the Kurds to claim autonomy emerged. This was 
taken through the emergence of the KRI as a political actor: the 
region acquired a degree of political-juridical power and came – at 
times – to be described as a ‘de facto state’ (Anderson & Stansfield, 
2004; Gunter, 1999; Romano, 2004; Stansfield, 2003b).  
 
Despite the KRI’s highly unstable and conflicted history (evidenced 
by its political and legal status internationally); its uneasy 
coexistence with the neighboring states of Iran, Turkey and Syria, 
(which, having large Kurdish populations have been historically 
hostile to Kurdish self-rule); and constant internal divisions, the 
KRI has provided a new and unique experience of semi-autonomy 
for the Kurds in general and Iraqi Kurds in particular.  
 
Since 1991 the region of Kurdistan can be viewed and studied from 
various angles. However, for the reasons noted above, this study 
focuses on the pivotal issue of collective identity formation in the 
KRI between 1991 and 2014. In studying collective identity, 
researchers encounter significant theoretical and methodological 
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decisions. The wide range of actors and factors active in processes 
of collective identity formation necessitates decisions regarding 
methods of data collection and analysis. 
 
Research questions 
My core research questions are as follows: 
1) What constitutes and determines the Kurdish identity in 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq?  
2) To what extent is Kurdish identity in Kurdistan Region-Iraq 
determined by cultural and historical factors or political 
agents? 
3)  What kind of collective Kurdish identity is formed in 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq?  
4) What are the main trajectories of that identity? 
 
This research also explores ‘how’ and ‘why’ Kurdish identity comes 
to be constructed in the KRI; the determinate actors in constructing 
Kurdish identity in the KRI; and the nature of Kurdish identity in 
the KRI. 
 
  
Theoretical framework 
The dominant approach to nations and nationalism holds that 
contemporary ethnic and nationalist identities are products of 
modernity. For Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Elie Kedourie, 
John Breuilly and others from the modernist school of nations and 
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nationalism,5 the social, economic and political transformations 
brought about by modern industrial ‘print-capitalism’ paved the 
way for new ideologically-sanctioned collective identities linked to 
broader conceptions of nations and nationalism; and which 
frequently articulated their demands for statehood (Anderson, 
2006; Breuilly, 2001; Gellner, 1969; Kedourie, 2000). However, 
culturalist approaches to nations and nationalism focus primarily 
on the importance of ethnic roots and symbolism. They argue that 
whilst national identity formations are modern phenomena, they 
are nevertheless (re)constructed around pre-existing ethnic roots: 
they capitalize on ethnic myths, symbols and memories (Smith, 
1991; Smith, 1999; Smith, 2009). The constructionist approaches 
to collective national identity – including -political discourse theory 
(PDT)—meanwhile, see national identity as a socially constructed, 
contingent, historical and unsolidified form (Anderson, 2006; 
Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Laclau, 1994; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). 
National identities are ‘the result…of human action, speech….as a 
result they can and do change over time.’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, 
p. 848)  
 
Following their critical discussion of a number of studies on the 
relationship between ethnic and nationalist constructions and 
                                 
 5 Full discussion on the modernist school vis-à-vis the ethno-symbolic 
approach is provided in chapter four. 
 10 
 
violence, James Fearon and David Laitin (2000) outline three forces 
driving the construction of ethnic or national identities: social and 
economic processes; discourse; and individuals. They note that 
existing approaches frequently adopt these drivers alone or in 
combination. My intention here is to incorporate the 
aforementioned approaches especially, the last two by utilizing 
ethno-symbolism and PDT as theoretical and methodological tools. 
This is not a straightforward task, yet, as John Breuilly notes: 
I do not think it is possible to have a satisfactory theory 
or even approach towards nationalism as a whole. 
Nationalism can refer to arguments of intellectuals, ways 
people feel and talk political movements and 
organizations, state policy, and much else. It is difficult 
to formulate a general and coherent view of any one of 
these subjects; it is a fantasy to suppose one could 
develop an argument which covered them all. (2001, p. 
49) 
 
As Breuilly notes, however, this should not prevent us from seeking 
to arrive at a plausible theoretical—methodological approaches that 
enables a greater, if not total, understanding of nations, 
nationalism and associated issues. Thus, I approach Kurdish 
identity formation on two main levels: 
 
1) Cultural-historical: examining the historical development of 
Kurdish identity formation in the KRI between 1991 and 
2014; and exploring the cultural and social tenets 
constituting the language and discourse of Kurdish 
nationalism. 
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2) Political: examining the political discourse used by the major 
Kurdish political parties, the Kurdish Regional Government 
and non-partisan organizations and individuals within the 
KRI. 
 
Accordingly, the case in question will be critically assessed through 
the ethno-symbolic approach, which is commonly associated with 
Anthony Smith; and the constructionist approach represented by 
the political discourse theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. 
The former highlights the importance of cultural difference and 
history for understanding identity; whilst the latter focuses on how 
political discourse shapes and constructs identity. These 
approaches are not kept separate, however: an attempt is made to 
combine their theoretical and analytical contours in order to arrive 
at a satisfactory explanatory theory of the dynamism of Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI since 1991. I argue that by combining 
the two theories we can better understand the interplay of culture 
and politics in the processes of identity formation in the KRI from 
1991-2014; and arrive at a more satisfactory understanding of 
identity formation more generally.  
 
Combining ethno-symbolism and PDT is particularly useful in 
studying identity formation in the KRI because of Kurdish political 
discourse’s dependence on cultural elements and historical 
narratives (both fictional and factual) in constructing Kurdish 
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identity, which is constructed by excavating historical roots and 
memorising the modern tragedies; by Newroz6 celebrations and 
Halabja7 and commemorations. Understanding these cultural and 
historical factors is insufficient for understanding the constitution 
of Kurdish identity, however; and nor can Kurdish political 
discourse be explored in a vacuum: it requires cultural and 
symbolic tools as building blocks. In addition, the cultural and 
historical elements are not presented as raw materials in nationalist 
political discourse, but rather are re-appropriated and incorporated 
into a range of nationalist narratives, which compete for hegemony 
over Kurdish identity. There are, in other words, competing forms 
of Kurdish identity in the KRI. Also important to note is that Kurdish 
identity is animated through antagonistic relations with non-
Kurdish identities. 
  
The relational environment of Kurdish identity formation has been 
well theorized by Abbas Vali. For him, the central point is that 
national identity is essentially a modern phenomenon, arising at 
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and tightly 
                                 
6 Newroz is an annual feast celebrated by Kurds and other people in the 
Middle East. It also marks the first day of the Kurdish and Iranian 
calander and falls on 21s t of March each year. A detailed discussion of 
Newroz is provided in the coming sections. 
7 Halabja is a town in the KRI which was attacked by Chemical bombs by 
the then Iraqi army on 16th March 1988. 
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linked to processes of modernisation and the political philosophy of 
popular democracy (Vali, 2003a, p. 13; 2006; 2011, pp. xii-xiii). 
This resonates with the modernist approach to nationalism and 
national identity formulated by scholars such Gellner (1983; 1969), 
Anderson (2006) and Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992). Vali 
argues that Kurdish nationalism should be understood as part of a 
growing nationalist trend at the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; and that it arose from the failure of newly 
formed modern nation-states in the Middle East, which sought to 
mimic European nation-states such as France and Britain. He 
perceives these failures as inevitable given the presence of ‘non-
sovereign’ Kurds in nation-states created by ‘sovereign ethnic 
groups’, and which failed to account for this ‘non-sovereign 
difference’ (Vali, 2011, p. 137). As these state-building processes 
were premised on the negation and subversion of non-sovereign 
Kurds, the Kurdish identity was transformed: moving from a 
linguistic identity to an ethnic identity, transforming the discourse 
and practice of Kurdish nationalism in the process. Thus, it follows 
that Kurdish identity is fundamentally related to other, non-Kurdish 
identities. While the dispersal of Kurds across a number of nation-
states in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria) may have 
had serious ramifications for the nature and development of 
Kurdish identity and associated nationalisms, relationality is 
essential for the function and development of Kurdish identity in 
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the region.  
 
Although the preceding discussions are self-explanatory with 
regards to the theoretical outlook of Vali, it is important to note 
that he also shows his explicit affinity to the constructionist 
approach. He makes clear his opposition to the ‘positivist 
obsession’ with empiricist epistemology, ‘which appeals to the 
authority of historical fact-evidence as means of validation of 
historical argument’ (2011, p. xv). He argues that adopting such 
an approach would seriously harm the theoretical arguments in the 
constructionist conceptualization of key concepts such as ‘nation’ 
and ‘national identity’ by leading scholars such as Gellner, 
Anderson and Hobsbawm. However, he argues that the positivist 
epistemological position exposes a serious contradiction in 
constructionist theory, for while constructionists criticise 
primordialism and ethnicism for the way they define the origins of 
the nation; and accuse them of conceptualising the ‘historical fact-
evidence’ in an essentialist and self-explanatory manner, they are 
also guilty of doing so. Thus, Vali argues that ‘the constructivist 
conception of the national origin entails a notion of the past which 
is given to the discourse, exists in the present and is capable of 
animating it.’ (2011, p. xv)8 
                                 
8 As can be noted, Vali uses the term ‘constructivist’ interchangeably with 
the more common term ‘constructionist’. Others distinguish between the 
two, associating ‘constructivism’ with psychology and ‘constructionism’ 
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There are two further points in Vali’s approach with serious 
implications for the present study. As noted above, Vali conceives 
of national identity as being inevitably related to relations of power 
in the modern nation-state. The consolidation of official national 
identity is tightly linked to the negation of the ‘non-sovereign’ 
group (or the minority) by the sovereign group (or the majority). 
In effect, the minority’s struggle to reassert itself involves an active 
political engagement vis-à-vis the majority. In other words, politics 
becomes a struggle for national identity. This consequently brings 
nationalism to the forefront in struggles of national identity and 
leads Vali to argue that ‘the nation should also be perceived, 
analysed and theorised at the level of nationalism’ (2011, p. xiv). 
As he notes, this argument represents ‘the constructivist 
conceptions of the nation in contemporary political and social  
thought’ (2011, p. xiv). The second – and equally important – point 
in Vali’s postulation of Kurdish identity formation is the pivotal 
position of ‘power’ in nationalist discourse: 
Power is the soul of national rights, without which they 
will remain exterior to themselves, a voice that does not 
speak, a force which does not signify. […]…power is the 
agency connecting rights and identity in the nationalist 
political field, both ethnic and national. (2011, p. 128) 
  
                                 
with sociology and other social sciences (Young & Collin, 2004). In this 
study the more common ‘constructionism’ is preferred.  
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These two arguments have serious implications for this study. 
Issues of collective identity – whether national or ethnic – are 
indivisible from the political domain in the KRI. In fact, since 1991 
the main political actors in the KRI have been the Kurdish 
nationalist parties, who have also been the leading architects of 
Kurdish identity formation. Furthermore, power and its 
consolidation was central to their efforts at both the local and 
national level.  
 
Since the 1991 uprising, Kurdish political parties have engaged in 
a constant power struggle with both rival Kurdish parties and the 
Iraqi government in Baghdad. These latter struggles began with 
negotiations in 1991, which sought to reach an agreement on a 
form of autonomy for the Kurdistan Region, but were doomed to 
fail over disagreements regarding power. Then, in October 1992, 
the nascent Kurdish parliament endorsed a federal relationship with 
the Iraqi state. The importance of these power relations in identity 
formation is evident in the fact that the most critical point of 
disagreement between Kurdish parties and Arabs in Baghdad 
following 2003 centred on issues regarding federalism, Peshmerga 
forces9 and natural resources. 
                                 
 9 Peshmerga is a term used for the main Kurdish armed forces in the 
KRI. The terms relates to ‘those who face death’. It is a new term, first 
reported during the short lived Kurdish Republic of Kurdistan in 
Mahabad, Iran in 1946, where it referred to Kurdish armed forces of the 
state. The term has since become popular among Kurdish nationalist 
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1.4 Contributions made by the research 
The history of modern states in the Middle East demonstrates the 
importance of ethnic and nationalist languages, symbols and 
ideologies play extremely important roles in states’ internal and 
external affairs. Similarly, it has been suggested that ethnic and 
nationalist languages and ideologies have been among the most 
important ‘cultural tools’ utilized by Kurdish nationalist groups 
(Romano, 2006). It has been argued that this ‘is a clear 
manifestation of the existence of sources of conflict that cannot be 
dealt with satisfactorily through the application of macro theories 
of world order.’ (Entessar, 1992, p. 1) The very existence of such 
groups in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey has also contributed 
significantly to the domestic and foreign policy-making processes 
of these states in a number of ways. 
 
Accordingly, the focus on a specific contested region (the KRI) 
provides a useful case study for work on identity formation and 
nationalism; and one that should not be ignored by scholars and 
analysts exploring the social and political aspects of these four 
states. By examining the dominant ethnic and nationalist 
discourse(s) in the KRI, this study will contribute to understanding 
of the enduring ethnic and nationalist conflicts in Iraq in particular 
                                 
groups in Iran and Iraq. 
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and in the wider region of Middle East in general. Furthermore, by 
explicating the inner dynamics of nationalist discourse(s) of Iraqi 
Kurds in their relationship with other dominant discourses, this 
study will further contribute to further understanding of the 
situation in the KRI; and provide insight into the nature of 
contemporary ethnic and national relationships in Iraq and the 
Middle East more generally. Finally, this research provides a new 
method for exploring identity formation and nationalism through its 
use of two major social and political theories: ethno-symbolism and 
political discourse theory. While there are limited attempts to utilize 
the former in studies of Kurdish identity and nationalism there have 
been – to my knowledge – no attempts to employ the latter in 
Kurdish studies. The current study may therefore be regarded a 
starting point in this regard, paving the way for further studies to 
utilize similar theoretical and methodological approaches. 
1.5 The argument 
In this research I argue that the Kurdish identity in the KRI is 
formed through the dynamics described above. The long history of 
Kurdish identity formation in Iraq shows that (as for other identity 
groups), there is no ‘essential’ Kurdish identity to which particular 
groups submit themselves. Rather, Kurdish identity has always 
been relative to the identity of others and is socially constructed 
(Romano, 2006; Vali, 2006). A one-dimensional analysis of these 
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processes of identity construction thus runs the risk of ignoring 
important factors, and is likely to lead to reductionism in one form 
or another. Accordingly, a key task of this study is to identify the 
major factors that have contributed to processes of Kurdish identity 
formation in the KRI. It will be argued that Kurdish identity in the 
KRI has been constructed and reconstructed in a relational manner 
vis-à-vis other national identities within and beyond the 
geographical borders of the Iraqi state (the Arab, Turkish and 
Iranian national identities in particular). Therefore, the nature and 
direction of Kurdish identity in Iraq has reflected the nature of these 
relationships.  
 
Following these lines of argument – and drawing on ethno-
symbolism – it can be expected that the dominant Kurdish identity 
in the KRI is constructed around Kurdish ethnicity. The first task of 
this study is to explore how this process occurs. It does not 
necessarily follow from this, however, that Kurdish identity in the 
KRI is homogenous; and the second major task of this study is to 
examine the hypothesis that the Kurdish identity is highly 
contested, reflecting the fragmented nature of Kurdish politics and 
Kurdish social realities. This second issue, I contend, can best be 
approached through the theoretical and methodological tools of 
political discourse theory.  
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In addition, while sharing features with Kurdish identit ies in 
neighbouring states, the Kurdish identity in Iraq has also acquired 
unique features. This point is illustrated by the hegemonic impact 
of Kurdish nationalist ideology in the KRI. This ideology is 
characterized by considerable ambiguity and is affected to a 
considerable extent by the strategic choices of Kurdish political 
parties and their often charismatic leaders (active in Iraq since 
194610). Another equally important argument to make here is that 
the process of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI has gone 
through at least three major phases since 1991. From 1991 to 2003 
it can best be described as an inherently ambiguous ethnic-
nationalist process; whilst from 2003 to 2009 it was chiefly 
characterized by increasing Kurdish nationalist traits. Finally, s ince 
2009 a counter-hegemonic discourse has emerged, challenging a 
traditionally dominant ethnic and revolutionary nationalist identity. 
This contemporary phase, I contend, generates a new dynamic that 
could result in a more civic form of Kurdish identity that can be 
contrasted the traditional ethnic-based identity.  
1.6 Methodology 
Rogers Smith (2003), developed an account of the ‘politics of 
                                 
 10 1946 saw the foundation of the Iraqi version of KDP (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party), the most modern and popular Kurdish political 
organization at the time. It also marks the fall of the first and only 
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. See David McDowall (1996, pp. 287-391). 
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identity’; or, as he calls it elsewhere, the ‘politics of people-
making’. He outlines three ‘stories of peoplehood’ – the economic, 
political power and ethically constitutive – which power identity 
formation (these can be related to the work of Fearon and Laitin 
discussed above). These relate to different (but overlapping) ways 
in which narratives help in processes of identity formation. 
Economic stories utilize material explanations and offer benefits to 
community members who hold the identity in question; political 
power stories promise them political power and/or protection; 
whilst ethically constitutive stories generate group identity through 
identification with ethically grounded values. Ethnic, racial, 
cultural, linguistic and religious identities can be understood as 
utilizing ethically constitutive stories.  
 
Although the three stories are all utilized in processes of identity 
formation, they may perform different functions across time; and 
one or two stories may play a more significant role at any given 
time. This suggests a process in which identities are constructed 
through contestation among elements of the three types of stories 
There is a normative element to Smith’s work, however: he argues, 
that the category of ‘ethically constitutive’ stories is the most 
‘coherent one…that highlights discourses capable of playing vital 
roles in human political life that other types of stories cannot play 
so well’ (2003, p. 61). He justifies this preference by arguing that 
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ethically constitutive categories are ‘harder to discredit via 
empirical evidence than economic and power ones’ (2003, p. 62).  
 
Whilst Smith acknowledges that political identities are not 
autonomous from factors such as economics, demographics, 
language, ancestry, religion, he nevertheless maintains that 
political elites play a significant role in ‘crafting’ identities and 
presenting them to the masses (2003, p. 60). Interestingly, while 
calling for general theorizing in the field, he encourages 
researchers to move beyond taking ‘nations’ as their primary field 
of investigation (2003, p. 52). As a result of the unique and peculiar 
nature of these processes of political identity formation, Smith 
suggests that ‘historically and contextually sensitive’ methods are 
required (2003, p. 53); and while not completely rejecting those 
derived from rational choice approaches, he argues that ‘they 
cannot….go very far in helping us to comprehend the substantive 
appeal and normative significant of particular identities’ (2003, p. 
53).  
 
Given their ontologically significant role in contemporary political 
life, Smith maintains that processes of political identity formation 
demand ‘high priority’ in terms of academic study. Arguing that 
research in this domain may be more accurately addressed via 
‘interpretive’ methodological tools, he states that: 
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Many important aspects of the politics of identity cannot 
be adequately probed without methods that are richly 
‘interpretive,’ that involves grasping the consciousness 
and senses of value and meaning that identities involve 
for human beings who possess them’ (2003, p. 52-3). 
 
These arguments are of considerable use in analyzing Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI. Whether understood as a de facto 
state, a semi-independent region or an autonomous region within 
the broader politico-juridical borders of Iraq, the KRI is a political 
and cultural community; and through discourse and practice 
develops the features of a specific collective identity. Thus, I 
employ a number of Smith’s theoretical insights in the research 
that follows. It is his interpretive methodology that is particularly 
useful for this research, however. I now turn to outline and justify 
the choice of data collection utilized in this research. 
 
1.6.1 Methods of data collection 
In their seminal study The Discursive Construction of National 
Identity, (which takes Austria as case study), Wodak et al. (Wodak, 
et al., 2009, p. 3) incorporate a mixed method of data collection, 
which includes interviews with political elite and ‘ordinary’ people. 
Ordinary people are included in order evaluate the degree to which 
elite discourse is received by the general public. Wodak et al. 
maintain that researching national identity necessitates 
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engagement with a wide range of phenomena, including the 
languages and interactions of ordinary people.  
 
Drawing on these claims, this research combines qualitative 
interviews with political elites with a survey of ordinary people. It 
also utilizes analysis of speech transcripts, political party and 
government documents; as well as visual and live images produced 
by key actors. To this end, a set of primary and secondary data has 
been pooled. This includes semi-structured interviews with a 
number of Kurdish politicians from major political and 
governmental bodies in the KRI; publications produced by political 
parties and government institutions since 1991; publications 
produced by non-partisan groups and organizations; cultural and 
intellectual sources in various forms and genres; and an online 
survey conducted through Facebook (at the time of research, the 
most-popular form of social media in the KRI), designed to capture 
the views of ordinary people in the KRI. While the interviews were 
conducted between 2012 and 2013, the online survey was 
conducted in November and December 2014. Other sources cover 
the period from 1991 to 2014. The two major choices of data 
collection in this study (i.e. in-depth interview and online survey) 
will be evaluated in the proceeding sections. 
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1.6.1.1 Personal interviews 
Language and other semiotic forms of meaning-making stand at 
the heart of processes of identity formation. As a primarily 
qualitative research, this study seeks to explore the dynamic of 
identity formation through the perception of actors who are 
involved directly in the process of Kurdish identity formation in the 
KRI. In this case, that means the political elite. 
 
The method of data collection in this study is based on my 
understanding that the tools of qualitative methods of enquiry may 
be utilised in the best way to address the main research question 
of the study. As Henn et al. note, ‘the logic of qualitative research 
is to explore the meaning that people have of the world around 
them’ (Henn, et al., 2006, p. 179).  
 
The significant role played by political elites in identity-related 
issues are addressed by Van Dijk’s (1993) study on racism in 
Europe. If they play such a substantial role in the European context 
then, in a region such as the KRI (with its long history of political 
conflict, and in which politics penetrates the entire social structure), 
political elites can be regarded as the main actors in collective 
identity formation. In addition to qualitative data pertinent to the 
discourse of the KRI’s political elite (such as speech transcripts, 
formal media interviews, and political party documents), in-depth 
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face-to-face interviews are regarded as a complementary mode of 
access (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 18). This is of significant importance 
given the importance of the party form in Kurdish politics 
(expanded on below in the discussion of the concept of 
‘particracy’).  
 
The methodology utilized in this study is further informed by its 
theoretical framework. To this end, a number of face-to-face 
interviews have been conducted with selected politicians in the KRI. 
Though it cannot be claimed that the sample units of the personal 
interviews conducted for this study (the politicians, in other words) 
represent the entirety of political institutions in the KRI, the 
selection is justified as interviewees are drawn from the main 
political parties and the key political institutions in the KRI.  
 
The discourse analysis provided in chapter seven is built around the 
theoretical framing of PDT. Therefore, the analysis will be formed 
around a set of themes outlined earlier in the chapter. Further 
detailed analysis will be provided through the utilization of the 
relevant methodological tools of PDT, such as the logics of 
‘equivalent and difference’. 
1.6.1.2 The online survey 
It has been suggested that surveys are the best available means 
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to obtain information about peoples’ opinion, values and behaviour 
(Fink, 2013, p. 24; Murphy, et al., 2014, p. 16). However, the 
online survey model has yet to gain full acceptance in the social 
sciences. It has been argued, for example, that any sample taking 
internet users cannot claim generalisation of inference (Fricker, jr., 
2008, p. 206). Nevertheless, taking into account the relatively 
large levels of internet usage in the KRI, the use of online surveys 
is likely to enhance the coverage size of any survey undertaken. 
Whilst Iraq as a whole has a very low internet usage level (or 
‘internet penetration’), standing at only, 9.2% of the total 
population in 2013 (ITU, 2015), it has been reported that the KRI 
has the lion’s share of overall internet use compared to the rest of 
Iraq (7% of the 9.2% mentioned above, as of 2014) 
(Macropolis.net, 2008). Indeed, the KRI is the main source of 
internet provision to the rest of Iraq (Smith, 2014). This is largely 
due to the fact that internet (and other developed communication 
technologies) were introduced to the KRI ahead of the rest of Iraq 
before the 2003 regime change in Baghdad. Another factor may be 
the comparably more developed social and economic conditions in 
the KRI. Facebook was chosen as an appropriate forum to conduct 
the survey as 77% of internet users in Iraq use Facebook (Arab 
Advisors Group, 2013), whilst in the KRI around 50% of internet 
users use Facebook (Invest in Group, 2013). The Facebook survey 
utilized the ‘Convenience’ method. This is appropriate given the 
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nature of the study, which is to explore the perceptions and 
opinions of the general public in the KRI.  
 
There are, however, drawbacks to the surveying method utilized in 
this study. As a primarily qualitative study, it is not possible to 
claim generalizability (Henn, et al., 2006, p. 157). Whilst the 
primary objective is to enable a better understanding of the social 
and political process of Kurdish identity formation in KRI, it cannot 
be said that the Facebook users who responded represent the 
entire population of KRI. This may result in coverage bias (Fricker, 
jr., 2008, p. 198). However, every effort has been made to include 
a balanced number of participants according to a range of 
categories, including geographical area, gender, education, and 
possible political support. This has been facilitated by the 
establishment of a large Facebook friendship network, which was 
then encourage to share the survey, allowing a ‘snowballing’ 
enlargement of reach, albeit one that differs from conventional 
uses of the term.11 In addition, the use of snowballing helps to 
formulate a typical number of cases rather than a representative 
portion of the general population (Henn, et al., 2006, p. 156). 
Another common limitation may be the issue of low response rate 
                                 
11 The snowballing method is normally used in studies where the sample 
consists of rare cases or those who may be difficult to reach (drug users, 
for example). However, Facebook allows for the expansion of this 
method beyond its common use (Fricker, jr., 2008, p. 200). 
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or nonresponse, given the total response number of 410 
(considered modest but reasonable). Whilst there are a number of 
reasons why people may not have responded to a survey on 
controversial area of political identity in the KRI, the survey frame 
population (those eligible to participate) was wide, allowing any 
Facebook user12 who would came across the survey link to 
participate.13 Thus, the degree of nonresponse does not 
automatically result in ‘nonresponse bias’. A further issue here is 
‘item nonresponse’, which sees particular questions skipped or 
ignored by respondents (Hen et al, 2006, p. 198). In the case of 
this survey, just over 15% of respondents skipped at least one 
question. However, this issue has been taken into account in the 
presentation of survey results through showing the total number of 
responses to each particular question.  
 
Finally, the choice of questions employed in the survey is grounded 
in the theories adopted for this study and is designed to test the 
hypotheses arrived at (Fink, 2013, p. 10). A mixed approach to 
data analysis is adopted, according to which the quantitative results 
of the survey are analysed and discussed in line with the overall 
                                 
12 The ‘post stratification’ process allows for the disregarding of ineligible 
respondents before the final statistical analysis. 
13 This type of survey is typical of ‘unrestricted, self-selected’ surveys, in 
which people respond to open survey invitations. (Couper, 2011, p. 6) 
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qualitative method of analysis adopted for the study. 
1.7 Structure of this study 
The structure of this study can be outlined as follows: chapter two 
is devoted to a detailed review of the relevant literature on the KRI, 
with a particular focus on studies that engage with Kurdish identity 
formation in the KRI since 1991. The chapter provides a critical 
discussion of these studies in order to explore the relevance of 
these studies to the current research.  
 
Chapter three provides a detailed historical overview of the KRI. It 
goes beyond common prescriptive historical overviews of the 
region to provide a preliminary analysis, which connects with more 
in-depth analysis in proceeding analytical chapters. As national 
identity is deeply rooted in historical accounts of the nation and 
people, I open the chapter with a discussion of the main historical 
accounts of Kurdish identity in general, which demonstrates that 
the emergence of the KRI in 1991 should not be understood as a 
historical accident. On the contrary, to better understand the KRI 
it is important to trace its roots in the development of the Iraqi 
state prior to 1991 (O'Leary & Salih, 2005, p. 22). To this end, the 
second stage of my historical overview begins with the end of the 
Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Iraqi state: the time at 
which Kurdish nationalism was in its infancy. I also pay attention 
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to the relatively unstudied period between 1958 and 1991, which 
saw the first and most popular Kurdish nationalist struggle against 
the central Iraqi Government (between 1961 and 1975). The final 
period I engage with forms the focal point for this study, starting 
in March 1991 and continuing until the end of 2014 analysis of this 
period demonstrates the suitability of the KRI as a case study, 
demonstrating the importance of developments in the period for 
processes of identity formation. 
 
In the first section of chapter four, Anthony Smith’s ethno-
symbolism approach is critically analysed and brought into dialogue 
with other approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. The 
second section assesses its theoretical relevance to the present 
study. Here, ethno-symbolism’s applicability to the Kurdish case 
will be highlighted with more focus on its merits and limitations in 
this regard. In chapter five, analysis of the cultural level is 
undertaken. Utilizing a set of themes derived from ethno-
symbolism, processes of Kurdish identity formation are subjected 
to discussion. The study’s primary and secondary data are 
subjected to a thorough analysis in order to determine the cultural 
and historical manifestations of Kurdish identity formation from 
1991 to the end of 2014. 
 
Political discourse theory is dealt with exclusively in chapter six. 
 32 
 
The theory is subjected to a critical assessment by exposing its 
ontological and methodological structures; and its key concepts are 
explicated. As with chapter four, the second part of the chapter 
serves as a preliminary application of the theory to the formation 
of Kurdish cultural identity in the KRI. In chapter seven, PDT is 
applied to the primary and secondary data. Working along a set of 
purposefully selected theoretical themes, Kurdish identity 
formation in Iraq is discussed through an analysis of the available 
data.  
 
Finally, in the conclusion, the analytical outcomes derived from the 
previous two chapters are examined in order to establish a 
relationship between the two. The final results of the research are 
compared to the hypotheses noted earlier; and answers to the 
research questions are offered.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The study of Kurdish politics and identity has progressed 
significantly since 1991. Prior to then, non-state actors were largely 
excluded from the political sciences (and the study of international 
politics in particular), which were overwhelmingly state-centric. 
Thus, as non-state actors, Kurds were studied at the margins of 
state-oriented studies or were entirely excluded. However, the 
post-Cold-War period proved to be more accommodating to intra-
state issues, with an increasing interest in the ‘micro-politics’ of 
peoples as opposed to the ‘macro-politics’ of states. The 1991 
events in the Middle East – in particular those which followed Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war, the first international 
intervention of its kind since the Cold War – created a new 
environment that led to the creation of the de facto autonomous 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq.1 The political entity that emerged in the 
                                 
 1 On October 15th 2005 the new Iraqi constitution was ratified. In it, the 
name ‘the Kurdistan Region’ was agreed upon. Prior to that, the region 
would have been referred to using a wide range of names and 
descriptions. These shifting terms are reflected in literature on the 
region as well: in the course of this review, numerous titles will appear, 
‘Kurdistan Region-Iraq’, ‘Kurdistan-Iraq’, and ‘the Kurdistan Region in 
Iraq’. Descriptive titles used ‘de facto autonomous region’, ‘Quasi-State’, 
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aftermath of Desert Storm – the military operation2 led by the USA 
and allied forces – created a unique opportunity for emergence of 
the Kurdish entity. As Michael Gunter notes, ‘the Kurdish problem, 
that earlier had languished on the back burner of international 
concerns, has now been internationalised.’ (Gunter, 1993, p. 313) 
Indeed, the KRI has now been analysed by a number of academic 
studies. The Kurdish case has never before been spelled out in the 
academic and scholarly circles comparably to the post-1991 period.  
 
In 1991 Iraq attacked Kurds and Shi’ites living in the country in 
retaliation for an uprising against Iraqi forces in March of that year. 
In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, which 
contains only the second explicit reference to the Kurds in a UN 
document (the first being the Sévres treaty of 1920). This called 
on the Iraqi government to halt military operations against civilians 
                                 
‘semi-state’, ‘semi-independent’, ‘autonomous’ and so on. My preferred 
title however, is Kurdistan Region-Iraq, as this is officially correct and 
distinguishes it from other Kurdish semi-autonomous zones, including 
‘Iranian Kurdistan’,’ Turkish Kurdistan’, which are less common outside 
the literature of Kurdish nationalism. 
 2 The operation was a significant military operation that formed part of 
the Gulf War (August 2nd 1990 to 28th February 1991) between the Allied 
forces (led by the United States of America) against the Iraqi forces, and 
followed the latter’s invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 under the 
pretext of annexation of Kuwait as Iraq’s nineteenth province. After 
diplomatic efforts failed to persuade Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to 
withdraw forces from Kuwait, the Allied forces began Desert Storm on 
17th January 1991. It lasted until 28th February 1991 after the defeat of 
Iraqi forces and their retreat into Iraq (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, pp. 
86-91). 
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in the north and south of the country. However, it proved 
insufficient in deterring the threat posed by the Iraqi forces to 
Kurdish civilians and an unprecedented number of Kurds –around 
1.5 million – fled towards the Iranian and Turkish borders. In 
response, the USA, UK and France (with Turkish assistance) 
created a no-fly-zone, which was part of ‘Operation Provide 
Comfort’. This was designed to protect Kurdish civilians in the north 
from further attacks by the Iraqi forces (Frelick, 1993, pp. 231-
237; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 34-41).  
 
Prior to 1991, anyone studying Iraqi Kurds would have found it 
difficult to gather enough literature on the subject. However, since 
the events detailed in the previous paragraph, scholars, journalists, 
historians and policy-makers have engaged with the Iraqi Kurdish 
case from a number of angles and in varying amounts of detail, 
meaning there is now a considerable amount of writing (including 
academic work) on the issue. However, it can be argued that 
academic work on Kurdish issues (what might be referred to as 
‘Kurdish Studies’) still remains underdeveloped, particularly with 
regard to the KRI. Significant areas of Kurdish political, social and 
economic life escape analysis. Thus, as part of my research I have 
selected a number of relevant studies on the political development 
of the KRI. In line with the overall goal of this research, however, 
I have chosen works that directly engage with the specific issue of 
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Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. Specifically, I engage with 
those that address the issue from 1991 to 2014.  
 
In this chapter I engage in a critical discussion of these works and 
assess their contribution to the study of Kurdish identity and 
nationalism in the KRI. Based on their theoretical starting points, I 
distribute the studies according to their overriding themes. In no 
particular order, these themes are as follows. 
2.2 Ethnic identity 
In his book The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National 
Identity in Kurdistan Region-Iraq, the Kurdish scholar Mahir Aziz 
examines the process of identity formation in the KRI by employing 
ethno-symbolism as the theoretical basis for his study. After 
assessing the theoretical conceptions of the approach against the 
background of competing ‘modernist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ 
theories, he argues that ethno-symbolism is best suited to the 
topic. Assessing KRI residents’ sense of collective identity against 
six theoretical hypotheses drawn from ethno-symbolism, he argues 
that the political community of the KRI constitutes an ‘ideal ethnic 
community’. However, he does not consider the issue of nation-
ness, as per Smith’s work. Smith defines an ethnic community – or 
‘ethnie’ – as: 
A named human community connected to a homeland, 
possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memory, 
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one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure 
of solidarity, at least among the elites. (Smith, 2008, p. 
13) 
 
For Aziz, Iraqi Kurds constitute an ethnic community: he argues 
that many of the six criteria laid down in Smith’s definition can be 
found in the KRI. The first of these is the ‘collective name’, and Aziz 
shows that the terms ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdistan’ have been used for 
around 2,000 years (Aziz, 2011, pp. 33-39). He further argues that 
‘Kurdistan had a collective name for its ethnic community by which 
it distinguished itself and continue to distinguish itself from others .’ 
(2011, p. 34)’  
 
The second criterion Aziz believes Kurds meet is common ancestry. 
He points to the ‘memory of Kurdish common history, its golden 
ages, heroes, myths and symbols’; and further argues that their 
importance for Kurdish self-awareness as far back as the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries should be regarded as clear 
indicators of a solid ethnic identity among Kurds. Further, Aziz 
recalls Kurdish association with an ancestral ‘golden age’ of Kurdish 
emirates and principalities under Islamic rule in the seventh 
century; with the Medes; and with the legendary Kawa the 
Blacksmith, ‘Kawey Asinger’.3  
                                 
3 Medes were an ancient Iranian people to whom Kurds associate 
themselves. Kawa the Blacksmith, is a mythical heroic character who 
fought against the ancient Iranian Tyrant Zahak. In Kurdish nationalist 
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The third criterion met by the Kurds is ‘historical memory’. Here, 
Aziz relies solely on the Newroz feast, which falls annually on the 
21st of March. He considers Newroz ‘an essentially Kurdish 
practice’, through which Kurds draw ethnic lines between 
themselves and others, although caution must be exercised here.4  
 
The fourth criterion is ‘shared culture’. Here, Aziz points to the role 
of language and religion. He rightly argues that whilst the Kurdish 
language is the primary ‘differentiating mark’ of Kurds, he notes 
that it is not the sole one. His argument here may well be grounded 
in the fact that Kurds still lack a universal national language: even 
in the KRI there is no a universal official language. Religion, 
however, is even less straightforward. Whilst Aziz notes that 
Yezidism is an essentially Kurdish religion, only a minority of Kurds 
are Yezidi (the overwhelming majority are Muslim). Consequently, 
Aziz argues that religion has not been a distinguishing marker for 
ethnic Kurds.  
                                 
historiography Kawa is considered as a Kurd and his story is 
incorporated in the myth of Newroz which is also a Kurdish and Iranian 
feast falls on 21s t March each colander year. Further discussions on these 
two issues are provided in chapters three and five.  
 4 Other ethnic and national groups in the Middle East also celebrate 
Newroz. Nonetheless, since the early twentieth century Newroz has been 
successfully re-appropriated in the Kurdish nationalist historiography 
and has been well incorporated into the Kurdish nationalist discourse, 
increasing its association with Kurdish identity. This issue is explored 
more fully in chapter five. 
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Aziz argues that the criterion of ‘homeland’ or ‘territory’ has a 
particular importance for Kurds, whose association with the 
concept of ‘Kurdistan’ ‘became an essential part of the collective 
memory and identity of the Kurds’ (2011, p. 36). This relates to 
‘solidarity’, the final criterion met by Kurds. Aziz argues that this 
operates through Kurds’ feeling of ‘belonging’ to Kurdistan. This 
sense of belonging to a common homeland and sharing its history 
engenders a sense of ‘sameness’ among Kurds; and produces 
solidarity in the sense of sharing a destiny. 
 
Throughout The Kurds of Iraq, Aziz places considerable importance 
on the territorial aspect of ‘nation’, meaning that he overlooks other 
important dimensions. He argues that the newly emerged form of 
collective identity in the KRI after 1991 – and in particular from 
1998 to 2008 – revolves around a territorial understanding of 
Kurdistan. Thus, ‘Kurdistani’ – or ‘Kurdstanyati’5 – is the prevailing 
form of identity post-1998. Taking university students as his 
research population, he reports that identifying oneself with 
Kurdistan has replaced other forms of identification, especially that 
                                 
5 These claims are not included in the book but were discussed during 
presentation of his paper at a conference entitled ‘The Kurds and 
Kurdistan: identity, politics and history’, on 2-3 April 2009 at the Centre 
for Kurdish Studies in Exeter, England. The paper was titled ‘The Three 
Phases of Kurdish Nationalism: Kurdawari, Kurdayeti and Kurdstanyati’. 
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of ‘Iraqi’ or ‘Iraqi Kurd’. The form Kurdistani in Aziz’s study is the 
latest development from ‘Kurdayeti’ or ‘working to achieve Kurdish 
nationalist aspiration’ (Hassanpour, 2003). The preceding form 
‘Kurdayeti’ is arguably more deeply ingrained in ethnic nationalist 
sentiments, while ‘Kurdistani’ suggests more territorial and civic 
traits. Aziz argues that prior to 1991 the more ethnic nationalist 
form of ‘Kurdayeti’ prevailed in the KRI and in Kurdish nationalist 
discourse, but that this has changed dramatically since 1991, with 
‘Kurdistani’ coming to dominate.  
 
Given that Aziz argues that the term ‘Kurdistani’ is territorially 
rather than ethnically grounded, there is an explicit circular 
argument in his work for, he asserts that the basis for 
contemporary Kurdish identity in the KRI is primarily ethnic. Thus, 
there seems to be a tension between the two forms that constitute 
Anthony Smith’s ‘dichotomy of nationalisms’ (civic and ethnic 
nationalism). Here, it is worth referring back to the original 
conceptualizations of these two types of nationalism by engaging 
with Smith (who himself draws on the work of Hans Kohn [1967]). 
For Smith, ‘civic nationalism’ is a rational and associational form, 
which perceives the nation as ‘a rational association of citizens 
bound by common laws and a shared territory’ (Smith, 2001, pp. 
39-40). Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is characterised as 
‘organic and mystical’ (Smith, 1991, p. 80); and perceives the 
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nation ‘as an organic seamless whole, transcending the individual 
members, and stamping them from birth with an indelible national 
character.’ (Smith, 2008, p. 40) 
 
Of further importance in Smith’s theory is the assignation of each 
form of nationalism to particular nationalists and peoples. 
Territorial nationalism is mostly associated with pre-independence, 
anti-colonial nationalist movements who generally perceive of the 
nation in a civic and territorial manner; and post-independence 
movements, which hold a civic and territorial notion of the nation. 
They seek to create their new nation-state and incorporate all 
ethnic identities into their new civic nation (Smith, 1991, p. 82).  
 
As a pre-independence national movement it is clear that the KRI 
belongs to Smith’s first formula. However, I very much doubt the 
claim that contemporary Kurdish nationalism’s perception of the 
nation is fully civic in character. Furthermore, while territorial 
claims are important for Kurds in the KRI, these claims are 
secondary to the identity of the Kurdish people and not the other 
way around. In other words, the territory of Kurdistan only obtains 
its full meaning when it is associated with ethnic Kurds. Indeed, the 
etymology of ‘Kurdistan’ is evidence to this claim, as it refers to 
‘the land of Kurds’. Therefore, the argument about a territorially 
defined ‘Kurdistani’ is a circular argument when weighed against 
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the very theoretical postulates of ethno-symbolism. 
 
Whilst a civic form of identity has emerged in the KRI since 1991, 
it was not until the late 2000s that this became evident in political 
discourse. Furthermore, its emergence has been ingrained in post-
2003 counter-discourses of identity; particularly since the 2009 
general elections in which the traditional ethnic nationalist 
discourses of the two dominant Kurdish parties (the KDP and the 
PUK) were challenged by calls for a notion of citizenship (‘Hawlati’) 
to replace more traditional forms of identification.  
 
This counter-discourse of citizenship has been articulated in the 
work of young, critical Kurdish writers such as Bakhtyar Ali, 
Mariwan Qanie and Aras Fatah, who wrote sporadically in 
independent and semi-independent journals such as Azadi 
(‘Freedom’), Yekgrtin (‘Unification’) and Rahand (‘Dimension’) as 
far back as the 1990s and early 2000s. These arguments were then 
popularized in 2001 by the first independent Kurdish newspaper 
Hawlati (unsurprisingly, this translates as Citizen). It is worth 
noting that this counter-discourse initially developed in elite-
oriented writings before being manifested in non-partisan or 
independent media and finally translating to mass political 
movements.  
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The difference between the civic form suggested by Aziz and the 
explanation of the emerging civic form I am outlining here is that, 
for Aziz, the ‘civic’ is derived from the notion of ‘Kurdistan’ as a 
territory to which people attach themselves (particularly since 
1998); as opposed to ‘Kurdayeti’, which relates to ethnic origin. On 
the contrary, my understanding of the emerging civic form of 
Kurdish identity in the KRI post-2003 is based on the claim that the 
emerging political and social atmosphere – best described by 
Gareth Stansfield as the ‘institutionalization’ of the KRG – and the 
emergence of a bourgeoning civil society has created space for the 
emergence of a collective identity with more civic traits than of 
ethnic ones. In other words, the civic character of the new 
‘Kurdistani’ form does not originate solely from attachment to a 
territory rather than an ethnic origin. Rather, it has been a 
constituent feature of the social and political transformations in the 
KRI since 2003. This character was widely manifested in the 2009 
general elections. This argument is expanded upon in chapter 
seven. 
2.3 Political space 
Denise Natali’s approach to the KRI – outlined in two books – differs 
significantly from other approaches to the case. The prevai ling 
outlook in her first book The Kurds and the State: Evolving National 
Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran (2005), which comes first to her 
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later book The Kurdish Quasi-state: Development and Democracy 
in Post-Gulf war Iraq (2010) is structuralist. Broadly speaking, 
Natali seeks to explain the history of Kurdish identity formation and 
Kurdish nationalism by examining the socioeconomic and political 
contingencies during three historical periods. This is undertaken 
through the use of an analytic framework she names ‘political 
space’. Each of these four historical periods, Natali argues, can be 
characterised by their particular ‘political space’, which placed 
limits on how Kurdish identity and nationalist discourse could 
operate; and dictated the nature of this discourse.  
 
The first historical period she analyses is the late imperial period in 
which the Ottoman and Qajar Empires (the two multi-ethnic super 
states which ruled Kurdish inhabited lands at the time) were 
defined through religious affiliation and loyalty to tribe and Sultan, 
rather than ethnicity. She argues that Kurdish identity during that 
time was subject to the political and social structure described 
above, which lacked affinity with ethnic group or community.  
 
The second period begins with the end the First World War and 
covers Iraq’s development into a colonial state, ending with the 
collapse of the Iraqi monarchy in a coup d’état in 1958. As a result 
of the continuing tribal nature of Kurdish society; and the 
ambivalent relationship between tribal elites and urban 
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nationalists, Kurdish identity and nationalist discourse during this 
period suffered from the ambiguity that characterized the Ottoman 
period. However, there was a gradual change to the political space 
in which the Kurds operated, which moved toward Sunni Arab 
ethnic-nationalist tendencies. Kurdish identity and nationalist 
discourse fluctuated between tribal and primordial loyalties; 
independence tendencies and patriotic Iraqi tendencies. At times, 
ethnic affinities were also apparent. However, Natali argues that 
due to newly emerging intra-Kurdish tensions between tribalists, 
leftists and nationalists, the Kurdish nationalist discourse failed to 
crystallize around an ethnic core.  
 
The third historical period of Natali’s analysis begins with the 1958 
coup d’état mastered by the Sunni Arab Abd al-Karim Qasim and 
lasts until the Gulf War in 1991. She argues that the political space 
in this time was initially characterised by an inclusive form of Iraqi 
patriotism called (‘Wataniya’). This was a form of Arab nationalism 
and saw the development of an ‘Iraqi first’ strategy, which was 
inclusive of Kurds. However, parallel to the growing of a more 
ethnically oriented Arab nationalism called (‘Qawmyah’) from the 
part of the dominant Arab Iraqi government, Kurdish identity and 
Kurdish nationalist discourse became increasingly focussed on 
ethnicity. Although this period was marked by considerable conflict, 
with various Iraqi Arabic forces and ideologies interacting violently, 
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it offered a seemingly unique opportunity to the Kurds, culminating 
in the March Accord of 1970. As a result of the gap between Iraqi 
government discourse and policy the Kurdish nationalist discourse 
became increasingly ethnic-based. The trend towards ethnicity 
further increased later, in response to increasingly discriminatory 
policies adopted by the Ba’athist government, which ruled Iraq 
following another coup in 1963; and was deepened following the 
collapse of the Kurdish revolution (begun in 1961 by Mela Mustafa 
Barzani) in 1975 and continued until the 1980s. Natali also notes 
that the single party Ba’athist rule from 1975 to 1991 further 
deepened the gap between Kurds and Arabs. They utilized 
exclusionist discourse and policies in promoting the ‘Arabization’6 
of Iraq; and brutally oppressed Kurds.  
 
However, Natali shows more interest in the economic policies of 
                                 
 6 This was a process through which Kurds and other non-Arab residents 
were forcibly moved either to the central or southern parts of Iraq or 
deep into the Kurdistan Region and were replaced by Arabs from the 
south. The process mostly affected the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and mixed 
areas of Khanaqin and the Mosul and Duhok provinces. The process 
began in the mid-1960s, continued through the 1970s and 1980s but 
dramatically intensified after 1991 when a new ‘normalization’ of 
nationality was introduced, according to which Kurds and non-Arab 
residents had to choose between leaving areas or declaring themselves 
Arabs. According to this ‘normalization’ procedure, Kurds, Turkmen and 
other non-Arab residents were forced to sign a (false) statement stating 
they were originally Arabs but had changed their nationality, and that 
they wished to reclaim their original Arabic nationality. Article 140 of the 
2005 Iraqi constitution was introduced to tackle the issue of Arabization, 
but the policy had by then had dramatic demographic effects on the 
regions affected. For more details on the Arabization process see 
(Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, pp. 144-181). 
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Ba’athist Iraq, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan where the government 
was able to co-opt large number of Kurdish tribal leaders and their 
subjects to join the Jash7  (or Jaș in Latin Kurdish spelling) militia, 
which fought alongside government forces against their Kurdish 
brethren in return to attractive regular salaries. The situation was 
further exacerbated by the Ba’ath Party’s deliberate policy to 
transform Iraqi Kurdistan from a productive society into a 
consumerist rent-seeking one.8 Against Natali’s economic focus, 
however, it can be argued that Ba’athist nationalist policies, which 
introduced demographically altered Kirkuk and other mixed areas; 
and their Arabization policies in the education and cultural systems 
in Iraqi Kurdistan were the most significant factors in shifting 
Kurdish nationalist discourse towards a focus on ethnicity.  
 
The fourth and final period covered in Natali’s analysis begins with 
the Kurdish uprising of March 1991. Like many observers and 
students of Kurdish studies, Natali argues that the period is unique 
in a number of ways. To elaborate, she notes that it was the first 
time since the creation of the Iraqi state that Iraqi Kurds could act 
autonomously in the sphere of politics. This opportunity was 
                                 
7 Jash literally means ‘donkey’s foal’ and is a derogatory term used by 
Kurds fpr those who collaborate with the ‘enemy’, in particular through 
fighting in an irregular army. (Gurbuz, 2012) 
 8 Refers to Ba’ath Socialist Party, the party which was found in 1941 and 
ruled Iraq exclusively since 1968 until 2003. 
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facilitated by the structural conditions that emerged in the 
aftermath of Saddam’s expulsion from Kuwait by Allied forces. 
Despite the numerous upheavals Iraq experienced in the period, it 
provided a unique political space in which Kurdish identity took on 
a number of different meanings, whilst Kurdish nationalism 
underwent enormous transformations, which continue into the 
present. Natali rightly claims that while this political space 
prevented independence and hindered the development of pan-
Kurdish tendencies, it helped Kurdish identity and nationalism in 
the KRI to flourish. Further, she claims that whilst Kurdish identity 
remained welded to the concept of Kurdish uniqueness, it was able 
to operate within a broader Iraqi context. The ethnic character of 
the Kurdish identity, however took root after 2003 as a result of 
increased tensions between the KRG and Baghdad following 
growing Kurdish territorial demands in Kirkuk and other disputed 
areas; the nature of the Iraqi constitution; and the sharing of power 
and revenues.  
 
Through her structuralist account of Kurdish identity formation in 
relation to the Iraqi state, Natali also explores processes of 
boundary formation in ethnic and nationalist relations. She argues 
that the nature of Kurdish identity and the vocabulary of Kurdish 
nationalism shifted along boundaries drawn by dominant Iraqi Arab 
rulers. Whenever ethnic lines delineated these boundaries, Kurdish 
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identity also incorporated ethnic elements in order to distinguish 
itself from the competing Arab majority in Baghdad. However, 
when, the Iraqi government utilized more cosmopolitan methods – 
during the early days of the Iraqi Republic under Qasim, for 
example – Kurdish ethnic identity was relatively contained (in effect 
tying itself to Iraqi identity); and Kurds primarily focussed on 
demanding cultural, economic and social rights equal to those of 
‘other Iraqis’. Thus, following the rules of Qasim (1963), Abdul 
Salam Arif (1966) and Abdul Rahman Arif (1968) and the Ba’ath 
Party’s retreat from its promises to the Kurds in 1974 (when it 
switched to the Qawmyah, pan-Arabic approach), the Kurdish focus 
on ethnic identity becomes more explicit.  
 
Natali’s first study only covers the period up to 2000. Since then, 
the ethnic-nationalist trajectory of Kurdish identity and discourse 
has been furthered. Whilst the long continuation of British state-
building policies in Iraq from the 1920s – which favoured the 
minority Sunni Arabs over the majority Shi’ite Arabs and the Iraqi 
Kurds – meant that both Kurds and Shi’ites were alienated and 
politically marginalised until 2003 (effectively making them 
brothers in oppression), events following the war dramatically 
changed the equation). By 2003 Arab Shi’ites were rulers of the 
new Iraq, while Kurds (despite their active and dominant role in 
the initial years after the 2003 Iraqi regime change) and Sunni 
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Arabs constituted the ruled groups. As the Shi’ite majority was now 
directing Iraqi nation-building, they found themselves in a situation 
of competition with both Kurds and Sunnis. Furthermore, active 
Kurdish involvement in the process of regime change meant that 
they were perceived by Sunni Arabs to have betrayed them 
(Gunter, 2008, p. 19). Thus, the new ethnic boundaries that were 
drawn after 2003 left the Kurds opposed by both Sunni and Shi’ite 
Arabs alike, further increasing the ethnic gap between the three 
components. This new ‘political space’ also influenced Kurdish 
identity and re-shaped Kurdish nationalist discourse, making 
ethnicity a more visible trait than ever before.  
2.4 The X factor 
Political space is not the only relevant concept in Natali’s work. In 
her later book The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and 
Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq, (2010) she focuses on the 
determining role played by external aid in fostering the Kurdish 
political identity in Iraq after 1991. For reasons related to the 
domestic and international position of the KRG, Natali names the 
KRI a ‘quasi-state’. She explains that the key factor in its 
emergence as such since 1991 is the external aid received by 
Kurdistan. Following the March 1991 uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan – 
in which the region freed itself from the hands of the Iraqi regime 
and established its regional government – one of its main 
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challenges came from Iraq’s damaged economy.  
 
Although the KRI was outside central Iraqi government control, the 
UN treated it as part of Iraq, meaning that it was – paradoxically – 
condemned by the economic blockade imposed on the Iraqi 
government following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To make things 
worse, the Iraqi government imposed a further economic blockade 
on the region. Damaged by this double blockade, lifelines were 
provided by international NGOs and organizations associated with 
the UN. From 1991 to 1997, the KRI was almost entirely reliant on 
goods and services provided by external aid (there was also a small 
amount of illegal cross-border trading with neighbouring states).  
 
Natali divides the provision of external aid into three phases (1992-
1997, 1997-2003, and 2003-present) and notes that it has done 
much good for Iraqi Kurds with regards to living standards and 
governance assistance. However, she notes that it has slowed 
moves toward greater autonomy or independence in two key ways. 
Firstly, it has created a patron-client relation with the international 
community, which is generally hostile to the nationalist separatist 
tendencies of Kurdish nationalist parties. Secondly, it has tied the 
KRG to the Iraqi central government, as UN bureaucracy is obliged 
to work through the ‘sovereign’ Iraqi state. As a landlocked 
territory, the KRI could not have dispensed with Iraq at this point. 
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While Natali is correct to note the significance of external aid in 
maintaining everyday life for the population of the KRI following 
the twin blockade crisis of March 1991, she overlooks the 
importance of other factors without which there would have been 
no social, political and cultural foundations for this aid to build on. 
While Natali does not deny the role of other variables such as 
symbolic and cultural and political ones, at the meantime, she gives 
a very secondary value to these and other factors. Thus, Natali’s 
approach suffers from a deep economic reductionism, 
characteristic of the neoliberal approaches in political science. 
 
One could argue that as Aziz and Natali examine the KRI from two 
different angles they come up with two different analyses of and 
explanations for the nature of Kurdish collective identity in the KRI. 
Aziz studies the trajectories of Kurdish identity formation from 
within and observes the shift from a more ethnic-based identity to 
one grounded in territory. On the contrary, Natali explores the 
issue from outside – at the level of the wider Iraqi state – and 
observes a more ethnically-oriented identity in the KRI. Thus, it 
could be said that the outcomes of the two authors are quite 
natural, as Kurdish identity formation inside the KRI is largely 
shaped by internal politics and social and economic realities. In the 
meantime, the form of Kurdish identity demonstrated in Natali’s 
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study is the product of a context in which Kurds interact with 
outside ‘others’ – be they majority Arabs in Baghdad; or 
neighbouring countries and their respective national groups. 
However, neither Aziz nor Natali is able to fully appreciate the role 
of these ‘others’ in Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. My 
analysis will hopefully move to fill this gap. The effects of the ‘other’ 
variable on the formation of Kurdish identity in the KRI is covered 
in greater detail in chapter seven through the constructionist 
approach of PDT. 
2.5 Structural factors 
Another scholar who has written extensively on the KRI is Gareth 
Stansfield. He offers a seemingly modernist explanation of identity 
formation processes that have been taking place in the KRI since 
1991. Like Natali, he considers the Oil-for-Food programme, which 
actively started in March 1997, as a ‘catalyst’ in the 
institutionalization of the KRG such that it became, in effect, the 
sole form of government in the KRI. This in effect, bolstered the 
newly emerging Kurdish identity. He further argues that this 
process means that ‘Kurds in their 20s now struggle to remember 
what life was like under the Ba’ath regime and associate the word 
“government” with Kurdish rather than Iraqi rule.’ (Stansfield, 
2003a, p. 134; 2003b, pp. 78,82)9 While he sounded a pessimistic 
                                 
 9  Michael Gunter’s explicates the same understanding towards the KRI 
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note about the political future of the KRI in 2003 (Stansfield, 
2003a), on the ten year anniversary of the eve of the American 
invasion he went so far as to forecast the establishment of the 
‘Republic of Kurdistan’ in 2016. The changes that lead to this 
prediction were triggered by a number of internal and external 
factors; and have changed the status of Kurds from ‘objects’ of 
history to major ‘subjects’ of history:  
In virtually every conceivable aspect, the Kurdistan 
Region has become an entity that possesses the 
necessary domestic attributes (such as a sense of 
nationhood and cohesiveness of Kurdish society and 
territory), governmental competence…and regional 
alliances (most notably the Ankara-Erbil axis) to move 
from being a region of Iraq to the Republic of Kurdistan. 
(Stansfield, 2013, p. 268) 
 
While Stansfield seems particularly interested in the economic and 
structural dimensions of these Kurdish ‘subjects’, he also 
acknowledges internal dimensions, paying attention to Kurds’ 
feelings and attitudes towards their ‘imagined community of 
Kurdistan’. However, as noted above, this internal dimension is 
secondary to external structural factors, as demonstrated by the 
extent to which regional and international politics remain 
favourably disposed to the KRI. (2013, p. 278) 
 
Although his analysis of the political and economic development of 
                                 
(Gunter, 2008, p. 40). 
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the KRI is excellent, with in-depth analysis of events and 
developments, Stansfield’s studies do not engage directly with the 
process of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. However, 
engaging with the rich content of his work will enhance any study 
on processes of identity formation in the region, and so they are 
important for the current research. 
2.6 Identity as cultural variable 
Another particularly interesting and relevant study to this research 
is David Romano’s The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, 
Modernization and Identity (2006). In it, Romano analyses Kurdish 
nationalist movements in Iraq, Iran and Turkey in the twentieth 
century from a social movement studies perspective. 
Understanding that a comprehensive study of these movements 
cannot be achieved using a single theory, Romano opts for a 
synthesis of three different approaches in order to address the 
inner dynamics of Kurdish nationalist movements in the states 
mentioned; addressing structural, rational and cultural dimensions. 
While the structural dimension engages with the intra-state and 
inter-state conditions within which the Kurdish nationalist 
movement operates, the rational dimension is approached by 
analysing the ‘resource mobilisation’ strategies adopted by these 
movements in challenging their respective states. Finally, Romano 
utilizes identity-based explanations to explain the cultural 
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dimension of Kurdish nationalist movements. The first two 
dimensions of Romano’s approach resonate with the work of Gareth 
Stansfield and Denise Natali, as they pay significant attention to 
structural variables and actors’ rational choices. As the cultural 
dimension (‘cultural framing’ for Romano) is particularly relevant 
for this study, it is this part of Romano’s work that I engage with 
here and draw on in my research.  
 
Before I do this, however, it is important to note that Romano does 
not engage with culture to the same extent as the structural and 
rational dimensions, a point made clearly in his first elaboration of 
the approach taken, in which he admits that ‘explaining the risks, 
sacrifices and determination of many ethnic nationalist movement 
participants and sympathizers requires a consideration of non-
material values and identity’, before stating that ‘identity and 
culture are not the ideal type variables of social science’ (Romano, 
2006, p. 17). Despite this, Romano does not entirely omit identity 
as a variable in his analysis of Kurdish ethnic nationalist 
movements.  
 
Although Romano’s analysis begins with the creation of the Iraqi 
state following the end of the First World War, to maintain the 
historical scope of this study, I will engage with his explanations of 
the Kurdish ethnic nationalist movement in Iraq from 1991. Like 
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the majority of scholars who study Kurdish nationalism and politics, 
Romano acknowledges that Kurds and Kurdish nationalists aspire 
to the creation of an independent state. However, he links 
hesitations in pursuing this goal to rational calculations made by 
Kurdish politicians, compelling nationalists to make the most of the 
particular structural conditions at any particular point of history. 
Additionally, Romano argues that the democratic elections in the 
KRI in May 1992 demonstrated a desire by Iraqi Kurds to gain the 
moral high-ground in their struggle against the Iraqi government, 
as well as demonstrating that they were capable of running their 
own affairs. However, the failure of this democratic experiment – 
which ended in intra-Kurdish fighting and continuous conflict – was 
extremely costly, both politically and societally (2006, p. 208). 
 
It is particularly important to recall Romano’s claim that the early 
stages of Iraqi state-building proved important in the development 
of Kurdish ‘cultural tools’ in the later history of Kurdish nationalist 
movement. He argues that the inclusion of Kurdish rights in the 
‘founding principles’ of the Iraqi state helped shape Kurds’ 
awareness of their identity, which was essential for later 
developments in Kurdish nationalism. However, it is important to 
note that in creating Iraq as a state the British made efforts to 
incorporate Kurdish political and cultural demands (having failed to 
keep their promises regarding Kurdish self-determination). Despite 
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this, the first Iraqi constitution of 1925 failed to account for Kurds 
as a main component of Iraq. It was not until 1958 that political 
space opened up for them, with the new Iraqi constitution explicitly 
mentioning Kurds as a key ‘national group’ in Iraq.10  
 
Analysing events in Iraq since 2003, Romano successfully 
demonstrates that despite Kurds’ ability to secure unprecedented 
gains; ongoing disputes between Iraqi Kurds and the central 
government over federalism; disputed areas and natural 
resources; along with the failure to symbolically incorporate Kurds 
into the Iraqi state increased ethnic tensions between Kurds and 
Iraq’s Arab majority.  
 
Expanding on this latter argument, Romano cites the failure to 
replace the national flag – which was introduced by the Ba’athist 
regime and was strongly associated with the regime of Saddam 
Hussein – with one that represents all Iraqi components of Iraqi 
society. Between 2006 and 2008, the flag, adopted by Saddam 
Hussein back in 1991 Figure 2.1, was not permitted to be flown 
from or hung in official KRG buildings, and the space dedicated for 
the Iraqi flag was empty during public appearances by Masoud 
Barzani (the regional president of KRI). Nor was the flag used in 
                                 
 10 A list of Iraqi constitutions can be found at: 
http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2306  
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the Kurdish parliament, with the Iraq flag from 1959-1963 used 
instead as it represented Kurds through a yellow sun with red rays,  
(Addustour, 2005; al-Sharq al-awsat, 2006), see Figure 2.4. Figure 
2.4 also captures the moment at which Masoud Barzani (the 
president of KRI), defending his decision not to allow the use of the 
Iraqi flag from the previous Iraqi regime. He also stated that ‘if the 
Kurdish parliament decides on independence we will declare it’ (al-
Sharq al-awsat, 2006). In the photograph old Iraq flags (1959-
1963) can also be seen besides larger Kurdish flags. 
 
 Although the flag (that of 1991) was further redesigned in 2004, 
Figure 2.2, for Kurds it still bore the marks of the Ba’ath. Again, a 
new flag was adopted in January 2008 after modifications based on 
Kurdish demands, Figure 2.3, which included the removal of the 
three red stars representing the Ba’athist slogan of ‘unity, freedom 
and socialism’. However, the Kurdish demand for using yellow 
colour for the inscription of ‘Allahu Akbar’ (‘God is the greatest’) 
was not met (Mohammed & Moore, 2008).  
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Figure 2.1 Iraqi flag (1991-2004). Source: (Flags of the world, 2014)   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Iraqi flag (2004-2008). Source: (Flags of the world, 2014) 
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Figure 2.3 Iraqi flag (2008-present). Source: Flags of the world, 2014  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Inside the Kurdistan parliament (2006) 
 
A further area of symbolic importance discussed by Romano is 
currency. The Iraqi dinar was supposed to include inscriptions in 
Kurdish as well as Arabic, yet this never materialized (Romano, 
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2006, p. 219-220; cf. O’Leary and Salih, 2005, pp. 3-46). Referring 
to the failure to build a unified Iraq that incorporated the Kurdish 
identity, Romano notes that: 
While eighty-some years of living under one state may 
have eventually inculcated an Iraqi national ethic in 
many Arab Iraqis’ the large majority of Iraqi Kurds have 
never to this day adopted Iraqi nationalism (2006, p. 
216).  
 
Romano’s study attaches little importance to the issue of collective 
identity formation in the KRI, though. Therefore, the study does 
not offer any substantial contribution to the issue of Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI per se. 
 
However, as noted earlier, its ‘cultural framing’ approach can help 
in analysing Kurdish collective identity formation. The crux of his 
argument may be that processes of identity formation were well  
incorporated in Kurdish ethnic nationalism in the KRI from the 
inception of the Iraqi state to the present. 
2.7 State-building 
In a detailed study of the KRI, Ofra Bengio follows the historical 
development of what she calls Kurdish state-building. She begins 
her study The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, (2012) 
at an extremely important point in Kurdish history in the KRI: 
‘Șorişy Eylul’ (‘The September Revolution’), a revolution that 
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erupted on 11th September 1961. Although this revolution falls 
outside the historical limits of my study, its long-lasting effects on 
Kurdish nationalist politics and identity and the political history of 
Iraq means that it cannot be ignored.  
 
The September Revolution is of importance here for four main 
reasons. Firstly, Iraq was governed by the Ba’ath Arab Socialist 
Party (BASP) from 1968 to 2003 (and for a few months in 1963). 
BASP was extremely hostile to Kurdish political demands. Secondly, 
the high level of Kurdish participation in the revolution, which was 
the first mass action in which individuals and groups from various 
social groups across the Iraqi Kurdistan participated. It therefore 
had a significant effect on Kurdish identity in Iraq. Thirdly, external 
factors meant the revolution functioned very differently to earlier 
ones, as it was backed by Iran, Israel and the United States.11 
Fourthly, the revolution saw the intensification of divisions between 
two rival factions in the KDP: one led by its leader Mela Mustafa 
Barzani, the other by its politburo.  
 
These four factors one can argue, not only determined the initial 
success and later failure of the September Revolution, but also 
                                 
 11 While Iran’s support to the revolt was explicit in its material and 
political terms, the support of the USA and Israel was implicit and 
limited. 
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contributed significantly to what Bengio calls the process of 
‘Kurdish state-building’ from 1991 onwards. It is to this period that 
I now turn. 
 
International political structures after 1991 allowed for limited 
Kurdish self-rule, but prevented any move that might threaten the 
Iraqi territorial integrity. However, against significant odds, the 
Kurds moved beyond their earlier calls for autonomy, instead 
adopting federalism as the foundation of their relation to the Iraqi 
state. This, Bengio argues, happened at a time when the main 
Kurdish parties were still in a position to work together towards 
national aims. However, when old rivalries resurfaced between the  
KDP and the PUK in 1994, the division destroyed the social and 
political life in the KRI; and led to the creation of what Bengio 
names ‘Barzaniland’ and ‘Talabaniland’ (Bengio, 2012, p. 273) (the 
former named after Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP; the 
latter after Talabani, the leader of PUK). More importantly, Bengio 
states that this division ‘gave rise to a fractured imagining of the 
[Kurdish] nation’ (2012, p. 273), a division whose origins can be 
traced back to the mid-1960s; and which had previously reached a 
peak after the collapse of the revolution and the death of Mustafa 
Barzani in 1979 (in this earlier schism Masoud Barzani led one 
faction of the KDP, with his brother, Idris while the main rival 
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faction PUK was run by Jalal Talabani) (2012, p. 162).12 This is of 
particular importance for my analysis of inconsistencies in Kurdish 
nationalist discourse in the KRI in chapters five and seven, below. 
  
The Iraqi state is also an important factor for Bengio. Although the 
KRI was protected by the no-fly-zone, the Ba’athist regime still 
posed a serious threat to the nascent and politically fragile KRI. 
Moreover, on the 31st August 1996 the KDP gained assistance from 
the Iraqi government in a conflict with the PUK. Here Bengio tries 
to illustrate the relevance of the Iraqi state factor in the Kurdish 
state-building process. This further fragmented the imagined 
Kurdish nation, reducing the credibility of Kurdish nationalist claims 
and upsetting the political power balance in the KRI.  
 
While Bengio’s study is rich and detailed in its historical account of 
the political development of the KRI, she gives no serious 
consideration to identity: there is little by the way of analysis of 
culture and discourse in the KRI. Treating the process as state-
building, I suggest, focuses her attention on political processes 
accompanying the historical development of Kurdistan Region-Iraq 
                                 
 12 Following Mustafa Barzani’s death in 1979, his two sons (Masoud and 
Idris) led the party, Idris as the main leader, until his death in 1987 at 
which point Masoud became the sole leader of the KDP. While the party 
held four congresses after Masoud took the presidency role, he has been 
re-elected as the President of the KDP at each of them. 
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at the expense of an analysis of Kurdish identity formation. 
2.8 Nation-building 
Another detailed study of the KRI in the period between 1991 and 
2012 is Mohammed M.A. Ahmed’s book Iraqi Kurds and Nation-
Building (2012), which offers a highly detailed account of the 
political and economic development of the KRI during a period in 
which a number of key developments shaped the nature of the 
region. These include the approaches taken by the KDP and the 
PUK; the relationship between the KRI and Arab opposition factions 
in the 1990s, and with the Iraqi government from 2003; relations 
with Iran, Turkey and Syria; and links between Kurdish politicians 
and the US before, during and after the invasion and reconstruction 
of Iraq. In short, the study is an amalgamation of various historical 
political and economic analysis of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq all of 
which dictated the way the Kurdistan Region-Iraq has been building 
as a ‘nation’, although, the author provides no theoretical 
justification for using the term ‘nation-building’ instead, he takes it 
for granted. Therefore, despite providing a rich historical overview 
of this period, Ahmed’s book does not offer a theoretical analysis 
of the kind found in other works reviewed here. Nonetheless, as 
Robert Olson notes, it presents a reasonably balanced overview 
throughout (though it cannot, of course, be said to be value free) 
(Olson, 2012, p. XIV). 
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2.9 Media discourse 
A study closer to the present one is Jaffer Sheyholislami’s Kurdish 
Identity, Discourse, and New Media, (2011). Applying an 
interdisciplinary critical discourse analysis that ‘blends social 
theories with theories of language and discourse ’ (Sheyholislami, 
2011, p. 14), it focuses on the interplay between Kurdish national 
identity and media discourse. Here, one should bear in mind that 
the focal point of critical discourse analysis is the claim that identity 
is socially constructed through discourse, understood as ‘a social 
practice, simultaneously constitutive of and constituted by social 
structures, relations, and identities’ (2011, p.14). Accordingly, 
Kurdish national identity, is understood as being ‘reflected and 
articulated in the use of language and discourse, and at the same 
time, [it is] constructed, reproduced and sustained through 
discursive practices.’ (2011, p.14) In other words, there is a 
mutually constitutive relationship between identity and discourse. 
Despite this, CDA acknowledges that national identity exists 
outside of discourse, however, it is continuously communicated 
through discourse. In addition, the role of agents and ideology in 
the discursive construction of identity is also acknowledged. 
Sheyholislami’s study demonstrates that these factors can 
determine the type and content of identity articulated. 
 
Broadly speaking, Sheyholislami’s study seeks answers to two 
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questions: 
1- What Kurdish identities are constructed, who constructed 
them, and why? 
2- What might be the sociocultural and political implications of 
these Kurdish identity formations? 
 
Based on data gathered mainly from the Kurdish satellite TV 
channel Kurdistan TV (KTV13) and a selection of Kurdish internet 
sites, Sheyholislami employs a set of linguistic and semiotic 
analytical methods. This occurs at three analytical levels: detailed 
microanalysis of the linguistic features of texts; a macroanalysis of 
discourse practices, which includes the ‘ways texts are produced 
and consumed’; and sociocultural practice, which focuses on the 
socioeconomic, political and historical contexts with which the texts 
operate. (2011, pp. 14, 41, 42, 45) 
 
To address these issues Sheyholislami works with a set of themes 
that revolve around the discursive construction of ideas central to 
nationalist identities: ‘a common past and history; a collective and 
shared present and future; a common language; national symbols 
and “invented traditions”; a common culture and a common 
territory’ (Sheyholislami, 2011, p. 23). Through detailed 
                                 
 13 KTV broadcasts from the KRI and is owned and run by the KDP. It 
began broadcasting on 1s t January 1999. 
 69 
 
microanalysis of Kurdish texts he concludes that these have proved 
successful (in varying degrees) in constructing the ‘imagined 
nation’ of Kurdistan through the construction and promotion of a 
set of ideas. He observed differences in how this was carried out, 
however: while KTV’s 2005 programmes rarely portrayed pan-
Kurdish identities, online Kurdish nationalist discourse was 
frequently overtly pan-Kurdish.14 Sheyholislami explains this 
contextually, arguing that KTV utilizes the language of its owner 
(KDP), which is compelled to avoid upsetting neighbouring states 
by raising the prospect of a pan-Kurdish state (perceived as a 
threat to their territorial integrity). The open and free environment 
provided by the internet, however, allows discourse producers to 
work relatively free from the constraints of realpolitik. 
 
The issue of pan-Kurdish identity formation plays a central role in 
Sheyholislami’s study, frequently dominating his analysis. 
However, he also argues that ‘there is not one single Kurdish 
identity’ (2011, p. 7), and therefore, that Kurdish identity is 
essentially fragmented. This argument is informed by a historical 
analysis of Kurdish identity. Beginning with the Ottoman period, 
Sheyholislami elaborates a multi-dimensional history of Kurdish 
                                 
14 Pan-Kurdish, (or ‘cross-border Kurdish’) refers here to ‘… the collective 
identity to which most Kurds, regardless of what nation-state they live 
in, have or could have a sense of belonging.’ (Sheyholislami, 2011, p. 
47) 
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identity. He suggests that the geographical spread of the Kurdish 
population across a large territory in the Middle East is one 
potential reason for the fractured nature of Kurdish society and 
identity. This is exacerbated by the fact that – since the First World 
War – Kurds have inhabited four separate nation states, each of 
which has subjugated them to practices and policies peculiar to that 
state. Sheyholislami refers to this as ‘territorial fragmentation’ 
(Ibid, p. 55, italics in original), an issue addressed by a number of 
scholars working on Kurdish culture and society – among them 
Martin van Bruinessenand and Abbas Vali, who contend that the 
situation is largely responsible for the fractured nature of Kurdish 
nationalism in both practice and discourse (Bruinessen, 2006; 
2007; Vali, 2003a; 2006).  
 
For Sheyholislami, this process is exacerbated by ‘cultural 
fragmentation’ (Ibid, p. 56, italics in original). This draws on the 
work of Martin van Bruinessen, who claims that ‘Kurds were (and 
are) certainly not a culturally homogeneous group’ (cited in 
Sheyholislami, 2011, p. 57), with Sheyholislami commenting that 
‘when referring to Kurds in general, the appropriate term would be 
nation or people’ (Ibid). This is an interesting suggestion, but there 
is insufficient elaboration to apply this to the process of Kurdish 
identity formation more broadly.  
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The third manner in which Kurdish identity is further fragmented is 
linguistic (2011, p. 58). Here, Sheyholislami notes that although 
the Kurdish language is one of the primary markers upon which the 
ethnic boundaries have been formed between Kurds and others, 
the existence of a wide number of Kurdish dialects suggests they 
have contributed to re-enforce existing processes of fragmentation. 
However, Sheyholislami is at pains to position the various Kurdish 
linguistic forms as different dialects of the same language, 
proposing the term ‘Kurdish varieties’ (2011, p. 114). This seems 
plausible and is deserves further attention by those working in 
linguistics and ethnographic studies. 
 
As previously noted, Sheyholislami’s study is relatively unique in 
its approach to Kurdish identity. While other studies have 
contributed in different ways to readers’ understanding of Kurdish 
identity, none of them has directly engaged in interpreting Kurdish 
identity from the discourses of the very people who claim that 
identity. Through its interpretation of Kurdish nationalist 
discourse(s) from a critical point of view, in which discursive 
practices and socio-political contexts are considered in addition to 
the texts themselves, Sheyholislami’s work has initiated a new 
direction in the study of Kurdish identity and politics. His 
constructionist approach to identity does not take nationalist 
discourse(s) at face-value but stresses the importance of critically 
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examining their social, political and economic foundations; and 
provides a rigorous explanation of Kurdish identity formation of 
Kurds across their diaspora. The work is also successful in 
appropriating critical discourse analysis to study the emancipatory 
efforts of non-dominant actors (such as non-state Kurds): all too 
often the approach focuses on hegemonic discursive formations. 
Furthermore, Sheyholislami incorporates cultural considerations 
into the study of Kurdish identity, the importance of which has 
already been established. However, the cultural dimension of his 
work is incomplete and further explanatory treatment is required. 
Nonetheless, it remains an extremely useful contribution to the 
study of discourse(s) of Kurdish nationalism at the beginning of the 
twenty first century. The author, I would like to suggest deserves 
credit for his efforts in that regard.  
 
However, there are some points that need to be addressed. The 
nature of the CDA means that Sheyholislami has not been able to 
directly tackle the political dimension of Kurdish identity as the 
identity is tremendously penetrated by politics in the full meaning 
of the notion. Furthermore, the roles of hegemony, the ‘other’ and 
antagonism in processes of identity construction are largely 
overlooked.  
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2.10 Conclusion 
From the above analyses, it can be seen the theoretical and 
methodological tools of political discourse analysis and ethno-
symbolism both have promise for the study of the process of 
Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. Whilst political discourse 
theory can successfully examine the political dimension in the 
dynamism of Kurdish identity formation and reveal its rooted 
inconsistencies, ethno-symbolism provides methods for exploring 
the cultural and historical dimensions of the process. A detailed 
discussion of these approaches, along with arguments in favour of 
their applicability to the case under study will be provided in 
chapters four and six. In the next chapter I provide a historical 
overview of the case study in order to better grasp the analytical 
contours of the present study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 Historical and socio-economic background 
3.1 Introduction 
As Leith and Soule note, ‘history is important to an understanding 
of nationalism and national identity in the modern context’ (2012, 
p. 9). Thus, I believe that an analysis of Kurdish history is essential 
for any temporally or spatially limited study, such as the present 
analysis of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI since 1991. This 
chapter provides such a history, offering a review of the political 
and socio-economic conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan prior to, during, 
and since the foundation of the Iraqi state. Its primary focus is on 
the history of Kurds and Kurdistan in general, with a particular 
focus on the development of the conditions that led to the creation 
of the KRI as a unique political entity in the Middle East.  
 
This history is divided into three key periods. The first of these is 
the pre-twentieth century period, in which arguments regarding the 
historical origins of the Kurds are central. Such an exploration 
assists in understanding processes of identity formation that 
operate by capitalising on historical narratives (regardless of their 
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truthfulness). Ethno-symbolism, in particular, considers these 
historical elements to be fundamental in processes of collective 
identity formation. The second period covered is the twentieth 
century (until 1991), during which time Kurds responded to the 
rapid growth of nationalist projects both globally and in the Middle 
East. The final period stems from 1991 until 2014. and holds even 
greater significance for this research as it represents an historic 
turning point in the history of Kurds in the Middle East, and in 
particular for Kurds in the KRI. This section begins with the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front’s (KF) takeover of local administrations in the three 
Kurdish governorates of northern Iraq and covers political and 
administrative processes. Particular attention is paid to the first 
round of free elections in the KRI in May 1992, which led to the 
establishment of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) (often 
referred to as the Kurdistan parliament) and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). An analysis of major political and socio-
economic developments following these elections is also 
undertaken, bringing the study up to the end of 2014. 
3.2 Pre-twentieth century: Kurds and their origin 
The dominant Kurdish nationalist discourse, as it is the case with 
all nationalisms, doses not hesitate to offer us a clear-edge 
definition to what constitutes the Kurds as a nation. Edmonds 
outlines the Kurdish nationalist claim in a short paragraph as 
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follows: 
The Kurds constitute a single nation which has occupied 
its present habitat for at least there thousand years. 
They have outlived the rise and fall of many imperial 
races: Assyrian, Persian, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, 
Mongols, and Turks. They have their own history, 
language and culture. Their country has been unjustly 
partitioned. But they are the original owners, not 
strangers to be tolerated as minorities with limited 
concessions granted at the whim of the usurpers. 
(Edmond, 1971, p. 88) 
 
Notwithstanding, the above definition reflects Kurdish nationalist 
imagination of the Kurdish nation, which contains a list of ‘natural’ 
and ‘artificial’ ingredients mixed together to create the desired 
formula of the nation. However, probably one of the main issues 
when it comes to exploring the historical origins of Kurds is lack of 
reliable sources. Besides, even when there are sources most of 
them are written by non-Kurds, be they historians from other 
ethnic and national groups who represent the majority in the 
political apparatus of the countries in question or outsiders, in this 
case, mostly Europeans. This bitter reality, it has been argued, may 
be the main reason behind the under-representation of Kurds in 
the history of the Middle East, and of course consequently, on the 
international level. So, Kurdish historians and nationalists when 
they complain about this and link it to deliberate exclusion might 
be understandable (O'Shea, 2006, p. 113).  To that end, Mehrdad 
Izady (cited in Gunter, 2007, p. 2) admits the difficulty in 
reconstructing Kurdish history due to the fact that it has largely 
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been written by power holders. Nonetheless, a small number of 
sources are available to the historian that can – with appropriate 
levels of caution – be relied upon.  
 
 Michael Gunter notes that there are at least two types of account 
of Kurdish history, (2007: p. 2-7): ‘primordialist’ and 
‘constructionist’. The former which, has mostly been promoted by 
Kurdish nationalism, holds essentialist world views, and 
‘constructionist’ which is the position that some modern 
researchers of Kurdish nationalism have taken. I will deal with the 
primordialist account first in line to the pre-twentieth century 
Kurdish history. The constructionist one will be discussed through 
our discussion of twentieth century Kurdish history. I think this is 
the best way to deal with the two approaches as the end of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the birth-time of 
nationalism in the Middle East, lend themselves more readily to 
constructionist than to primordialist accounts. 
 
The primordialist account relies heavily on historical roots, whether 
mythical or established. Many Kurdish nationalist accounts of 
Kurdish history thus draw on the history of the Medes, an ancient 
Iranian people who destroyed the Assyrian empire in 612 BC. In 
addition, the story of Kawa the Blacksmith who defeated the 
oppressive and brutal ancient Iranian ruler, Zohak ‘who had been 
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feeding the brains of young men to two giant serpents which were 
grown on his two shoulders’ (Gunter, 2007, p. 2; Edmond, 1971, 
p. 88), has been incorporated into Kurdish history and methodology 
especially since the twentieth century in a way that it has become 
an established myth-symbol of Kurdish nationalism. Although, 
newer historical accounts treat them as two different events, the 
story of Kawa the Blacksmith is ingrained in the Kurdish annual 
holiday Newroz, which falls on 21st of March every year (Aydin, 
2005). Moreover, Gunter refers to another historical people that 
Kurdish nationalists perceive as the ancestors of Kurds, 
Kardouchoi1 who fought Xenophon (the Greek army commander) 
while the latter was withdrawing from Persia with his 10,000 
warriors in 401 BC (Gunter, 2007, p. 2). Apart from Medes and 
Kardouchi, reference has also been made to Guti, and Kurti as 
ancestors of modern Kurds (O'Shea, 2006, p. 113; Yildiz, 2004, p. 
7). These major historical perceived links have been well 
established in the discourse and historiography of Kurdish 
nationalism. The Medes are well referred to in the Kurdish national 
anthem ‘Ey Reqib’ where it says: ’we are the sons of Medes and Kai 
Khosrow, our homeland is our faith and religion’ (KRG, 2010b)2. 
                                 
1 ‘Kardo’ a relatively new Kurdish baby name was probably introduced in 
the 1960s in the Iraqi Kurdistan which supposedly derived from 
Kardouchio. 
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Probably, the primordialist story of Kurds is not limited to the above 
selected examples. One could argue, the list is open to expansion 
even in the future.  
 
If the above examples where drawn from the pre-Islamic Kurdish 
history, the Islamic period likewise makes a turning point in the 
perceived history of modern Kurds. Although, the attention paid to 
Islam in Kurdish nationalist histories varies. As for the earliest 
emergence of Kurds as a proper ethnonym, we notice a near 
common sense among scholars and historians that it was at the 
time of the Islamic conquest around the seventh century (Edmond, 
1971, p. 87; Gunter, 2007, p. 3; MacDowall, 1996, p. 21; O'Shea, 
2006; Yildiz, 2004, p. 7). Izady even goes so far as to argue that 
the establishment of Islam in the region resulted in the 
consolidation of Kurdish ethnic identity (cited in Gunter, 2007: p. 
3), but caution must be exercised in using ‘ethnic’ as a category so 
far back in history given its formulation by Anthony Smith as ‘a 
named human community connected to a homeland, possessing 
common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more 
elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least 
among the elites.’ (Smith, 2008, p. 13) There is no historical 
evidence to suggest that such a shared culture existed at the time: 
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as McDowall notes, the tribal nature of Kurds prevented them from 
forming any sort of a compact ethnic group at that period of history 
(1996, pp. 22-24). Although, there were Dynasties in the historical 
Kurdish lands which, ruled by Kurds such as Shaddadis (951-175), 
the Hasanwayhids (919-195), Marwanids (984-1083) and some 
others (Gunter, 2007, p. 4), but McDowall argues it is unlikely that 
they self-identified as such, noting that they were ‘based on family 
ties, ethnic cultural tradition and Islam’ (1996, p. 23). Some would 
hesitate to approve the above date (seventh century) as the exact 
period where Kurds were known as a proper ethnic group. In fact, 
Van Bruinessen reports that a substantial number of orientalists 
agree on exactly who to call Kurds at least by sixteenth century 
(2007).3. As for the term Kurdistan, the early uses of the term date 
back to the twelfth century when a province was established in the 
Iranian Ottoman land under the same name by the Turkish Seljuk 
prince Saandjar (Yildiz, 2004, p. 2). A province with the same name 
is still there in North-Western of Iran, which nationalist Kurds today 
consider Iranian or Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat). Furthermore, 
beyond the province of Kurdistan, there was another all-
encompassing term ‘Kurdistan’ which signified not a geographical 
                                 
 3 The two terms in common use in the KRI are Badinan and Soran. These 
refer to two unofficial geographical areas, the former to the west of the 
Great Zab River, the latter to the river’s east and north-east. These 
regions also provide two of the main Kurdish language dialects with their 
names (i.e. Badini/Bahdini and Sorani). Sorani is currently the unofficial 
lingua franca in the KRI. 
 81 
 
area where Kurds have been residing but also ‘a system of Kurdish 
fiefs’ – as discussed earlier – as well as a human culture (Ibid). 
However, Kurdistan, at the present time, still refers to geographical 
spaces, which cover the mountainous areas that join the borders 
of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, Figure 3.1. 
 
It is worth noting that since their encounter with Islam in the 
seventh century Kurds have had an active involvement in the 
political events of the Islamic world. The involvement may vary 
across a wide range of levels and in different ways. Among the 
most cited historical figures who are associated to Kurds, one way 
or another, is Salahaddin Al-Ayyubi (better known in the West as 
‘Saladin’) who defeated the Crusaders and took over Jerusalem in 
the twelfth century and also overthrew the Fatimid  
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Figure 3.1 Kurdish political enclaves and territorial demands 1918-1998.  
Source: (Global security, n.d.) 
 
rule in Egypt in 1171 after which he established the Ayyubid 
dynasty ruling over Egypt, Syria and large areas of the Islamic 
world including Iraq, at the time. However, his dynasty is not 
understood as Kurdish in the way in which the Ottoman Empire is 
understood as Turkish or the Saffavid Empire is Shi’ite and Persian. 
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Some would understandably explain that by the fact that the era of 
Salahaddin was not the era of nationalism and religion was the 
major ideological motor behind politics and war (Blau, 2006, p. 
103; MacDowall, 1996, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, probably, since 
its first uses in the twelfth century down to the modern time the 
term Kurdistan has largely been ambiguous term rather than a 
straightforward one.  
 
As will be demonstrated in the proceeding sections, the ambiguity 
of the term is fundamentally a political artefact rather than an 
objective reality. It is important to note that the Ottoman era 
represents a major historical turning point for Kurds, as it saw the 
first uses of the term ‘Kurdistan’ and periods of significant Kurdish 
self-rule in specific localities, although these were in a constant 
state of conflict with each other; as well as with the Ottoman 
Empire (Edmond, 1971, p. 87). The region also suffered major 
misfortune during the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, which was fought 
between the two major Islamic empires of the Middle East (the 
Ottoman and Safavid) (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 25-27). The impact 
of the battle lies not only in that it constituted the ‘first division’ of 
Kurdistan (further division did not occur until the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in the 1920s), but because it left Kurds in the 
middle of two conflicting powers, a legacy that continues today 
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(Vali, 2011, p. 8).4 The political, social and economic effects of the 
‘first division’ also continue today.5 In the next section I will discuss 
the historical developments during and after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, events which led to the creation of the Iraqi state 
encompassing parts of Kurdistan with its mostly Kurdish 
inhabitants. 
3.3 Twentieth century, historical overview: the emergence 
of Kurdish discourse on identity 
The Kurdish nationalist historiography is keen on asserting the 
historical roots of Kurdish identity formation. While according to the 
modern approach to nationalism, the issue of ‘nation’ and its 
associated ideology of nationalism is a pure modern product 
probably, starting at the end of eighteen century and flourished 
from the nineteenth century onwards. The ethno-symbolic 
approach, on the other side of the camp, while not denying the 
modern character of nations and nationalism maintains that nations 
                                 
 4 In his discussion of the Battle of Chaldiran, David McDowall 
concentrates primarily on the resultant balance of power in the 
aftermath of the war, with Kurds given relative independence by the two 
rival powers in order to keep the area conflict-free. However, this came 
at a significant cost to the Kurds, who found themselves on either side 
of the border between Ottoman and Safavid lands. Over the course of 
the next four centuries this division had a significant negative impact on 
the Kurds, with severe social, economic and political ramifications 
(MacDowall, 1996, pp. 25-31) 
 5 The polarised nature of politics in the Middle East today (including in 
Iraq), with one faction supported by Iran and another by Turkey, can be 
seen as the result of this bipolar system. 
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do have historical roots marked by ethnies which’s Anthony Smith’s 
definition of them we provided earlier. As Gunter (2007, pp. 3-5) 
points out, the Kurdish nationalist historiography dates the origins 
of Kurdish nationalism to such Kurdish historical sources as 
Sharafnama of Sharaf al-Din Bitlisi (Șerefname of Șerefxane 
Bitlisi), the prince of Bitlis (1543-1597), the epic of Mem u Zin of 
Ahmadi Khani (Ehmadi Xani, 1650-1707), and the more modern 
Kurdish poet Haji Qadir Koyi (1817-1897) and others. Each of these 
three Kurdish individuals are said to have demonstrated a sense of 
Kurdish identity in a way that they can be considered pioneers of 
Kurdish nationalists in the modern era. While Sharafnama is a 
history of Kurdish dynasties in the Islamic period; Mem u Zin is a 
tragic love story, elements of which have been re-interpreted as 
displaying a Kurdish identity and inscribing a Kurdish destiny, 
sometimes understood as leading to a Kurdish declaration of 
independence (Strohmeier, 2003, p. 27). Van Bruinessen, for 
example, unequivocally announces Khani ‘the father of Kurdish 
nationalism’ (Bruinessen, 2003), although it is the works of Haji 
Qadir that perhaps most explicitly advocate Kurdish unity. 
 
On the other side of the debate about the origins of Kurds and also 
of the emergence of Kurdish nationalism is the constructionist view 
which relates the inception of Kurdish nationalism to the era in 
which the nationalism of other people, who once shared the two 
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major Islamic Empires, emerged and flourished. The era coincided 
with the major historical turning point in the world history around 
and immediately after the First World War.  
 
Undoubtedly, the outcomes of the First World War proved to 
reshape the entire geographical, demographical and political map 
of the Middle East. The nascent Kurdish nationalists while 
enthusiastic to benefit from the potential re-mapping of the region 
failed to guarantee their share from the modern artefact of ‘nation-
state’. That particular moment has so impacted on the minds of 
Kurdish nationalists that it created an enduring complex, which can 
be named ‘the complex of statehood’. Ever since, statehood in all 
its forms and manifestations makes an essential element in the 
vocabulary and discourse of Kurdish nationalism. The complex is 
also well represented in Kurdish poetry and literature ever since6. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the complex has a profound 
effect on the sense of identity among average Kurds as well. In 
what follows I will elaborate on this point. 
 
                                 
 6 There is hardly a twentieth century Kurdish poet who does not engage 
with the issue of statehood in their poetry. A brief list of some of those 
who touch on the issue include the aforementioned Haji Qadir Koyi 
(1867-1950), Qanie (1898-1965), Cigerxwin (1903-1984), Fayaq Békas 
(1905-1948), Hajar (1920-1991), Abdullah Goran (1902-1964), Śerko 
Békas (1940-2013), and Rafiq Sabir (1950), to mention just a few from 
the twenty century (Books LLC, 2010). 
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After the First World War with the carving out of new states from 
the territories of the Ottoman Empire Kurdistan was divided and 
incorporated into new entities (Turkey, Iraq and Syria), in addition 
to the eastern part of Kurdistan, which was part of Gajar Empire in 
Iran (Stansfield, 2006, p. 1). Undoubtedly, the partition of Kurdish 
areas by Allied Forces in 1920s7 marked a dark moment in the 
process of nation building and self-determination of the Kurds. 
Although, promises were made by Britain to the Kurds in the Treaty 
of Sèvres in August 1920 up to the ultimate right of independence 
8but Britain reneged those promises in the Treaty of Lausanne9 in 
                                 
 7 According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (initially signed by the 
United Kingdom, Russia and France – Russia later withdrew), Ottoman 
lands were to be divided between Britain and France, with Britain taking 
control of Mesopotamia (including most of present day Iraq) under ‘the 
British Mandate’ (Gunter, 2003, p. 197). 
 8 The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10th 1920, was an agreement 
between the victorious Allied Forces and representatives of the 
government of Ottoman Turkey. It abolished the Ottoman Empire and 
obliged Turkey to renounce all claims over Arab Asia and North Africa. 
The pact also provided for an independent Armenia, an autonomous 
Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the 
Anatolian west coast; as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands 
and the Dardanelles. Rejected by the new Turkish nationalist regime, it 
was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (Britanica, n.d.; Bruinessen, 
2007; MacDowall, 1996, pp. 131-137; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 10-11). This was 
signed on 24th July 1923, and ended the state of war that existed 
between Turkey on the one side and Britain, Italy, France, Japan, 
Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croatian-Slovene State on the other. It 
also defined the land and sea borders of the new state of Turkey with 
its neighbors: Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus; and the newly established 
states of Iraq, Syria, Hejaz (Saudi Arabia), Egypt, Sudan and Yemen. 
The treaty broke the promises made to Kurds in the Sèvres Treaty, 
which could have led to the establishment of an independent Kurdish 
state in Kurdish dominated areas of the Middle East ( Britanica; 
MacDowall, 1996, pp. 137-143; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 11-12). 
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1923 and did not live to its own promises to Kurds. According to 
the Treaty of Sèvres, a provision was made for an independent 
Kurdistan state to be shaped out of areas called Kurdistan within 
the territories of defeated Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sèvres, 
Section III, Articles 62-64). 
3.4 From Iraqi Kurdistan to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
Given this study’s focus on Kurds in Iraq it is important to pay 
particular attention to political developments in Iraqi Kurdistan 
since the end of the First World War. With varying degree of their 
geographical limits, political powers and socio-economic structures, 
one could divide the history of Kurdistan Region-Iraq after that 
period in line with the establishment of three major regional 
governments or self-administrations: the Kingdom of Kurdistan of 
Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji ‘Șéx Mehmud’ (1878-1956) in Slemany 
(1920-1924), the Autonomous Kurdistan area (1971-1974) and the 
last, which is also the longest-lasting one, is Kurdistan Region-Iraq 
established since 1992. 
3.4.1 Iraqi Kurdistan since the Kingdom of Kurdistan 
(1922-1924) 
In the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks, 
Armenians, Kurds and Slavs expected to achieve statehood. Under 
the British administration a Kurdish administration was established 
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in Slemany by Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, in November 1920 after he 
was appointed as the governor of Slemany for the second time – 
the first which was on 1st December 1918 to 1919. Sheikh Mahmud 
declared the Kingdom of Kurdistan and himself as the king. The 
unfortunate Kingdom of Kurdistan lasted only until 1924.  However, 
there are different accounts as to the factors behind the demise of 
that administration most of which summarised in two: first, the 
British appointment of Sheikh Mahmud was only ever intended as 
a tactical measure to keep the Kurds (and Slemany in particular) 
free from Ottoman influence. However, Mahmud sought to expand 
his powers to include most parts of Vilaiyet (Al-Mosul) which was 
largely inhabited by Kurds. Second, he failed to consolidate the 
Kurds in his government by his failure to embrace Kurdish 
intellectuals of the time and concentrating on tribal enclaves only 
(Stansfield, 2006b, pp. 1-2). Taking the situation at the 
international level at the time, the third factor may be added, which 
is with the new Lausanne treaty in place by 1923, the existence of 
a semi-autonomous Kurdistan was not viable for the British 
mandate in Iraq any more.   
 
To elaborate more, the failure of the Lausanne Treaty to keep to 
promises regarding Kurdish independence made in the Treaty of 
Sèvres is, of course, also highly significant here. In 1920 the Allies 
imposed the treaty of Sèvres on Ottoman Turkey. The treaty 
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included articles beneficial to Kurds, including the opportunity to 
establish their own independent state if they wished to do so. 
However, the Treaty was rejected by new Turkish National 
Assembly led by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, who successfully 
negotiated with the Allies to abolish it. Its replacement, the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne halted Kurdish aspirations for statehood (and 
any form of self-governance); and entirely ignored their rights. 
Hopes for an independent state under Sheikh Mahmud finally ended 
with his arrest by Iraqi forces (with British assistance) in 1924, 
leaving Iraqi Kurds as second-class citizens under the rule of Iraqi 
Arabs (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 155-178). 
 
Lausanne recognised three Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Iraq, but did not mention Kurdistan to be administered by their 
people. For the final stage, despite the disagreement on the 
Kurdish side, the destiny of northern Kurds marked to be second 
nation/citizen under the command of Arabs in Iraq. With the help 
of Britain, Iraqi forces succeeded to demolish the Kurdish 
administration and arrest Sheikh Mahmud in 1924 (MacDowall, 
1996, pp. 155-178). 
 
Understandably, consolidating the pillars of the newly created Iraqi 
state has proved to be extremely difficult. Ever since its creation 
the so-called nation-building has ceased to go beyond being an 
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Arabic nationalist aspiration. This was probably, largely due to lack 
of trust between the major two components of Iraq (i.e. Arabs and 
Kurds) and also the growing gap between Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs. 
From 1920 until 2003, the Kurds have always lived in both severe 
uncertainty and constant struggle. As for the Kurds, the resultant 
effects created an enduring and complicated issue, which is often 
referred to as ‘the Kurdish question in Iraq’. One could argue that 
there has been no single occasion of history in the modern era of 
Iraq (and other countries with Kurds population in the Middle East) 
at which the Kurds felt at peace. They launched several revolts 
against successive Iraqi governments to enable their voice to be 
heard, and even when forcefully muted refused to abandon their 
aims. The resistance continued until 2003 as they did not find 
themselves as sharing partners along other components in Iraq and 
their ethno-national identity never been ‘practically’considered in 
Iraqi constitution. 
3.4.2 Kurdish fight for national right and Iraqi response 
Incorporating one part of the ‘greater Kurdistan’ into Iraq and 
controlling it was never going to be an easy task for either Britain 
or Arab rulers in Iraq. Although Kurdish nationalism failed in its 
attempts to forge a nation state, a number of leaders explored the 
concept of ‘Kurdayeti’ (Kurdishness or Kurdish nationalism) as the 
key to self-determination. This proved popular – largely among 
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tribal leaders, although some members of the Kurdish nationalist 
intelligentsia also explored its potential. Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, 
once as an appointed governor of Slemany and then as a self-
announced King of Kurdistan, was the most influential Kurdish 
leader in the period of the post-First World War. After his Kingdom 
was abolished he led a series of uprisings between 1923- 1931 
against the British Mandate in Iraq. During that period negotiations 
were held with British commissioners and Iraqi government 
demanding recognition of the independence of southern Kurdistan 
or, at least equal rights in the state of Iraq. Seemingly, all peaceful 
attempts (as well as revolts) failed (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 159-
169). The British Colonial Army attacked Slemany to destroy the 
Kurdish Administration that had been set up by Sheikh. Finally, the 
British trained Iraqis were able to capture Sheikh and finally crash 
his revolution. With the help from the British the Iraqi state 
consolidated its foundations until it achieved its independence from 
Britain in 1932. Although there were Kurdish revolts and rebellion 
against the Iraqi government after Iraqi independence however, 
the period from 1938 to 1958 was relatively calm. 
 
The Iraqi 1958 Revolution, similar to the post First World War 
political re-alignment, offered promises to the Kurds as far as 
autonomy or even independence. When Abd al-Karim Qasim 
(1914-1963) seized power in the 1958 Coup d'état and ended the 
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Iraqi monarchy, he first announced that the new government is to 
be shared among all components of Iraq: Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurds. 
 
For the first time the Iraqi constitution of 1958 declared that Iraq 
consists of two main nations (Arab and Kurd) and other ethno-
religious minorities. But this confirmation never translated into 
reality and Kurdish rights of sharing in power never put into 
practice. Instead Iraqi governments responded to Kurds’ demands 
using extreme violent means. 
 
The imposed reality continued the unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Another round of rebellion restarted when Qasim broke his 
promises and Kurds gained no place in new Iraqi administration 
and political map. Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979) a tribal leader from 
Barzan area which falls in the Badinan enclave of Kurdistan Region-
Iraq and who led a number of revolts against the Iraqi government 
in the 1930s and early 1940s (Stansfield, 2006b; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 
15-16), the then leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party10, led a 
revolt against Qasim in 1961.  
 
The fighting between Kurdish Peshmerga forces under KDP, which 
                                 
 10 The Iraqi KDP was founded in 1946 during the short-lived Republic of 
Kurdistan (Mahabad) in Iranian Kurdistan, with Mela Mustafa Barzani as 
leader (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 231-236; Stansfield, 2003b, p. 66). 
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broke down on 11 September 1961 hence, the September 
Revolution ‘Șorişy Eylul’, despite the fact that it was interrupted by 
a number of ceasefires, it lasted until 1970. Intra-Kurdish relations 
during this period were characterised by constant and severe 
conflicts. The major conflict was that between Mustafa Barzani, the 
leader of KDP and the politburo of the party and it was mostly 
between Barzani on the one side and Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal 
Talabani (the current PUK leader and president of Iraq between 
2005 and 2014) on the other. Most commentators link the conflict 
to the differing social background of the two factions. While Barzani 
was a tribal leader his rivals were considered urban intellectuals 
with leftist aspirations. The conflict reached a point where the Iraqi 
government intervened in favour of Barzani’s rivals and even 
infightings were occurred in the mid-1960s. The mentioned 
rivalries continued throughout 60s well into 70s until the collapse 
of the revolution and the foundation of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) by Talabani and other Barzani rivals in June 1975. However, 
the rivalries did not end at that point but continued throughout 
1980s and 1990s (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009; Stansfield, 2003b, 
pp. 71-73; Stansfield, 2006b). 
 
As for the relationship between Kurds and Iraqi central 
government, following a sustained period of intense fighting and 
negotiations, for the first time in the history of Kurds in Iraq, an 
 95 
 
official agreement was reached. The March Accord of 1970s (was 
signed on the 11th March) between Kurds and Baghdad. Its 
essential articles guaranteed the cultural, political and self-rule 
rights of Kurds in Iraq (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 327-328; Stansfield, 
2003b, pp. 75-77). The accord followed a long and violent clash 
between Kurdish forces under Barzani and the Iraqi forces. It has 
been argued that the factors that forced the Iraqi government 
under Ba’ath to come to that stage were mixed with internal and 
external dimensions; probably the most salient ones were military 
loss in the face of the Kurdish Peshmerga and the uneasy relations 
with the Iranian government of the time (Edmond, 1971, p. 102). 
3.4.3 Autonomous Kurdistan Region 1970-1974  
The March accord, by far, was the only comprehensive document 
in which most Kurdish demands were reflected. The agreement was 
planned to guarantee Iraqi Kurdistan11 the status of an autonomous 
region within Iraq with its separate legislative and constitutive 
bodies that would allow the Kurdish affairs in the region be 
administered by the people of Kurdistan. The accord also contained 
detailed measures and policies in areas such as Kurdish share in 
natural resources, culture, education, welfare and a separate 
                                 
 11 ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’ is used in discussions that historically fall before 1991, 
as the term ‘Kurdistan Region of Iraq’ was introduced after the 
establishment of the first elected government post-May 1992 elections. 
 96 
 
development strategy with its own budget. In addition, according 
to terms of the accord, a four year timescale was set in place for 
implementation, during which Iraqi Kurdistan would become 
autonomous. In the period of 1970 to 1974, there were so-called 
liberated areas under the control of the Kurdish forces, Peshmerga. 
The provinces of Erbil, Slemany and Duhok constituted, in effect, a 
de facto autonomous Kurdish region governed by KDP (Bengio, 
2012, p. 30). Furthermore, according to the accord, the Kurds were 
to have an active participation in the Iraqi government. To that 
end, five Kurds were appointed to the cabinet by Iraqi government 
in Baghdad (Stansfield, 2006b, p. 4). However, as the two parties 
could not agree on the terms of the agreement, especially as the 
Kurdish party insisted on the inclusion of Kirkuk city into the 
autonomous Kurdistan, a demand which was rejected by the Iraqi 
government outright, it did not take long for the signs of ill-faith to 
appear and the relationship between Ba’ath and KDP broken down 
(MacDowall, 1996, pp. 327-335; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 22-23). The 
already troubled relationship between the two parties was 
deteriorated by two assassination attempts against Mustafa 
Barzani and his son Idris. The Ba’ath party’s attitude in the last 
years of the timescale did not show signs of good-will towards the 
implementation of the accord and a peaceful solution of the 
persisting issues, Instead it became apparent that the Ba’ath 
government was seeking military solutions. 
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While the Kurdish rebellion was largely dependent on Iran in terms 
of military and aid logistics and it was clear that Iran’s backing was 
contingent on its relationship with the Iraqi government, 
consequently, the Kurdish position by then was highly fragile. A 
historical event, the Algiers Agreement of 6th March 1975 exposed 
the fragile and vulnerable situation of the Kurds during that time. 
The agreement which was signed at the OPEC conference in Algiers 
solved the long-lasting disagreement between Iraqi and Iranian 
governments on border lands. In the fulfilment of the agreement 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Shah of Iran) cut all support to the Iraqi 
Kurds. In return, Iraq gave major concessions to Iran, the major 
one which was to give away Shat Al-Arab to Iran. Despite massive 
efforts by Barzani to minimise the effects of the Algiers’ agreements 
on the Kurdish struggle against the Ba’ath Iraq which included 
convincing the USA in order to intervene in any way possible, but 
the agreement went ahead and Barzani could not get his plight 
heard neither by Iran nor by USA. Finally, the inter-state condition 
created by the implementation of the agreement left Barzani with 
three options, either surrender to the Iraqi government, withdraw 
to Iran as refugees or  continue fighting without any possible 
outside help. After assessing the situation, Barzani decided to end 
the revolution, a decision which was agreed upon by KDP as well  
(Bengio, 2012, pp. 125-150). 
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The collapse of the revolution and abandoning the fight not only 
left Kurdistan with large numbers of human loss and resulted in 
fleeing most of Peshmerga and the leadership to Iran (MacDowall, 
1996, p. 339; Yildiz, 2004, pp. 23-24), but also civilian Kurds have 
had to pay a heavy price later on.  Around 250,000 civilians, 
fighters, their families and others sought refuge in Iran between 
1974 and 1975 probably creating the first biggest Kurdish exodus 
in the twentieth century, the second which would happen later in 
1991 (Bengio, 2012, p. 147; Stansfield, 2003b, p. 79). By 1978 
about 1,400 Kurdish villages were razed. Approximately 600,000 
people deported to Mujama’at, ‘collective settlement camps’ build 
around cities to control closely any movement of people, and about 
300.000 Kurds displaced to the southwest and centre of Iraq or 
made homeless. There were real civilian massacres and a long-
term process of displacement and extreme social instability.  
 
The collapse of the Kurdish rebellion which started as September 
Revolution ‘Șorişy Eylul’ back in 1961 has had a significant impact 
on the Kurdish nationalist struggle in Iraq. The collapse, which was 
since given different labels and names such as Niskoy 74 (‘1974 
failure’), Heresy Șoriș (‘collapse of the revolution’) or the more 
pejorative Kurdish term Așbetal which if it is translated into English 
stands as ‘stopping of the mill’ (Karadaghi, 1993, p. 214), has 
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undoubtedly has so deeply inscribed in the memory of Iraqi Kurds 
and its politicians that it still occupies a massive space in the 
Kurdish political discourse in KRI. The event has also been well 
engrained into Kurdish poetry and literature ever since12. 
 
Throughout the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, Kurds, as civilians inside 
Iraq, found themselves as the most vulnerable people. Any 
movement of Kurdish forces, Peshmerga, on borders or inside Iran 
would affect the situation of Kurds inside Iraq. Both Iraq and Iran 
supported various factions of Kurdish parties against each other 
during the war, as a result, at some occasions the Peshmerga would 
find themselves fighting alongside the forces of Iran. Facing 
resurgent Iranian/Kurdish activity in the north of Iraq, Saddam 
adopted severe measures to remove permanently the threat posed 
by the rebellious Kurds to his regime. In 31 July 1983 and months 
later, up to 8,000 males of Barzani tribes were removed from their 
families in Qushtapa and other collective settlement camps around 
Erbil city. These were taken to Baghdad and months later executed 
and buried in mass graves in southern Iraq (Middle East Watch, 
1991: 41).  
 
The most catastrophic event for Kurds in the 1980s was the al-
                                 
 12 For a detailed and balanced analysis of events in the KRI between 1960 
and 1975 see Bengio, 2012. 
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Anfal (also known as the Kurdish genocide) campaign authorised 
by Saddam Hussein in 1988 as a plan for systematic depopulation 
of rural Iraqi Kurdistan in order to remove Kurdish rebellious forces 
presence from the region, and to cut all facili ties needed for 
resurrecting and maintaining the Peshmerga (Anderson & 
Stansfield, 2009, p. 169). The campaign was pursued with ruthless 
brutality by Saddam’s cousin Ali Hassan Al-Majid, who became 
known as ‘Chemical Ali’ through his infamous atrocities in both 
Kurdish regions in North and Shi’ite areas in south of Iraq but 
especially through mastering chemical attack on Halabja on 16th of 
March 1988, destroyed approximately 4,000 Kurdish villages with 
conventional and chemical weapons (MacDowall, 1996, p. 360). 
 
As for preparation for the Anfal campaign, Iraqi government 
needed to find political reasons and religious justification for the 
action. In its propaganda, the Iraqi government had portrayed the 
Kurds rebellions, if not all the Kurds, as ‘traitors’ and ‘collaborators 
with the enemy’, referring to the fact that PDK and PUK had sided 
with Iran, the ‘enemy’ of Iraq. The Iraqi regime also justified the 
Anfal campaign as it took on a connotation of religious 
excommunication (takfir). (Rogg and Rimscha, 2007: 828)13. 
                                 
 13 The term is borrowed from the eighth ‘Sura’, of The Holy Quran and 
means ‘spoils of war’. The underlying message was that as Kurds re 
unbelievers, it is acceptable to kill the men and to take women and 
property as spoils of war. This is despite the Ba’ath Party’s claim to be 
a secular socialist party (the Centre of Halabja Against Anfalization and 
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It was not only villagers that were targeted, the most known 
catastrophic humanitarian mass killing happened on 16 March 1988 
over the city of Halabja in the southeast of Slemany, which was 
attacked by chemical weapons and in the matter of hours 
approximately 5000 civilians died (MacDowall, 1996, pp. 357-358). 
Another example was displacing the whole town of Qaladize and its 
surrounding area of Pishder district in 1989. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The Kurdish town of Halabja, March 1988 
Air-bombed by chemical weapons by the Iraqi forces on 16th of March 
1988. Source: (Kardozi, 2012) 
                                 
Genocide of the Kurds (CHAK), 2007, pp. 8-9; Gunter, 1993, p. 296). 
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Figure 3.3 The town of Qaladiza on the Iranian border, 1991.  
With an estimated population of 100,000, Qaladiza was razed to the 
ground in June 1989. This photograph was taken in 1991 following the 
return of local people in the aftermath of the March 1991 uprising. 
Photograph by Suzan Miesals (Miesals, 1991)  
 
Undisputedly, what Kurds of Iraq have experienced in the last 
century was a full-scale discrimination, fight, constant 
displacement, temporary cease-fire, negotiations that always been 
breached by mistrust, and extreme oppression that ended with 
genocide operations14. Undoubtedly, these events have had a 
                                 
 14 The mass killings and atrocities of the 1980s are yet to be universally 
recognised as genocide; and Kurdish activists inside the KRI and in the 
diaspora are struggling to secure international recognition on the 
matter. In recent years a number of European parliaments have shown 
interest in the subject and some have recognised the actions as 
genocide: the UK and Sweden among them. The website of the Centre 
of Halabja for Genocide and Anfalization (Chak) contains valuable 
information and data on Iraqi actions against Kurds in the 1980s: 
http://www.chak.be/pages/Lnaguages/English.htm 
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profound effect on the state of identity of Iraqi Kurds. Any average 
Kurd on the streets of KRI has a story to tell in this regard. The 
stories have also fixed in a fascinating manner in the language and 
discourse of Kurdish nationalism. The rooted effects of these events 
have so far proved to be far-reaching for generations to come. I 
would argue that these experiences have created a line of 
convergence along various, even conflicting political discourse. 
They are the grounds upon which a collective memory has been 
built transcending even the geographical boundaries which divide 
the Kurds to become a universal memorial property of Kurds 
wherever they may be. 
3.4.4 From ‘North of Iraq’ to ‘Kurdistan Region’: Uprising 
1991 and the Establishment of Kurdistan Regional 
Governments 
In the aftermath of the first Gulf War the victorious Coalition forces 
led by the US signalled that Kurds in the north of Iraq (as well as 
Shi’ites in the country’s south) should prepare for the unexpected, 
and in March 1991 – within two weeks of the war’s end – another 
Kurdish uprising began, resulting in the near total ‘liberation’ of 
Kurdish populated areas.15 The speed with which the liberation was 
                                 
 15 Like so many aspects of Kurdish history, the precise start date and 
initial location of the uprising is disputed (in both Kurdish and non-
Kurdish accounts). Official accounts date it to the liberation of Ranya on 
the 5th of March, but others consider the 4th of March uprising at the 
Khabat compound near Erbil the beginning of the uprising.  
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happening was largely due to the fact that the Iraqi forces had 
suffered massive blows in their confrontation with the allied forces 
on the Kuwait front. Taking advantage of the vulnerable situation 
of the Iraqi forces in the north and instigated by enthusiastic 
Kurdish nationalist calls from main Kurdish parties through their 
radio broadcasting, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan rose up and 
marched against Iraqi forces in what called the 1991 uprising 
(‘Raperin’ in Kurdish) (or the Intifadha in Arabic). Not only the 
clandestine Kurdish party cells and Peshmerga that were in 
marching, also the whole population rose up including the Kurdish 
auxiliary Jash forces. The people were still celebrating liberation 
when it was realised that the USA and its allied forces are not happy 
to see a fractured Iraqi state. When Saddam Hussein realised the 
strategy shift of USA then he successfully reconsolidated his army 
and marched back into Kurdistan. As Kurds had experienced 
Saddam’s vengeance in the past, hundreds of thousands of people 
left their cities and towns leaving everything behind walking or 
driving to mountains on Iranian or Turkish borders. In that freezing 
condition of early spring, hundreds of people lost their lives either 
in cold or in hanger (Galbraith, 2005, pp. 268-269). In addition to 
hundreds of those civilians stayed at their homes captured and later 
on killed by Iraqi forces. The Peshmerga from most Kurdish parties 
confronted the Iraqi army advancing towards so-called liberated 
areas, which again caused hundreds of deaths on both sides. 
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Iraqi forces had the military capability to retake Iraqi Kurdistan, 
but they retook the big cities while stopping at the edge of other 
populated areas. What stopped Saddam from advancing further 
into liberated areas in Kurdistan was the United Nations Securi ty 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 688 which, accordingly the Operation 
Provide Comfort (OPC) implemented on Iraq in order to provide 
security and humanitarian aid to refugees fled to Turkish and 
Iranian borders. In this context a safe haven in the north and a no-
fly zone in both Kurdish and Shi’ite populated areas were imposed. 
Through the OPC the USA and its allies persuaded people who fled 
from Iraqi forces to go back to their homes where they could better 
be supplied with basic needs. The no-fly zone applied on about half 
of Iraqi Kurdistan territories which was not under the control of 
Iraqi government. The zone was secured according to OPC put 
strict obstructions on Iraqi ground and air forces against moving 
towards Kurdistan. More than a million Kurdish refugees began 
returning to their cities and towns in May 1991 (Gunter, 1993). In 
an unexpected move, the Iraqi army and local administration were 
ordered to withdraw from re-occupied areas of Kurdistan except in 
Kirkuk city. This gave the IKF control over three provinces of 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq: Erbil, Slemany and Duhok (Galbraith, 2005, 
p. 269).  
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These new events confirmed the de facto of Kurdistan Region as an 
autonomous region with self-government. Since 1991 Kurdistan 
Region has taken its own different path in political development 
from the rest of Iraq. It is no longer seen as simply three integral 
governorates of Iraq as they used to be since the end of First World 
War. However the story post-uprising entails different forms of 
Kurdish self-rule, intra-Kurdish conflict and political developments 
vis-à-vis the primary concerned state (Iraq) and other concerned 
neighbouring states (i.e. Iran and Turkey). 
3.5 Governing Kurdistan Region 
Iraqi-Kurdistan as a term has been used in this research as a 
geographical area in northern Iraq that consists of the actual areas 
under the control of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the 
‘disputed areas’ like the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Shngal 
and Makhmuur, to name just a few. The term KRI is a new formula 
which started after the establishment of the first KRG in 1992 and 
does not include the disputed areas. See Figure 3.4 
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Figure 3.4 Map of Kurdistan Region-Iraq and disputed territories.  
Courtesy of International Crisis Group (2003) 
 
After holding its first democratic election on May 19 1992 the IKF’s 
administration was replaced by a legitimate government of 
Kurdistan Region. Only residents of the ‘free’ part of Kurdistan 
Region-Iraq were allowed to vote for the Kurdistan National 
Assembly which consisted of 105 seats at the time. The competition 
was very tough between KDP and PUK which ended in a near dead-
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heat. After negotiations both parties agreed on power-sharing in a 
council of Ministers appointed by the parliament with 50 MPs from 
the KDP, 50 MPs from the PUK, and 5 PMs elected from Christian 
minority list. (Romano, 2004, p. 158; Stansfield, 2003b, p. 96)  
 
Saddam’s isolation of the region from the rest of Iraq proved fruitful 
for Kurds. This led to a form of regional self-government in the 
Kurdistan Region that the Iraqi government would not otherwise 
have tolerated. Michael Gunter observed back in 1993 that despite 
the fact that independence was not an option on the table for the 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq at that time, however, the very aspiration to 
independence would not be ruled out by Kurdish leader. He recalls 
an announcement released at the occasion of unification between 
two Kurdish political parties back in 1992 declaring ‘our Kurdish 
nation’s right to self-determination, including the right to establish 
its independent state as the last objective ’ (cited in Gunter, 1993, 
p. 300). As part of their elections campaign in 1992, the expression 
of self-determination was one of their main slogans. To be more 
precise, PUK’s election campaign was mostly based on the slogan 
of ‘self-determination’ (see Figure 3.5), while KDP would refrain 
from using such terms opting implicitly to ‘autonomy within Iraq’, 
instead. 
 
Unfortunately the power sharing in KRG did not resolve the long-
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lasting disagreement between both major parties that had started 
since mid-1960s. The disagreement turned into a full-scale civil war 
in 1994 and  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Front page of the PUK’s official paper during May 1992 election 
campaigns in the KRI. A slogan at the top of the page reads ‘The right 
of self-determination, we will write it in our hearts’.  
 
 
lasted until 199816. This was the most serious intra-Kurd conflict of 
the many that occurred during the 1990s. At the meantime, it was 
the most devastating fighting during that period, and probably in 
the modern history of Iraqi Kurds as well, with destructive effects 
                                 
 16 For further detail see McDowall (1996), Anderson and Stansfield 
(2004) and Galbraith (2005).  
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and long-lasting legacy. Just one year before the fighting erupted 
between PUK and KDP, another less destructive fighting occurred 
between PUK and the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK) which 
resulted in the defeat of IMK, capturing of many of their members, 
including the supreme leader (Sheikh Osman Abdul Aziz) and 
retreat of the rest to the Iranian borders, later to regroup around 
Halabja and Qaladize (Bengio, 2012, p. 210). The actual fighting 
between KDP and PUK lasted from 1994 to 1998, which ended with 
the Washington Agreement in 1998 (Yildiz, 2004, p. 60). However, 
the political history of Kurdistan Region in the second half of the 
1990s tells the story of mistrust and conflict between KDP and PUK 
and their leaders. Only after the 2003 invasion when rebuilding 
Iraqi government in Baghdad attracted their attention they 
substituted internal conflict with cooperation.  Even when the USA 
involved in their conflict in 1998 (through the Washington 
Agreement) to cease the fire between both parties, they did not do 
much to unify the two single-party administrations until later in 
2000s. 
3.5.1 Instability and Conflict: the intra-Kurdish fighting, 
1994 – 1998 
As noted earlier, the KDP was founded in 1946 as an uneasy 
alliance between two different social groupings: a tribally-oriented 
group under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani; and an urban 
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intelligentsia guided by Ibrahim Ahmed and his young protégé, 
Jalal Talabani (President of Iraq from 2005-2014 and current leader 
of the PUK). Despite the differences in their political views and 
ideology, both groups gathered around one political party. However 
the interfusion broke in 1964 and the KDP split into two wings. The 
first group (known as ‘politburo wing’) led by Ahmed-Talabani and 
the second (‘the leadership wing’) led by Barzani. The rivalry ended 
with the success of Barzani in gaining March Accord 1970 
(MacDowall, 1996, pp. 315-320). After the collapse of Kurdish 
revolution in 1975, the division resurfaced again. The KDP 
reorganized under the leadership of Idris Barzani and then Masoud 
Barzani (sons of Mustafa Barzani), while Jalal Talabani formed a 
new party from mostly moderate and left-minded nationalist 
groups (Stansfield, 2005, p. 197). 
 
The period from the end of 1970s through to 1980s witnessed 
constant rivalry between KDP, PUK and some other Kurdish political 
forces. As KDP, under the new leadership, recommenced its armed 
struggle against the Iraqi government in the late 1970s under a 
new revolutionary name (‘Gulan revolution’). The period also 
witnessed the ever increasing strength of PUK. There is a Kurdish 
proverb saying ‘you can’t cook two bull heads in the same pan’, the 
situation in Kurdistan Region-Iraq the post-1975 failure proved to 
resemble that of the proverb. The two main political parties both 
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claimed their legitimate right to lead the newly revived Kurdish 
armed struggle. While KDP would recourse to the historical legacy 
of Mustafa Barzani who led the September Revolution for years and 
also led KDP, as the single unifying political front until 1974, PUK 
would build their claims of legitimacy on the basis of criticizing the 
failed leadership and backwardness of Barzani, a man who was to 
be blamed over 1974 historical Kurdish failure (according to the 
PUK). It is interesting to note that the Kurdish renewed armed 
struggle against the Iraqi government after 1975 has a different 
name and content in the PUK’s historiography (i.e. ‘Șorişy Niwé’ in 
Kurdish which stands for the New Revolution).  
 
In the course of ten to fifteen years until 1991, the two parties 
seized every opportunity to downgrade the other’s credibility and 
strength. Unfortunately, the period also witnessed some 
devastating in-fighting between the two parties, sometimes 
dragging other political parties into their rivalries. Probably the 
worst of these fighting was the Hakari fighting between KDP and 
PUK Peshmerga forces in which a large number of PUK Peshmerga 
were killed or captured among a number of high-ranked colleagues 
of Talabani (MacDowall, 1996, p. 345; Stansfield, 2006b, pp. 87-
89). Under severe conditions of 1980s of which all Kurdish political 
parties and Kurdish civilian had their share, KDP and PUK reconciled 
under an umbrella Kurdish front called the ‘Iraqi Kurdistan Front’ 
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(IKF) in 1988. The IKF brought eight major political parties in 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq, along with KDP and PUK, Kurdistan Popular 
Democratic Party (KPDP), Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP), 
Kurdistan Action independent Party (PASOK), Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP), Kurdistan Toilers Party (KTP) and Assyrian Democratic 
Party (ADP) (Mistafa, 1988; Stansfield, 2006b, p. 92), and proved 
to be an ideal coalition for upcoming events. Following the 1991 
uprising the KDP and PUK continued as the primary actors in the 
political life of the KRI. The relation between both major parties 
has, in a way or another, always been in an unstable state. Their 
cooperation and opposition have marked the Kurdish nationalist 
movement after 1975. 
 
When the results of 1992 elections revealed, the PUK with 43.6% 
5of the vote did not accept its marginal defeat versus the KDP with 
45% of the vote (MacDowall, 1996, p. 381). PUK could not agree 
to take on the role of opposition either, as proposed by the then 
deputy-leader of PUK Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin. After tensions 
and negotiations between major parties, they adopted a plan which 
satisfied both sides. According to the plan, the KDP and PUK equally 
divided the 100 seats of KNA (in addition to 5 seats reserved for 
the Christians) between them. Following tense negotiations 
between the two parties, they agreed to the aforementioned fifty-
fifty power-sharing agreement which, spread throughout the KRG 
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structure. (Stansfield, 2005, p. 200) 
  
The power sharing not only failed to resolve the mistrust and 
disputes already existed between the two parties but it deepened 
the rivalry and antipathy between party leaders until the intra civil 
war known by Kurds as Birakuji (Fratricide) in 1994 erupted. The 
fighting resulted in the long-lasting division of KRI between two 
enclaves dominated by KDP and PUK. 
Since then KRI divided politically and geographically between KDP 
and PUK regions. Erbil and Duhok make the KDP dominated region, 
and Slemany and Germyan the PUK strongholds (see Figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6 The PUK and KDP controlled zones of the KRI (1994-2002). 
Source: Johanna Revera (2011)  
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The KDP and PUK have had long disputes over leadership and 
revenue linked to the Khabur border gate. The disputes over 
revenues generated from the Khabur border gate may have been 
the main factor behind the actual conflict between the two parties. 
This aforementioned division created an extreme instability and 
uncertainty in sociopolitical life of Kurdistan Region.  During the 
civil war people were asked to show their loyalty to either party on 
both sides and threatened, arrested tortured or even killed when 
proved that they were loyal to the rival party. No official statistics 
on all causalities have been published, however it is believed that 
more than 2,000 Kurds were killed until the half term of the civil 
war before the USA brokered a peace in 1995 (Plotz, 1996). This 
division was strictly enforced to the extent that party members 
were forbidden from visiting areas outside of their party’s control. 
With regard to internal refugees, the KDP estimated that 58,000 of 
its party members and supporters had been expelled from PUK-
controlled region between October 1996 and October 1997, 
likewise, PUK claimed that 49,000 of its party members and 
supporters were expelled from the KDP-controlled region between 
August 1996 and December 1997 (Global security, n.d.) 
 
After several meditations from Iran, Turkey and the USA a process 
of political understanding and normalization was embraced by the 
two parties that gained American approval in 1998 under the terms 
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of the Washington Agreement in 1998, which ended their actual 
armed conflict (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, p. 177). However 
they did not manage to wholly overcome the conflict.  It took nearly 
seven years of normalisation, negotiation and coordination until 
they managed to merge their two single-party administrations. This 
intra-Kurd war constrained the formation of a unified military force 
for the KRI and although agreements in 2006 ostensibly created a 
unified Ministry of Peshmerga, each party retained control of 
significant numbers of armed forces under different names and 
justifications. 
 
3.5.2 Particracy, single-Party Administration of KDP and 
PUK, and Power Sharing 
The fifty-fifty power sharing agreement reflected the manner in 
which the entire social life of the KRI was divided, with the KDP and 
PUK exercising a substantial degree of control over political, 
economic and social life. Until the 2009 elections, there was very 
little space for independent associational life, or an active public 
sphere beyond party control. Almost every political party in 
Kurdistan Region, especially both major dominant parties, act as a 
little cabinet covering civic organisations within its party structure. 
This argument is more applicable to the ruling parties, KDP and 
PUK (Bruinessen, 2005, p. 66), as they are not merely single 
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organisations, but also embrace student union, women 
organisation, teacher association and security apparatus within 
their structures. Although there were KRG offices and Kurdistan 
Parliament as legislative body but they were acting as party 
organisations rather than regional government bodies. Natali 
argues that the KRG and Kurdistan Parliament actually operated by 
officials play as functionaries for political party leaders (Natali, 
2010, pp. 11-12). Politburos and party leaders are the main 
reference of power rather than Kurdistan parliament as it supposed 
to be. While decisions are made and laws passed in the parliament 
but the reality is these have to be first approved by respective 
politburos. Arguably, the mentioned situation is more apparent 
with the two main parties. 
 
The legacy of favouritism in recruitment has a long root in 
Kurdistan Region, which undoubtedly dates back to Iraqi regime. 
Partisanship has deepened in the Kurdistan Region (as it has in Iraq 
more broadly). The two parties still retain the power over processes 
of recruitment and employment, which is strongly tied to party 
loyalty, kinship ties and favouritism. This is what some call it 
particracy (‘Hizbokrasy’17 in Kurdish), in KRG administration, which 
means the existence of party power behind every decision made by 
                                 
17 This term, which refers to the power of the parties behind decisions, 
first emerged during the 2000s in the writings of a growing critical elite. 
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parliament or government executives. In some cases it is very 
difficult to clearly distinguish government offices from party ones. 
For instance, Masoud Barzani when he was first elected as 
president of the Kurdistan Region in 2005 and re-elected again in 
2009 built the presidency office near to his home and his party 
presidency office in Sari Rash, 40 km (25 miles) north-east of 
capital Erbil and located approximately 7km (4.5 miles) close to his 
party politburo. This situation, in other words, shows the lack of 
institutional policies and bureaucratic procedures in doing politics 
and administration in KRI.  
 
However, the political instability became more apparent since the 
KDP and PUK signed their ‘Strategic Agreement’ on July 27 2007 
which, accordingly, Talabani and Barzani agreed to unify the two 
KRGs in order to help Kurds make the best of changes and 
developments in post-Saddam Iraq. The fundamental principles of 
the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK are as follows: 
1. Participating in the Iraqi and regional elections with a unified list. 
2. All government positions in either Iraq or KRG will be shared by 
the two parties (KDP-PUK) and both will support each other’s 
members in not only Erbil but also in Baghdad. Moreover, the PUK 
and KDP will share power in the cabinet for four years, with each 
party holding the prime ministerial position and controlling the 
cabinet for two years each. (Semin, 2012) 
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Although the unified KRG was announced following the strategic 
agreement between both major parties, but still three sensitive 
ministries were not unified until mid-2012. Even though there were 
on-going negotiations between KDP and PUK and constant criticism 
from opposition parties, three ministries: Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Finance and Economy, and Ministry of Peshmerga had 
not been completely merged until 5th of April 2012 when Nechirvan 
Barzani announced his seventh KRG cabinet (KRG, 2012a). 
Furthermore, although the two ministries of Peshmerga are 
supposed to be unified, until the writing of these lines each party 
of the KDP and the PUK retain their own armed units with few 
Peshmerga units under the full control of the Ministry of 
Peshmerga. 
 
Having merged the two single-party administrations since June 
2006, the power sharing system returned to KRG and continued 
but this time between more powerful KDP and weak PUK, especially 
after the crack happened to the PUK and the Change Movement 
(Gorran) emerged. 
 
Rather than fostering a greater unity, the power-sharing 
arrangements acted as a catalyst for the intensification of 
competition between the two main parties, who struggled to work 
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alongside each other in government (to the point where even slight 
disagreements could erupt in conflict) (Stansfield, 2005, p. 201). 
Beside the almost paralysing effects of the new power-sharing 
system in KRG the manifestation of the rooted rivalries between 
the two parties is far from over (Stansfield, 2006a). One of the 
most striking characteristics of this division, then, is the inability of 
the KRG to act as a unified national government that transcends 
factional party politics.  
 
Even the untrained observer could identify the presence of party 
politics by simply observing government offices and directories, as 
portraits of party leaders and historical Kurdish nationalists 
decorate their walls. Depending on which area of KRI you visit you 
will see portraits of different party leaders or historical Kurdish 
nationalist leaders. While in some areas a joint portrait depicting 
Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani is hung on the walls, in other 
areas only portraits of Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, Mustafa 
Barzani, or Nechirvan Barzani grab your attention. At some offices 
even portraits of Idris Barzani (the deceased older brother of 
Masoud Barzani), or Masrur Barzani (son of Masoud Barzani), or 
Kosrat Rasol (PUK’s politburo member) appear. In Figure 3.7 an art 
shop is photographed where portraits of living and dead Kurdish 
political leaders appear. This reality demonstrates the divided 
situation in KRI even over symbolic figures, something which is 
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fundamentally linked to the bitter reality of Kurdish inability to 
sketch a unified national identity, at least in small geographical 
areas such as that of KRI. 
 
Figure 3.7 An art shop in Erbil selling portraits of major Kurdish political 
leaders, both dead and alive. Photograph by author.   
3.5.3 A unique opportunity 
Several factors played a significant role in the KRI gaining semi-
autonomy. Firstly, the process began with UN Security Council 
Resolution 688, which secured a no-fly zone that allowed Kurds to 
return to their homes after the mass exodus of 1991. In effect, the 
people of Iraqi Kurdistan were able to organise their social and 
political life free from the threat posed by Iraqi government forces. 
The resolution was the first time that the Kurds were mentioned by 
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name by a major supranational organisation since the break-up of 
their lands following the First World War. In 1993 Michael Gunter 
argued that the success of the KRI would pave the way for future 
similar international actions and it is likely that international action 
in Kurdistan – despite its drawbacks – inspired international 
interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor during the 1990s. 
 
Secondly, another major factor in the KRI gaining semi-autonomy 
was UN Security Council Resolution 986, which introduced the Oil-
for-Food Programme (OFFP) and treated Kurdistan separately from 
the rest of Iraq. It was designed to allow the Iraqi government to 
export an agreed amount of oil under the supervision of the UN so 
that the basic needs of its citizens could be met and reserved 13% 
of oil export revenue for the Kurdistan Region (Natali, 2010). As 
Ofra Bengio observed, that means KRI would get $130 million 
dollar from OFFP in every round, which made it much better off 
than the rest of Iraq (2012, p. 274). In addition, before OFFP 
commenced the international aid through UN backed organizations, 
other governmental and none governmental organizations (NGOs) 
would make one of the main sources that helped KRI to maintain 
and continue. Denise Natali, in her study on the impact of foreign 
aid in the political development of KRI argues that international aid 
has significantly contributed in the maintenance, continuity and 
growth of KRG administration leading to its current status, which 
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she refers to as ‘Quasi-state’ (Natali, 2010).  
 
Thirdly, recognising the KRG as an official Kurdish administration 
by Transitional Administration Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004 within 
the framework of adopting federalism as the basis for the system 
of government in Iraq (Stansfield 2005, 197) was a great gain for 
Kurds in Iraq. 
 
Fourthly, Kurdistan Region with its current borders was most 
consolidated in the permanent Iraqi Constitution (backed by 78% 
of Iraqi voters in a referendum held on 15 October 2005). The new 
Iraqi Constitution openly confirmed that it ‘recognise[s] the region 
of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region’ 
(Iraqi Interior Minsitry, General Directorate of Nationality, 2005). 
Since the adoption of new constitution, the KRG has gained 
legitimacy as a constituent state in the pluralistic democratic 
federal Iraq. 
 
The final factor in the politics of Kurdistan Region which contributed 
in the consolidation and prosperity of KRG was the integration of 
both Erbil and Slemany administrations and reunification of 
Kurdistan Regional Government on 7th May 2006 under the 
premiership of KDP’s vice president Nechirvan Barzani. 
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This combination of factors means that the KRI has been beyond 
the everyday control of the Iraqi central government for more than 
two decades. It is arguably becoming more distanced from the rest 
of Iraq and a sense of ‘difference’ has been grown. This is evident 
not only in the discourse of nationalist political parties but also on 
the streets of the KRI.  In a detailed study of ethno-nationalist 
identity in the KRI, Mahir Aziz (2011) shows that a new generation 
have grown up in Kurdistan without experiencing the socio-political 
influence of the central Iraqi government and are unwilling to be 
labelled Iraqi, instead identifying as ‘Kurdistani’. This claim appears 
to be substantiated by numerical data: in an unofficial referendum 
carried out alongside the general election in January 2005, Kurds 
were asked to vote on whether they wanted the KRI to remain part 
of Iraq or obtain full independence. 98.8% of those who voted 
supported independence (Olson, 2005: 228). 
 
Analysis addressing the political development of Kurdistan Region 
evaluate establishment of KRG as the most important event in the 
history of Kurds. Many argue that the formation of KRG provided a 
unique opportunity to Iraqi Kurds to consolidate their jurisdiction 
something which encourages some researchers to label KRG as a 
‘semi state’, ‘de facto independent state’ or ‘de facto state’ 
(Galbraith, 2005; Gunter, 1993). In this regard, Denise Natali 
described the KRG as a quasi-state where the international aid 
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agencies have played a significant role in its consolidation and 
development (Natali, 2010). 
3.6 The Economy of Kurdistan Region 
Before the Gulf war of 1991 and emergence of the semi-
autonomous entity of Kurdistan Region which followed, the Iraqi 
government had intentionally left the Kurdish areas economically 
behind. Despite the destruction caused to agricultural economy and 
infrastructural facilities as a result of displacing rural population 
from nearly 4500 Kurdish villages, industries had rarely been set 
up by the Iraqi government which could offer good job 
opportunities for forcibly relocated rural and urban populations. In 
addition to the repression and destruction to which the Kurdistan 
Region was subjected, it was just like other parts of Iraq, 
significantly affected by Gulf war and its aftermath. 
 
At the time of the 2003 regime change in Iraq, Michiel Leezenberg 
argued that contrary to wavering political conditions since 1991, 
the Kurdistan Region has experienced moderate economic 
prosperity. He clearly pointed to some distinctive elements of the 
Kurdistan Region’s economy during the first decade of Kurdish 
ruling experience 1992-2003 such as: continuing to use the older 
‘Swiss print’ Iraqi Dinar, while in the rest of Iraq the new locally 
printed banknotes became the official money; foreign aid and 
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internationally funded NGOs; the revenues of the transit trade in 
oil, which were an enormous source of wealth; and the OFFP of the 
UN (Leezenburg, 2003, p. 149; 2005, pp. 631-638). However, 
needless to say that due to the on-going resistance in Iraqi 
Kurdistan up to 1991, deliberate ignorance and even destruction of 
thousands of villages and several larger towns by the Iraqi 
government badly damaged the infrastructure and left the Kurdish 
populated areas in a state of enduring underdevelopment. 
 
During the early stages of Kurdish self-rule, it appeared that the 
KRI’s newly semi-autonomous administration was incapable of 
leading the region’s recovery, with international and regional aid 
organisations playing a greater role in helping it through the 
extreme scarcity it experienced during the early 1990s. As a result, 
a major source of income in the KRI during the 1990s was the 
illegal trade of crude oil from Iraq to Turkey. This was a major point 
of dispute between the KDP and the KUP in the 1990s; and between 
the KRG and the Iraqi central government after 2003. The trade 
saw Iraqi oil illegally smuggled into Turkey through the KDP 
controlled Ibrahim Khalil border crossing. Under UN sanctions, the 
exporting of Iraqi oil was illegal, but the trade was encouraged or 
tolerated by the KRG, the Iraqi Government and Turkey. Other 
goods including cigarettes, alcohol, food, luxury items and 
household appliances were routinely smuggled into KRI, often 
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through the Khabur border crossing and Iranian borders, 
generating further income through customs duties. However, the 
wealth created by smuggling was rarely redistributed and became 
something of a curse on the KRI’s citizens. As Leezenberg notes, 
‘disagreement over the division of these revenues was one of the 
main causes of Kurdish infighting’ (Leezenburge, 2005, p. 638). 
Initially, it was shared by the KDP, PUK, and KRG; but the latter 
was excluded when disputes emerged later.  
 
To better understand economic life in the KRI it is important to 
understand the context created by the economic blockades 
imposed on the region in the 1990s – the first by the UN Security 
Council (which covered all of Iraq); and the second by the Iraqi 
government – which significantly affected social, economic and 
political life in the KRI. The lack of government spending power 
meant it was difficult to increase employment, a pressing issue 
given the small private sector in the region. These factors, 
combined with the concentration of wealth with the two major 
political parties, created space for a politics of patronisation and 
exploitation. Thus, in the mid-90s it was common for the 
unemployed to be recruited into the KDP and PUK’s ever-growing 
armed units, fuelling on-going fighting and deepening the schism 
between the two parties (as well as the social milieu more broadly). 
This drew widespread disapproval, however, and that paved the 
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way for the emergence of a new oppositional front following the 
2003 Iraq War. 
 
The 2003 conflict provided Iraqi Kurds with a golden opportunity to 
fight alongside the American military, creating opportunities 
greater even than those that arose during the 1991 war. When the 
Turkish parliament refused to allow 60,000 American soldiers to 
enter Iraq from Turkey, the Kurdish leadership seized the 
opportunity by showing their willingness to provide a safe passage, 
and offered to send troops to support the American led coalition as 
part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Galbraith, 2005, p. 271). The 
Kurdish Peshmerga thus formed a unified front with US forces in 
the north of Iraq and participated in the ‘liberation’ of large parts 
of the region, including Kirkuk and Mosul.  
 
By allying with the US the Kurds hoped to achieve two objectives. 
Firstly, they wanted to secure their control over the disputed areas 
in the northern front; and secondly they wanted to ally with the 
US, which was to govern Iraq until regime change was secured. 
Subsequent events showed that they were at least partially 
successful, although to date no resolution has been made regarding 
the disputed regions.  
 
Despite this failure, Kurds played a central role in the 
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reconstruction following the establishment of the Iraqi Governing 
Council, which had five (out of 25) Kurdish members.18 In 
particular, the election of Jalal Talabani as President of Iraq in April 
2005 constituted a major political achievement for the Iraqi Kurds. 
The appointment of Talabani for the president of Iraq proved to 
have had a tremendous symbolic effect on the Iraqi Kurds. This led 
the popular Kurdish presenter (Ferhad Sengawi) in a public 
gathering to deliberate Talabani’s appointment to chant ‘Now 
Qandil is Ruling Baghdad’ (Sengawi, 2014). Qandil refers to the 
famous mountainous area on the IKR-Iranian borders which, has 
always been a sanctuary for Kurdish Peshmerga and civilian. 
Furthermore, Kurds played an influential role in drafting Iraq’s 2005 
constitution, managing to incorporate a number of their historical 
demands. The federal structure of Iraq strengthened the KRG’s 
political and jurisdictional power within Iraq; and the instigation of 
a ‘normalisation process’ in Kirkuk – designed to negate the 
Arabisation process that had operated there throughout Ba’athist 
rule – was also seen as a major gain for the Kurds.  
 
One should note that the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil 
has been in a very unsettled state exactly after where Kurds 
                                 
 18 The bargaining power of Kurdish members in the council demonstrated 
in their ability to make the rest of the members accept federalism as the 
new form of the Iraqi state in March 2004 (AlJazeera.com, 2004). 
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thought that they have achieved more than they have ever done 
so. The implementation of the Iraqi constitution and political 
agreements between the Kurdish parties and Iraqi Shi’ite parties 
who hold the real power in post-2003 Iraq proved to be difficult. 
The main areas of disagreement between the two parties were the 
nature of the federal state, the powers of regions and the centre, 
the issue of Kirkuk and other disputed areas, the ever-growing 
conflict over management of natural resources and revenues and 
also the issue of Peshmerga forces (Stansfield, 2006a). While KRI 
political leaders have had to work in a very fragile and conflict-
ridden context of Iraq since 2003, so far, the new era can best be 
marked as the golden era of KRI. In fact, a large number of 
researchers and commentators have argued that KRI is moving 
towards becoming an active non-state actor on the international 
stage in a way that some independent states are unable to do. It 
has also been argued that the blooming economy in the region 
post-2003 has been both the result and effect of the political status 
and security conditions that KRI has been enjoying since 2003. 
While KRG would hardly manage to pay for its employees before 
2003, now, thanks to the enormous volume of foreign and national 
investment through various sectors, Oil, commodity trade, local 
industry, business and agriculture, KRI is home to tens of 
thousands of foreign companies, businesses and workers. While the 
standard of living for an average citizen in KRI may not be 
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comparatively justified, significant progress has been achieved in 
terms of people’s welfare and public infrastructure. The economic 
development has had dramatic effects on the foreign relations of 
KRI with neighbouring countries especially Turkey and Iran. At the 
moment, hundreds of Turkish and Iranian companies are working 
in major sectors of economy in KRI19. Furthermore, in the last two 
to three years Turkey has been willing to provide passage for the 
export of crude oil to major international and European oil markets 
(Pamuk, 2013). 
 
While we are not in a position to reduce our analysis to pure 
economic factors, economy has proved to work well in normalising, 
even improving relations between KRI with its two unwelcoming 
neighbours namely, Iran and Turkey. The new situation can be 
better understood if we point back to the conflictual and strained 
nature which characterised KRI relations with Iran and Turkey in 
the 1990s and pre-2003.  
                                 
19 The long-lasting dispute over oil and other natural resources between 
Erbil and Baghdad resulted in the Iraqi government withholding the 
KRI’s 17% share of the Iraqi federal budget from February 2014. This 
action was taken during Nurial-Maliki’s governorship and proved a 
significant economic constraint on the KRG, with significant knock-on 
effects for ordinary people in the KRI.  
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3.7 Reform or change: Emerging Opposition in the politics 
of Kurdistan Region 
The presence of a large number of political parties in Kurdistan 
Region dates back to the end of the Gulf War and the Uprisings in 
1991. Despite the diversity in their social orientation and political 
ideology from nationalistic to Islamist and from communist to more 
liberal, there has not been an active political opposition system in 
Kurdistan Region until the second half of 2000s. The fifty-fifty 
power-sharing system of early 1990s eliminated any chance for the 
emergence of an opposition-friendly environment. Consequently, 
the intra-Kurdish fighting has resulted in a political system which 
was not hospitable to political differences. 
 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), founded in 1994 in the mid of 
conflict between KDP and PUK found a highly fertile ground in the 
civil war period and grew up rapidly (Stansfield, 2005, p. 212), but 
gradually weakened during first half of 2000s. The party, which has 
links to the international front of Islamic Brotherhood, had been 
active for decades as a clandestine organization with no overt 
public activities until it announced itself in the form of a political 
party back in February 1994 at the most strained environment of 
KRI in the 1990s. While not very critical at the beginning, later at 
the end of 1990s through into 2000s, KIU tried to play the role of 
an opposition party. However, it suddenly decided to go into 
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coalition under the Coalition of Kurdistan List with the two major 
parties during the January 2005 Iraqi elections (Stansfield, 2006a). 
The KIU’s decision to participate in the coalition reduced its 
popularity as an opposition party. Thus, it decided to withdraw from 
the coalition due to the latter’s ‘corrupted profile’, this time taking 
rather an opposition stance and formed an electoral coalition under 
the name of Service and Reform List with Kurdistan Islamic Group 
(KIG), Kurdistan Socialist Party and Future Party for the 2009 
election. The KIU has been known by its reform-oriented slogan 
and approach, but the majority of people and its supporters were 
unconvinced, and mounted more pressure on ruling parties to 
accomplish real reform in the Kurdistan Regional Government. 
 
The voices of protest against social injustice, corruption and lack of 
public services formed a new mixed-base movement under the 
name of ‘Gorran’ or Change Movement ‘CM’ (later to become a 
party). This is the reform party founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa 
Amin in 2009. Amin, is a prominent Kurdish veteran Peshmerga 
and educated politician, resigned from his post as the deputy leader 
of the PUK in December 2006. He initially established a media 
outlet called ‘Wusha’ which stands for ‘word’. Finding a very fertile 
social and political environment at the time, Nawshirwan eventually 
set up his own political movement which soon managed to gather 
large numbers of frustrated grassroots and critical party members 
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from other main parties including KDP, PUK and KIU. The new 
party, which, initially preferred to act as an open movement instead 
of a ‘conventional party’ strongly opposed the corruption and 
nepotism, which KDP and PUK with their respective governments 
were accused with, for a long period of time since the establishment 
of the first KRG cabinet in 1992. The Movement advocated 
transparency in all aspects of public administration, government 
and party policies. Largely at the expense of the PUK, Gorran won 
almost 24% of the votes and secured 25 seats in the Kurdistan 
parliamentary elections held on 25 July 2009. Later in September 
2013 the CM was able to secure 24 seats in the Kurdistan 
parliament. Thus, Gorran was now the first real opposition party in 
the Kurdistan Parliament (Gunter, 2011). Gorran, instead of 
reform, set up a real change in the political system in its political 
manifesto and mobilised the discontented population of Kurdistan 
around promises of peaceful change of the political setting in KRI, 
as it believes that no real reform can be expected from the current 
system. The only way forward believed to be a real change towards 
democratic and institutional governance. The political manifesto of 
the CM extends from social and economic to political life.  
 
The entire political performance and strategy of the two ruling 
parties including their approach to nationally sensitive issues such 
as the issue of independent, national symbols, the issue of Kirkuk 
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and other disputed areas, has been under severe criticism by the 
CM allied with other long-disagreed smaller parties (Movement for 
Change [Gorran], n.d.). The CM too is questioned over its leaders’ 
part in the current political, administrative and economic conditions 
as most of its leaders once were active and influential especially, in 
the PUK controlled zone. 
 
In chapter seven I argue that the emergence of a viable opposition 
in the KRI has disrupted dominant Kurdish nationalist discourses in 
the region, with the new opposition utilising a discourse questioning 
the founding myths of Kurdish nationalism and problematizing the 
established nationalist ideology whilst offering new perspectives on 
how politics should be conducted in the KRI.20 
 
3.8 The Profile of Kurdistan Region: Essential Facts 
3.8.1 Population and area:  
The Kurdistan Region comprises of the three governorates of Erbil 
(the capital), Slemany and Duhok, which all together cover in total 
                                 
 20 In addition to the Movement for Change, the KRI has also witnessed 
the Hevdey Shubat (Seventeenth February) protests in Slemany and 
surrounding towns which started on 17th February 2011 and lasted for 
almost two months. This was a wave of popular disapproval of the way 
in which the traditional political parties were behaving. They resulted in 
10 casualties among both civilians and police forces and were ultimately 
crushed by force. The protests contributed to the development of new 
political discourses (Aragno & Schmidt, 2011). 
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an area of 40,643 square kilometres. As of 2010, nearly 5.2 million 
people live in Kurdistan Region (KRG, 2010a).The population is 
divided amongst 33 cities and districts and 136 towns (Kurdistan 
Region Statistics Office, 2011). 
 
Despite the fact that the Kurdistan Region has an increasing urban 
population, the rural areas were re-inhabited and reconstructed 
gradually in early 1990s, after it had been systematically destroyed 
by Iraqi governments between 1970s and 1990s. 
3.8.2 Political life:  
There is a pluralistic political party system in KRI which is 
implemented by law. According to KRG’s ministry of the Interior, 
as of 2011, 29 political parties licenced in Kurdistan Region. In 
addition to another 21 parties that still pending for formal license 
(Rudaw.net, 2011) 
 
In the 2009 general elections, other political parties stepped in to 
the parliament after removing the threshold of 7% of votes as a 
minimum to enter. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the 111 
Kurdistan parliament members according to major political parties. 
 
The political map has changed further as the result of the last 
general elections (September 2013) according to which the CM, 
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came forward as the second party with 24 seats pushing PUK to 
the third position with 18 seats. At the meantime, the KDP was able 
to retain its premier place with 38 seats while KIU Managed to 
secure 10 seats and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) secured 6 
seats. The interesting point here is the fact that compared to the 
first elections of 1992 where the parliament seats were exclusively 
occupied by the two main parties each with 50 seats with the 11 
seats going to the minorities, the 2009 elections showed a real shift 
in the political map in KRI after 17 years. The unconventional 
parties were able to create a breakthrough for the first time by 
gaining 41% of parliament seats. 
 
Table 3.1 Distribution of MPs in the Kurdistan Parliament (2009). 
Political parties and coalitions after the 2009 elections. Adopted from 
Kurdistan parliament and KRG websites 
Name of lists and political parties MPs/111 
Kurdistan List: (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan) 
59 
Change List 25 
Reform and Services List: (Kurdistan Islamic Union, 
Kurdistan Islamic Group, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic 
Party, Future Party) 
13 
Islamic Movement List 2 
Freedom and Social Justice List: (Kurdistan Communist 
Party, Kurdistan Toilers Party, Kurdistan Independent 
Work Party, Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, Democratic 
Movement of Kurdistan People) 
1 
Turkoman Democratic Movement 3 
Turkoman Reform List 1 
Turkoman Erbil List 1 
Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Council (Christian) 3 
Al-Rafidain List (Christian) 2 
Armenian independent MP: Aram Shahin Dawood 
Bakoyian 
1 
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3.9 Conclusion: 
A history of the KRI since the founding of Iraq shows that 1991 
marks a historical turning point for the region. The twentieth 
century witnessed the deaths of hundreds thousands of Kurds and 
frequent devastation of the region, with the Iraqi government and 
intra-Kurdish fighting preventing Kurds from achieving autonomy. 
Even once semi-autonomy was gained after 1991, the KRI’s single-
party administration severely hampered the region’s socio-political 
and economic life. Despite decades of suffering, and promising 
recent developments, Iraqi Kurds are still not free from extreme 
social and political instability. 
 
The events since the founding of Iraq have had an important 
influence on processes of identity formation in the KRI since 1991. 
Particularly important factors in this regard include the neglect the 
Kurds suffered at the hands of the international community, 
beginning in the aftermath of the First World War; frequent 
mistreatment by majority Arabs in Iraq, resulting in an enduring 
mistrust between Iraq’s two main populations; divisions in the 
Kurdish nationalist movement, which began in the 1960s and 
continue into the present; and the violent suppression of Kurds by 
the Iraqi government. In the forthcoming analytical chapters I draw 
on this history to show that Kurdish identity in the KRI is the 
product of a long historical and social journey, which needs to 
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account for the actions of ‘other’, non-Kurdish actors and significant 
social and political processes. The ever-changing historical and 
social context within which Kurds act produces a highly contingent 
and diverse identity, but one that has proven sufficient to outlast 
its often brutal suppression.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 The ethno-symbolic approach 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I utilise the ethno-symbolic approach to explore 
cultural and historic Kurdish identity formation in the KRI. In 
particular, I draw on Anthony Smith’s theory of nations and 
nationalism to critically discuss the ethno-symbolic approach; and 
to examine the theoretical implications of ethno-symbolism for 
understanding the inner dynamics of Kurdish identity formation 
since 1991. A full application of the theory to Kurdish identity 
formation is conducted in chapter five. 
4.2 The starting questions 
Ethno-symbolism begins with two questions: ‘when is the nation?’ 
and ‘how did it arise’? In other words, what must be accounted for 
in the genesis and history of any given nation? This problematizes 
the term ‘nation’, which is difficult to define. Primordialist 
approaches claim that nations are ‘perennial’; that they have 
existed in one form or another throughout known history and so 
are ‘timeless’ and ‘immortal’, existing in the ‘state of nature’. They 
consider the state, its bureaucracies and its political power as ‘the 
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public expressions of these pre-existing ethnic cleavages and 
cultural identities.’ (Smith, 1996a, p. 446) Modernist approaches, 
meanwhile, argue that nations – at least as the term is understood 
today – are modern phenomena that emerged during the industrial 
stage of European history at the end of seventeenth century 
(Gellner, 1969; 1983). Instrumentalists such as Benedict Anderson 
(2006) contend that state-makers – nationalist by definition – 
found the concept of the nation to be fertile ground for the 
mobilisation of the public and thus important in developing the 
nation-state and its social, economic and civil contours.  
 
For primordialists, nations, nationalism and national identity reflect 
ancient kinship ties. Pierre Van Den Berghe, for example, contends 
that ‘… both ethnicity and “race” (in the social sense) are, in fact, 
extensions of the idiom of kinship, and that, therefore, ethnic and 
race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and 
attenuated form of kin selection’ (1994, p. 97). Here, an 
unequivocal linkage is claimed between current forms of group 
identification and those from the distant past. Indeed, Berghe goes 
so far as to argue that ‘just as in the smaller kin units, the kinship 
was real often enough to become the basis of these powerful 
sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism and 
ethnocentrism’ (1994: p. 98). For Clifford Geertz, another well-
known primordialist, kinship ties are so pervasive in our social life 
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that ’for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, 
some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural – 
some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction’ 
(1994, p. 31). 
 
Evident in these quotes are two of the main trends in primordialist 
thinking: sociobiological and cultural primordialism (Smith, 1998, 
p. 147). Smith offers two arguments against the former, stating 
firstly that it proceeds from unfounded generalisations, which fail 
to account for different types of group attachment; and secondly 
that it is over reliant on a single factor (i.e. biological) whilst ruling 
out other factors that affect the ways in which nations evolved or 
formed (1998, p. 150). Smith notes that Geertz’s cultural approach 
is ‘far removed from the genetic socio-biologists’ (1998, p. 150): it 
does not take the primordialist ties as providing insight into an 
objective reality but rather considers them presumed ones. 
However, it still turns out to be ‘no more than an interesting 
tautology’ (1998, p. 158). It attempts to explain ethnicity and 
nationalism through ‘particular sentiments and attachments, which 
differ from others and shows how ethnicity and nationality 
exemplify their characteristics’; but fails to follow the historical 
formation and development of nationalism and ethnicity (1998, p. 
158).  
 
 143 
 
Contrary to the primordialist approach, ethno-symbolism traces the 
historical roots that underlie these sentiments and attachments. In 
order to elaborate further, and to explore other aspects of the 
ethno-symbolic approach, it is important to consider terminology 
used in the literature. It is to this task that I now turn. 
4.3 The ethno-symbolic conception 
4.3.1 Ethnie vs. Nation 
At the outset, before directly engaging with the ethno-symbolic 
theory of nations and nationalism, we need to come into terms with 
definitions of the main concepts which we will inevitably run into 
on the way of discussing the theory. To start with, the very basic 
concept and one which rests at the centre of ethno-symbolic theory 
is ethnie or ethnic group (Guibernau, 2004, p. 125). The term is 
defined by Smith as ‘a named human population with a myth of 
common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link 
with an historical territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity’ 
(Smith, 1993, p. 49, italics in the original). Vested with more 
complex and developed characters is ‘nation’, which is in turn 
described by Smith as ‘ a named human population sharing a 
historical territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public 
culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all 
members’(Smith 1996,2,3:359, italics in original). 
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As it can be seen from the two separate definitions of both ethnie 
and nation, while they both share some elements, at the meantime, 
they differ in other essential ones. To elaborate, while both share 
the elements of common name, common myths and shared 
memory/history, nations, can be distinguished from ethnies by 
common culture, physical occupation of homeland, common rights 
and duties, and a single economy. The difference, Smith argues, is 
due to the cultural nature of ethnies as compared to the political 
nature of nations. While cultural differentiates are essential for 
ethnies, however, in fully-fledged nations, they are replaced by 
common public culture. In addition, while a link to a homeland is a 
characteristic of ethnies, it is the physical occupation of the 
homeland that differentiates nations. Moreover, there might exist 
some (elite) solidarity within ethnies, however, what makes a 
community a nation is the sharing of common rights and duties 
among the citizens. 
 
Finally, while a single economy is a characteristic of nations, 
ethnies lack this element. The mentioned lines between ethnies and 
nations corresponded to their respective historical development. In 
other words, while it was highly possible for ethnies to exist in the 
pre-modern era, in the contrary, it was almost impossible to speak 
of nations until the modern times. Three of Smith’s criteria for 
nationhood namely, public culture, single economy and equal rights 
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and duties for all tightly related to modernity, also, the three 
elements, accompany the formation of the modern nation-state, 
some way or another.  In addition, the very terms ‘citizenship’ and 
‘citizen’ are artefacts of the modern times. As for the relationship 
between ‘state’ and ‘nation’, Smith differentiates the two when he 
bluntly remarks ‘a nation is not a state and it is not an ethnic 
community’ (2008, p. 12).  Furthermore, a nation might be in 
possession of its own state – in its institutional terms—but they 
differ in that nations ‘…..are felt and lived communities whose 
members share a homeland and a culture’ (2008, p. 12). 
 
As noted earlier the core to ethno-symbolic theory is historical 
ethnies and their myths and symbolic properties, upon which 
today’s nations are re-constructed. Accordingly, following Smith’s 
understanding, one way to approach contemporary nations or 
‘nations-to-be’ and to understand the language of their nationalism 
is to trace their underlying ethnic roots manifested mainly by their 
ethnic symbols and myths of ancestors. Effectively, this task 
involves a socio-historical exploration of the modern nations, which 
may mean going as far back as pre-modernity or even antiquity. 
Although Smith accepts the basic assumption of the modernist 
approach to nations and nationalism, mainly formulated by Ernest 
Gellner (Gellner, 1969, p. Ch7; 1983), which implies that nations 
and nationalism are wholly modern in nature, products of the long 
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and extensive processes of modernisation, and industrialism; and 
fundamentally conditioned by the changes came about in the 
political, social, and economic spheres including the cognitive 
transformations associated with modernism. However, Smith 
argues that the modernist account of nations and nationalisms tells 
only half of the story (1996b, p. 359); consequently failing to tell 
why some ethnic groups made it to nations while some others did 
not. Moreover, the vital point is that the modernist account cannot 
appreciate the crucial role of myths, symbols and historical ethnic 
ties in building ‘new nations’ or ‘imagining’ them—in Benedict 
Anderson’s terms during the modern era. Smith further suggests 
that to understand why  nationalism as an ideology and sentiment 
has become so popular and susceptible to elite manipulation, 
intellectuals and/or intelligentsia, some form of reference to the 
past and origins of ‘the people’ has to be established. To further 
explain this position, Smith (2000, p. 40) offers some elaborations 
by suggesting that, although, the English nation and the kind of 
English nationalism which appealed to a polity called ‘the English 
nation’, could only be crystallised by the end of eighteenth and the 
beginning of nineteenth century, nevertheless, it will be an over-
simplification to think that the English nation and nationalism 
suddenly erupted at around nineteenth century. On the contrary, 
we can find elements of an English identity from around the 
eleventh century, despite the fact that only in modern times a 
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distinctive English nation could be found supported by modern 
state institutions.  
 
Furthermore, another sound argument of Smith can be found in 
explaining the oft-cited relationship between the past and the 
present, between today’s nation and their ethnic roots, which he 
maintains, do not, and will not, have to be real. In fact as the 
famous Ernest Renan has long remarked ‘getting its history wrong 
is part of being a nation’ (Renan, 1996). Interestingly, Renan’s 
disposition as regards one’s history has also been reiterated by 
Walker Connor in which he argues that ‘since the nation is a self-
defined rather than an other-defined grouping, the broadly held 
conviction concerning the group’s singular origin need not and 
seldom will accord with factual data’ (Connor, 1994, p. 4). In fact, 
for Connor both ethnicity and nationalism are based on subjective 
‘felt ties’ rather than objective criteria. For Smith likewise, (1998, 
p. 192) it is not the physical kinship between the past and present 
ethnic communities that matters in defining the structure of ethnic 
and national communities – a position common to primordialism, 
but ‘ [i]t is the sense of cultural affinities…implanted in a myth of 
descent, shared historical memories and ethnic symbolism’ (italics 
in the original). Therefore, for Smith, this is the distinguishing line 
between his ‘historical ethno-symbolism’ and the primordialist 
approach which contends that nations are natural phenomena 
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based on primordial historical kinship ties, in other words, per 
primordialism, nations like families are given ‘in the state of nature’ 
(Smith, 1999, p. 4; Smith, 2009, p. 3).  
 
To recall, while nations share some basic elements with ethnies, 
they are nevertheless, distinguished by some new elements 
historically associated with modernity such as a mass public 
culture, single economy and common legal rights- mentioned 
through Smith’s definition of nation. This will bring us to the third 
concept directly related to notions of nation and ethnic groups, 
namely, nationalism. 
4.3.2 Nationalism  
Firmly tied to the above two concepts is ‘nationalism’, which in turn, 
has been defined as ’an ideological movement for the attainment 
and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf 
of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an 
actual or potential ‘nation’ like others ’ (Smith, 1971, p. 17, italics 
in original). Smith has given a great deal of attention to the concept 
of nationalism. As a doctrine, nationalism is a language and 
symbolism on behalf of the nation, a socio-political movement, and 
an ideology of the nation (2008, p. 6).  
 
As it can be noted from Smith’s definition of nationalism, he treats 
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it as an ideology. The definition of nationalism as an ideology is 
largely at odds with the common sense understanding of the 
notion, which portrays nationalism as lacking any form of ideology 
or philosophical foundation (Smith, 2008, p. 21). However, the 
crucial and the most controversial question here – one which will 
have wider implications on our understanding of the two 
phenomena (i.e. nation and nationalism) – is exactly which comes 
first, the nation or nationalism? Reading through Smith’s works the 
reader can easily recognise the fact that he has been working hard 
to counter-argue the prevailing proposition within the modernist 
approach of nations and nationalism which stands that nations are 
just products and creations of nationalism and national ist ideology. 
This view has been expressed explicitly by the well-known 
modernist scholar of nations and nationalism, Ernest Gellner, in his 
often-cited statement: 
“(n)ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist 
– but it does need some pre-existing differentiating 
marks to work on, even if, as indicated, they are purely 
negative” (Gellner, 1969, p. 168).  
 
While Gellner assigns a secondary value to them, for Smith it is 
these pre-existing elements that matter most in the nation-
formation process, a position, which modernists have ardently 
dismissed.  
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As it has been noted, according to Smith, myths, symbols and 
memories make fundamental components of ethnic communities, 
nations and nationalism as an ideology. Also, that cultural and 
political traits coexist in the nation and the ideology which claims 
to represent the nation, namely nationalism. Therefore, for Smith 
nationalism is a culture and identity as well as a political quest, 
hence, he is ruling out the presumed dividing lines between 
‘political’ and ‘cultural’ nationalism (Smith, 1996a, p. 448). Smith’s 
argument above follows his critical position to the state-centric 
account which treats nationalism as an overwhelmingly political 
doctrine with a critical relation to the modern state, a position most 
notably associated with John Breuilly1.  
 
Although, Smith appreciates the vital role played by culture, 
especially ethnic and nationalist culture in nation formation and 
nationalist ideologies, he seems to be refraining from subscribing 
to a purely cultural approach to nationalism (Smith, 1996a, pp. 
447-448). Following these lines of argument, the ‘subjective-
objective’ binary no longer holds up in Smith’s theoretical 
formulation. To elaborate more on this point ‘[T]he concepts 
employed by ethno-symbolism’, Smith argues ‘are simultaneously 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. To illustrate this proposition, he goes 
                                 
 1 Breuilly argues that ‘nationalism is inconceivable without the state and 
vice versa’ (2001, p. 32). 
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on by saying ‘for ethno-symbolism it is culture –and culture in 
relation to politics—that is central, not subjective attitudes or 
feelings’ (Smith, 2009, p. 26). I would like to make the point here 
that Smith’s emphasise on the political sphere in questions of 
nation formation brings ethno-symbolism closer to this study’s 
second theoretical approach (i.e. political discourse theory). For, 
PDT gives a determinate position to the political in its discursive 
analysis of the social and identity in particular. This trait is mostly 
characterized by the notion of ‘primacy of politics’ (Philips & 
Jorgensen, 2002) I will return to this point in chapter six. 
4.4 Ethno-Symbolism in details: 
According to ethno-symbolist theory2, ethnic myths and symbols of 
the past play a central role in ethnic revival and nation-formation 
processes and in turn, in the process of collective identity 
construction. For, nation formation is a process through which the 
pre-existing ethnic ties are re-constructed in the present context 
(Smith, 2008). As mentioned earlier, Smith’s position here clashes 
head on with both the primordialist and instrumentalist theories of 
nations and nationalism. While it is not the actual primordial ties 
that determine the process of nation formation, nevertheless, 
                                 
2 At more than one occasion Smith has described Ethno-symbolism as an 
approach rather than theory, see for example (Smith, 1996a, p. 162; 
Smith, 2009). 
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nationalism capitalises on pre-existing ethnic roots (real or felt), 
ethnic myths and symbols, without which one cannot imagine 
creation of nations out of nothing. Nevertheless, processes of 
nation formation may take diverse paths arriving, consequently, at 
distinctive forms of nations. This discussion will then take us 
straight to another equally important dimension in ethno-
symbolism, which is the routes of nation formation. I would like to 
suggest that the following theorisation is also, equally important to 
the case under investigation. 
4.4.1 Routes of nation formation 
Smith observed that there are two main routes through which 
nations historically have been formed. The two different routes 
have constituted two forms of nationalisms, ethnic and civic 
nationalism. Each route, he argues, represented two groups of 
people from the society respectively, first, ‘lateral ethnies’, which 
constituted the civic nationalism which, in their effort in nation 
formation took up a ‘top down’ direction, represented by the upper 
strata of community (aristocrats), who started their journey of 
nation formation from within their high-culture community to later 
incorporate other lower strata, or the mass, through minimising the 
available class and social boundaries. The process has largely been 
enforced by industrialism and modernisation, as they changed the 
very social structure on which the pre-modern societies were 
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based3. According to Smith, French, English and Spanish 
nationalisms in late seventeenth and eighteenth century which 
culminated in English, French and Spanish nations were some 
examples of this type of nationalist development.  
 
Second, Vernacular ethnie (or demotic), which constituted the 
ethnic nationalism, this is a different type of nationalism, which 
derived from the lower strata of society. In other words, it took 
bottom-up direction, contrary to the Lateral type. Here Smith 
attributes a central position to the clergy, intellectuals and 
intelligentsia, in laying down the very foundations of nationalism 
and the future nations. Through appealing to the mass and 
perceived rediscovering of the ethnic past of the people a sense of 
belonging to a particular nation is strengthened. Therefore, 
intellectuals made the best use of historical myths and symbols of 
the people.  
 
The distinguishing line between Smith and instrumentalist-
modernists like Anderson and Hobsbawm is evident at this 
particular point. While for the latter, the symbols or traditions, that 
invented by the elite and intellectuals played major role in their 
manipulation of the mass, conversely, for Smith, the myths and 
                                 
 3 For Ernest Gellner, mass produced public culture produced by state 
institutions replaced structure in the modern era (1969:155). 
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symbols did exist even before the modern era and some even in 
the antiquity, and also different kinds of ethnic communities (if not 
nations) existed without which it would have not been possible for 
modern nations to emerge ex nihilo (Smith, 1996b, p. 574). This 
route is mainly characteristic of the ethnic type of national ism or 
ethnic-nationalism, examples would include, the Quebecois 
nationalism, some major nationalisms in eastern Europe, Jewish an 
Armenian nationalism. (Smith, 1998, pp. 93-95; Smith, 1993, pp. 
53-58; Smith, 1991, pp. 27-47, 99-120). The process by which 
nations formed characterised by undertaking major tasks by the 
constituting agents (nationalists).  
 
Furthermore, Smith outlines the three tasks through which the 
process of nation formation has gone or would go through as 
follows:  
Firstly, the ‘purification of culture’, which involves rediscovering or 
redefining the ethnic past of the people in question; the 
authentication of that past in order to produce it as unique to the 
nation in question; and its re-appropriation or regeneration so that 
it becomes tangible to contemporary generations (Smith, 1999, pp. 
194-196; 1994, pp. 449-451). This culminates in ‘the people’ 
investing in particular and unique values, until such a point where 
‘the nation and the people have been fused, and identified with the 
ethnie’ (Smith, 1999, p. 194). Obviously this would happen at the 
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latter stage where the nation has come into being. To put it 
differently, in order to make the best use of past in the way of 
nation formation, three key processes needed to be undertaken 
namely, rediscovery of the past and its ethnic contents; 
authentication of that past in order to make it purely ‘ours’, as it is 
from ‘our’ ancestries; re-appropriation of that past (ethnic history, 
symbols, myths and so on) in order to become more tangible to the 
current generation (Smith, 1996a, pp. 450-451). 
 
Second: the universalization of chosenness: the idea is originally 
and basically of a religious nature. However, in the modern world 
the idea of ‘chosen’ people is intrinsic to most nationalisms, even 
the most secular ones. The idea of one’s ethnic uniqueness or 
chosenness has been largely universalised through specific 
doctrines of nationalism, which claims that ‘every nation must 
possess an authentic identity, that to have its own distinctive and 
original culture’ without which any attempt of nation formation will 
be condemned with failure (Smith, 1994, p. 453).  
 
Probably all processes of nation formation have witnessed 
universalization of chosenness one way or another. Apparently, the 
process of Jewish nation-formation may make an ideal example of 
this idea, as the nationalist Jews found and still do, the most 
invaluable currency in the idea of the Jews being the ‘selected 
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people of God’. The Armenian and Greek nationalism are two other 
visible examples of this process. Arguably, the Kurdish nationalism 
has not made itself exceptional in this regard. The common belief 
among Kurds that Noah’s Ark was settled at mount4 Judi (known 
as Cûdî in Kurdish language) in today’s Turkish Kurdistan may 
demonstrate the idea of chosenness among Kurds (Bird, 2004, p. 
4). Some Kurdish historian and writers would support the above 
believe with a verse in the holy Quran in which God speaks to Noah 
saying ‘And say: My Lord! Cause me to land at a blessed landing-
place, for You are the Best of those who bring to land’5, ‘the blessed 
land’ is often used to describe Kurdistan, as in Figure 4-1 a book 
written in Arabic (by a Kurdish writer), entitled Kurdistan: the 
blessed land. In addition, the common belief that the prophet 
Abraham was originally from the ancient Mesopotamian region 
which encompassed most of todays ‘Greater Kurdistan’ has been 
well incorporated not only in the Kurdish religious discourse but 
even in the secular ideology and historiography of the PKK. Abdulla 
Ocalan, the leader of the PKK has theorised the above idea well in 
his book The History in the Tigris Valley: Orfa, The Symbol of 
                                 
4 This idea was more clearly evident in the political discourse of the 
Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM), in the 1990s. It was centred on the 
belief as Salahaddin Al-Ayyubi had once freed the Islamic world from 
Crusaders, the Islamic Caliphate would be reinstated by Muslim Kurds, 
appointed by God for this task. I return to this point at a later stage. 
5 English translation of Verse 29 of Sûrah 23, al-Mu’minû in the Islamic 
Holy Book Quran. (al-Hilali & Khan, 2006) 
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Blessing and Curse (2008). In the book, Ocalan expands the 
religious character of the prophet Abraham and his defiance of the 
Sumerian oppressors which is cast as a pioneering democratic 
move whose legacy the PKK seeks to preserve and promote. 
  
Figure 4.1 A book titled Kurdistan: The Blessed Land. The subtitle recalls 
a verse in the holy Quran, which says ‘My Lord land me on a sacred 
place’. Source: (Ismael, 2015) 
 
 
Smith’s final stage is the ‘territorialisation of memory’: the creation 
of an ‘ethnoscape’, which sees ‘certain kinds of shared 
memories…attached to particular territories so that the former 
become ethnic landscapes, or ‘ethnoscapes’…and the latter become 
historic homelands.’ (Renan, 1996) Here it is possible to trace 
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connections to historical processes of nation formation in which the 
territorialisation of memory played a significant role in the process 
(Smith, 1999, pp. 149-159; 1996a, p. 454). 
 
The pivotal role played by intelligentsia all the way through the 
above processes should not be underestimated. In fact, ‘at the 
centre of the self-appointed task of the intelligentsia stood the 
rediscovery and realisation of the community’, as Smith argues  
(1994, p. 153). The ethnic history and memories capitalised 
through preserving and reproducing various symbols and these 
incorporated within the public culture and centralised national 
education. The above trends represent the process by which 
nations and nationalisms emerged in general. However, in 
asserting the enduring relevance of these theoretical postulations, 
Smith claims that ‘these long term processes are still at work across 
the globe’ (ibid: 458). 
4.4.2 State institutions 
The lines between state and nation formation seem to be too 
abstruse to distinguish. The situation is better clarified when we 
think of the notion of ‘nation-building’. Arguably, the notion is more 
often than not used interchangeably with ‘state-building’. The 
implications of this flawed conflation between nation and state has 
gone beyond mere theoretical fallacy. As Walker Connor has long 
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maintained, the above misconception has historically produced 
precarious human consequences, in effect, creating another 
converse process which he termed ‘nation-destroying’ (Connor, 
1972). Furthermore, the vague boundaries between the two 
notions of state and nation have largely contributed in making it 
even more difficult to come up with a consensus among the 
scholars in the field as to nature of the relationship between the 
two. Referring to the historical development of the modern western 
nation states, Smith acknowledges the indispensable role played 
by the state and its institutions in the formation of national ideals. 
He even argues that ‘(i)n the west, the nation and the state 
emerged together’ (Smith, 1999, p. 70). Elsewhere, he further 
argues that ‘the state was the necessary condition and matrix for 
the gestation of the national loyalties so evident today’ (Smith, 
1991, p. 59).  
 
The role played by intellectuals, intelligentsia and nationalist elite 
in forging the first European nations and later other non-European 
ones is acknowledged by Smith. Through rediscovering of myths, 
symbols and ethnic history of the ‘people’, the role assigned to 
these groups was vital in processes of nation formation in Europe 
and beyond. Moreover, this point has been given a great deal of 
attention from the part of ethno-symbolism especially, Smith 
himself (Smith, 2009, pp. 61-80; 2008, pp. 33-36; 1999, pp. 187-
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190). Pertinent to the last point is the major role played by 
individuals such as poets, novelists, artists (singers, painters, and 
sculptors), film-makers, and drama players and so on, in processes 
of nation-formation. The symbolic significations of monuments 
such as the Statue of Liberty in the USA; the statue of Ataturk in 
Istanbul, the Egyptian pyramids, the statue of Alfred the Great in 
Britain and many similar examples all around the world can only be 
understood when they are re-articulated in the discourse and 
language of respective nationalisms. As mentioned earlier, it seems 
that the existence or lack of any real connection between the 
monument and the current ‘nation’ who claim them does not make 
them irrelevant at all. As it will be demonstrated later in this study, 
the Kurdish nationalist discourse both pre and post 1991 have 
shown competency to make the best use of the past in its 
construction of the current identity of the Kurds. Notwithstanding, 
these efforts encountered with enormous difficulties in this way for, 
arguably, the modern Kurdish nationalism has done equal harm to 
itself as the actions of those hostile to it. Arguably, it has 
contributed significantly in fragmenting the already vulnerable 
national history and memory of the Kurds. In the proceeding 
sections the Kurdish case in KRI will be investigated employing 
elementary analytical tools of ethno-symbolism. The detailed 
analysis will be provided in the next chapter. 
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4.5 The Kurds and Kurdistan: nation, identity and 
nationalism 
Is it ever possible that this helical time  
Would bring into sight for us a star  
Our luck for us would become a yar (lover, 
supporter)  
And just for once would awake from her slumber  
Would rise for us someone we can trust in this 
world  
And appear among us a King  
The sword of our art would be recognized  
The value of our pens would be known  
Our ills would find a cure  
Our science would be appreciated  
Oh, if we could have a dignified leader  
Compassionate, generous, well-spoken,  
Our coins (words) would be stamped with value 
(minted)  
And would no longer be so suspected and without 
market  
Though our words are pure and excellent  
The two metals (gold and silver) are made dear by 
being minted 
If we had a Mîr who would see himself worthy of a 
crown  
And for him a throne would have been identified  
Then fortune would have showed its face to us  
If for him a crown could be had  
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Perhaps for us a value would obtain 
He would take care of the orphans  
Would take us out of the hands of the villains 
These Turks would not have had a sway over us  
Our land would not have been made ruins under 
the owl 
Would not have been ruled by the Eliyyis (Safavids) 
and thieves 
Subjugated and made obedient by the Turks and 
Persians.  
(Ahmadi Kahni, 1690) (Mirawdeli, 2012) 
4.5.1 The problem of definitions 
Apparently, Smith is aware of the risk in imposing a Europe-centric 
definition of nations and nationalism on other non-European cases 
(Smith, 1971, p. 169). Therefore, care should be taken when 
employing ethno-symbolism to the KRI. His careful distinction 
between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ stems from this. Smith’s attempt is 
more apparent in his description of the state as ‘a legal and political 
concept, hence it is not a community’ (Smith, 1996b, p. 359) while 
defining the nation as ‘a particular kind of social and cultural 
community, a territorial community of shared history and culture ’ 
(1996b, p. 359). Therefore, his definition of the ‘nation’ mentioned 
earlier requires more than a ‘common history of shared memory 
and culture’, it also demands ‘autonomous public institutions of 
coercion and extraction within a recognised territory’ which is 
contents more pertinent to his own definition of the ‘state’ (1996b, 
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p. 359).  
 
In a detailed critique of Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach 
Montserrat Guibernau (2004, pp. 125-141) argues that Smith sets 
the threshold for nationhood too high. This is especially evident in 
Smith’s classic definition6 of nation as mentioned above. For her, 
Smith’s definition excludes many existing nations simply because 
they lack the ascribed characteristics set by Smith among which 
‘single economy’ and ‘legal rights’ stand out. Therefore, she argues 
that these features are feature of states rather than nations. 
Effectively, nations that lack a state of their own are excluded from 
Smith’s typical category of nation.  By doing this, she rightly argues 
that Smith too has fallen into the common mistake of equating 
nation with state, despite his own warning against doing so, while 
they are in fact two different things. Accordingly, the fundamental 
flaw runs through Smith’s approach is the conflation of nation and 
state, which’s implication mentioned above. Thus, Guibernau 
suggests that by doing this Smith excludes from his definition of 
                                 
6 In his 2002 essay ‘when is a nation’ Smith makes some fundamental 
changes to his definition of the concept of ‘nation’. According to the new 
definition, nation is defined as ‘a named community possessing an 
historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture 
and common laws and customs’ (Smith, 2002, p. 15). As Montserrat 
Guibernau made the classification, we now have two definitions of 
‘nation’ by Smith, namely, classical and new. The new one, as I 
elaborate more latter, brings the Kurdish case closer to Smiths ideal 
type of nation. 
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‘nation’ all those national communities who are stateless or nations 
without states. She then examines Smith’s approach through the 
Catalan case, a distinctive ethnic group within the state of Spain. 
By associating citizenship rights and a single economy (per Smith’s 
classical definition of the nation) she argues, the ethnic-symbolic 
theory fails to aid our understanding of the notion of nation. 
Noticeably, Guibernau more or less subscribes to Walker Connor’s 
definition of nation as ‘a body of people who feel that they are a 
nation’ (Connor, 1994, p. 112). Guibernau’s argues that a nation 
is: 
 …a human group conscious of forming a community, 
sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, having a common past and a 
common project for the future and claiming the right to 
rule itself (Guibernau, 1996, p. 47).  
 
In addition, for Guibernua, Smith’s approach is a cultural approach 
to nations and nationalism in which the political side of it has 
‘practically been left out’, while, a ‘fully-fledged theory of nations 
and nationalism, she argues, ought to examine the political as well 
as the cultural aspects of nations and national identity’ (Guibernau, 
2004, p. 126). This is an accusation, which has implicitly been 
denied by Smith (as we discussed earlier). The indispensability of 
the political dimension of nation and its associated issues has been 
reflected on both the theoretical and analytical operations in this 
research. It is highly acknowledged in this research that neither 
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ethno-symbolism nor political discourse theory can help us in our 
understanding of the processes of identity formation on their own, 
as the former is overwhelmingly cultural the latter over-
emphasizes the play of politics in the process. Therefore, both 
theories are employed in this study in an attempt to bring them 
together despite some essential differences between the two.  
 
The two points made by Guibranau above are very important in our 
quest for examining the ethno-symbolic approach’s applicability to 
the Kurdish case. In what follows I am going to elaborate more on 
this point. 
4.5.2 Can Kurds produce a nation? 
In this section, I consider Kurdish nationalism ‘across Kurdistan’ in 
relation to Smith’s approach. Drawing on Guibernau I note that it 
is difficult for the Kurds to reach nationhood as defined by Smith 
given the lack of economic unity and common public culture in 
Kurdish regions (although this varies according to the precise 
location). Broadly speaking, there are significant populations of 
Kurds in four states, each of which are dominated by non-Kurdish 
ethnies. With the exception of the KRI, education in these countries 
is conducted in languages other than Kurdish;7 and it certainly 
                                 
 7 As previously noted, the KRI still lacks a lingua franca.  
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cannot be said that Kurds have a single economy. 
 
Focussing more specifically on the KRI, however, provides a 
different picture. From its semi-independent status it has 
generated a relatively independent economy of its own, even 
during times of deep internal political divisions and fighting. Thus, 
since 2003 the KRI has moved towards fully-fledged nationhood by 
Smith’s definition. In particular, the booming economy in the KRI 
since 2003; and its importance in the region’s international status 
has presented a golden opportunity for Kurds to promote their 
nation and identity nationally, regionally and internationally 
(Bengio, 2012; Aziz, 2011; Anderson & Stansfield, 2004).  
 
Citizenship rights seem more distant given the ambiguous nature 
of the political and administrative status of the region; and the 
nature of the political system in place in Iraq and in the wider 
Middle East region. The issue has, however, become more central 
to the political discourse in the KRI since 2009, with challenges to 
traditional Kurdish nationalist discourses, which were more 
focussed ethnicity and narrow definitions of nationalism. 
Nonetheless, despite its distinct status, this process is not 
sufficiently well-progressed for the KRI to meet Smith’s definition 
of ‘nation’. 
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Thus, in speaking of the KRI as a nation it is necessary to adopt a 
definition closer to those of Connor and Guibernau. For the former, 
nationhood revolves around subjective feelings of belonging rather 
than ‘objective’ facts such as legal rights or the economy (as in 
Smith’s definition). Such feelings can clearly be seen in the KRI, 
and manifest themselves in a number of forms. However, there is 
widespread identification with ‘Kurd’ (understood as an ethno-
nationalist grouping) and ‘Kurdistan’ (as a territorial homeland) 
(Bengio, 2012; Aziz, 2011; Lawrence, 2008; Bruinessen, 2006; 
Romano, 2004). 
 
Here, it is important to engage with the mass character of Connor’s 
definition of the nation. For him, a nation requires mass feelings of 
belonging (and so nationalism is a mass feeling). This resonates 
with major modernist approaches to nations and nationalism, but 
contrasts sharply with the ethno-symbolic approach, which argues 
that although nationalism may eventually become a mass 
phenomenon, the sense of nationhood embedded in nationalist 
thinking may exist only within a nationalist elite.  
 
The political dimension – which Guibernau asserts is absent in 
Smith’s approach – is also highly relevant for the Kurdish case.8 
                                 
 8 As noted above, Smith is dismissive of these claims, as for him the 
cultural and political dimensions work together in nationalism. 
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Indeed, it is possible to argue that politics is an indivisible and 
significant factor in Kurdish identity formation. The very fact that 
Kurds reside in four separate states (i.e. Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and 
Syria) demonstrates the political complexity of the Kurdish case, 
with the Kurdish question a central issue in both cultural and 
political terms in each of them (for the states’ official discourse as 
well as for Kurdish nationalists). As Abbas Vali notes, this issue is 
the primary reason for the fragmented Kurdish identity; and also 
means that Kurdish identity is produced in relation to other 
identities (Vali, 2006).9 
 
In the KRI, it can be argued that despite challenging conditions, 
the KRG has successfully laid foundations for forming such an 
identity by fostering extensive cultural, political, economic and 
social processes designed to create a Kurdish national identity that 
draws on historic ethnic and nationalist ideals. This is despite its 
continued ambiguous legal and political status; and its vulnerability 
to short-term party interests, the uncertainty stemming from 
internal divisions and the KRI’s difficult relationship with the Iraqi 
state.  
 
Kurdish nationalism throughout Kurdistan has manifested the 
                                 
 9 This point is discussed in greater detail in chapters six and seven. 
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essential elements of nationalism outlined by Smith: namely, the 
quest for autonomy, unity and a focus on Kurdish identity. This is 
also true for the KRI more specifically, both prior to and since 1991. 
Throughout their history (and particularly since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire), Kurds have striven for autonomy, with this drive 
sometimes resulting in claims to statehood.10 Despite the 
frequency and severity of division in the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, it has strived for linguistic and discursive unity. To this 
end, particular importance is given to poems of Ahmadi Khani, with 
his epic work Mem u Zin (dating from the 1690s) held up as an 
historic example of advocating for Kurdish unity and statehood; 
although there is debate about its particular relevance for 
contemporary Kurdish nationalism (Gunter, 2007; Bruinessen, 
2003; Vali, 2003a).11  
  
Whilst Iraqi Kurds can be seen to have failed in forming the rigid 
type of nation portrayed in ethno-symbolism and other mainstream 
approaches, they have persistently sought to discursively construct 
or imagine the nation. In doing so, they have been faced with a 
                                 
 10 For further details on the history of Iraqi Kurds see McDowall (2004), 
Stansfield (2004).  
11 Fascinated by the seemingly nationalist remarks of Khani in an era 
normally regarded as pre-nationalist, Kamal Mirawdeli, an academic of 
a Kurdish origin argues that Khani was a nationalist theorist: a highly 
controversial claim in contemporary academic work on nationalism. 
(Mirawdeli, 2012). 
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number of major obstacles – both internal and external.  
4.5.3 Memories and their lack 
As noted above, collective memory plays a decisive role in Smith’s 
approach to nation formation. For him, ‘states may be established 
without recourse to memory and remembering, but nations require 
shared memories to give their often heterogeneous citizenry a 
common habitat, a source of pride and dignity, and a common 
destiny.’ (Smith, 1996c, p. 384) 
 
Universal Kurdish memory is clearly articulated in Edmond’s 
depiction of Kurdish nationalism. Writing in the early 1970s, he 
presented what he referred to as ‘the historical basis of Kurdish 
nationalist thinking’:  
The Kurds constitute a single nation which has occupied 
its present habitat for at least three thousand years. 
They have outlived the rise and fall of many imperial 
races: Assyrian, Persian, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, 
Mongols, and Turks. They have their own history, 
language. And culture. Their country has been unjustly 
portioned. But they are the original owners, not 
strangers to be tolerated as minorities with limited 
concessions granted at the whim of the usurpers. 
(Edmond, 1971, p. 88) 
 
Most of the elements Smith claims produce nations are evident 
here, with reference to ethnic ties (mythic or real), symbols, 
culture, territory, and above all, a political claim to ‘the right of self-
rule’, which for Elie Kedourei and Gellner constitute the major 
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pillars of nationalism (Gellner, 1969, p. Ch7; Kedourie, 2000). 
These elements can be identified at the inception of Kurdish 
nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century (largely by young 
and educated Ottoman Kurds) in, for example, the discourse used 
in Kurdistan, the first Kurdish newspaper, first published in 1898 
(Strohmeier, 2003, pp. 21-26).  
 
Despite this, careful analysis of the history of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement reveals that the failure to maintain a shared 
memory is one of the characteristic features of the Kurdish 
nationalist project. Since 1946 it is possible to identify divisions in 
Kurdish nationalism, particularly within Iraq. In part, these can be 
traced back to the actions of governments of the four states with 
substantial Kurdish populations and to the Kurdish parties that 
emerged following the collapse of the Republic of Kurdistan in 
Mahabad, Iran, in 1946: the year that also saw the founding of the 
Iraqi KDP.12 The divisions between leaders of the KDP in Iraqi 
Kurdistan from the 1960s to the 1980s can be traced back to this 
point, for example, with disagreements over their future visions for 
Kurdish autonomy in addition to their social differences. As noted 
                                 
 12 The short-lived Republic of Kurdistan, sometimes called the Republic 
of Mahabad, was the only Kurdish state in the twentieth century. It was 
established with the support of Soviet Union in the Iranian Kurdistan; 
and coincided with the establishment of another short-lived state in Iran, 
the Azerbaijan People’s Government. See McDowall (1996) for more 
details. 
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above, these divisions have had a substantial impact on the nature 
of social, political and economic life in the KRI (cf. Anderson and 
Stansfield, 2004, pp. 155-184); and profoundly affect identity 
formation in the region.  
 
These divisions are evident in the role played by the September 
Revolution. Common sense would suggest it plays an important 
role in Kurdish historical memory and provides symbolic power for 
Kurdish nationalist discourses. However, it has always functioned 
as a source of disagreement, with competing explanations by 
various sections of the nationalist community – both public and 
more formally political. It occupies a central role in the KDP’s 
nationalist discourse, but has been considered a catastrophic 
failure by the PUK since its culmination in March 1975, with Mustafa 
Barzani blamed for this.13 According to the PUK’s historiography, 
the September Revolution was an enormous failure for Iraqi Kurds. 
This disagreement flared up in 2012, when Masoud Barzani 
suggested 11th September as the ‘Peshmerga Day’, drawing fierce 
criticism from major Kurdish political parties in the KRI and beyond. 
The commentator member of the PUK, Shanaz Ahmed – daughter 
of Ibrahim Ahmed – strongly criticized Barzani’s suggestion, 
                                 
 13 It is interesting to note that key founders of the PUK back in 1976 were 
former members of the KDP at various levels of membership. Jelal 
Talebani, for instance was once the second man in the KDP while others 
occupied leading positions in the party. 
 173 
 
arguing that the date is inappropriate; and that Peshmerga Day 
should remain unpartisan (unlike the September Revolution) 
(Ahmed, 2012).14 Thus, forty years after the revolt’s conclusion, 
Kurdish nationalist discourse in the KRI struggles to come to terms 
with its historical relevance. This is just one example among many 
that demonstrate the inconsistencies and contradictions in 
mainstream Kurdish nationalist discourse in KRI, simultaneously 
demonstrating the symbolic crisis in the nationalist discourse of the 
KRI and the fragmented nature of Kurdish identity. I return to this 
point in greater detail in chapter five. 
4.5.4 Cultural and political nationalisms 
As noted earlier, for Smith, there are two forms of nationalism: a 
‘statist nationalism’, which defines the ‘nation’ as a territorial-
political unit and understands ‘nationalism’ as ‘the aspiration of the 
colonised population for self-government of the new political 
community whose boundaries were established by the colonies’; 
and an ‘ethnic nationalism’, which views the nation ‘as a large 
political ethnic group defined by common culture and alleged 
descent’ and consequently understands nationalism as a ‘cultural 
movement’ (1971, p. 176). Although more inclined towards the 
                                 
 14 In a rather pragmatic manner Shanaz rejects 11 th September on the 
basis of its coincidence with the events of September 11 th 2001 in the 
USA, which she says would be disrespectful to Americans if Kurds 
revered that date. Her pragmatic sensitivities also represent the political 
support that the Iraqi Kurds have received from the United States.  
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latter, Smith refuses to see nationalism as a cultural rather than 
political movement. Accordingly, his claim that there is an 
indivisible relationship between the cultural and political 
components of national identity is significant for the study of 
identity formation in the KRI, as ‘any attempt to form a national 
identity is also a political action with political consequences, like 
the need to redraw the geopolitical map or alter the composition of 
political regimes and states.’ (Smith, 1991, p. 97).  
 
This works the other way as well, and here I suggest that political 
actions by Kurds on both the national and international levels are 
intrinsic elements of Kurdish identity formation, and thus their 
interactions with other actors are essential parts of the process. 
The history of the KRI since 1991 is marked by fierce political 
confrontations with many of these ‘others’, including the 
governments of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. The meetings these 
states held with one another regarding ‘the Kurdish question’ 
demonstrates their relevance to issues of Kurdish identity.15  
 
                                 
 15 The last meeting between the three states of Iran, Syria and Turkey 
was held on 14th November 1992 in Ankara, Turkey in which the Kurdish 
issue was top of the agenda. Michael Gunter reported that ‘Iraqi Kurds 
and the three states’ showed concern regarding the situation. The states 
warned Iraqi Kurds against separation, while Kurdish parties were 
equally concerned about the meeting and considered it a threat to their 
nascent entity in the KRI (Gunter, 1993, p. 312). 
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It is interesting to note that while the official discourse of the 
Iranian state does not hesitate to mention such terms as ‘Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq’, the Turkish government takes a very different 
approach. Since the 1990s, the terms Kurdistan and Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq have been considered taboo in official and public 
discourse in Turkey16. Therefore, the Turkish state and press prefer 
the term Kuzey Irak (Northern Iraq), although there are occasional 
mentions of ‘the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq’17.  
  
Such sensitivity regarding names is not unique to Turkey. For 
example, it resembles Greek sensitivity towards the naming of the 
Republic of Macedonia, as Greeks prefer using Northern Macedonia 
instead to distinguish it from their own region of Macedonia. 
However, the Turkish attitude towards ‘Kurdistan’ is distinctive in 
that the word is also a forbidden name, even as a baby name. Here 
Kurdistan signifies a political concept, even in private usage.18 
Therefore, while majority in the Turkish government and Turkish 
                                 
16 Since the establishment of the Modern Turkish state any reference of 
Kurdistan was officially forbidden and considered a separatist attempt. 
17 The Turkish government under the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has been showing shifting signs in their sensitivity towards 
‘Kurdistan’ as a name. At more than one occasion high ranked Turkish 
officials spelled the name in major public gathering since 2014. 
 18 A Turkish Court of Appeal recently allowed a couple to name their girl 
Kurdistan. The decision was considered ‘historic’ by the family’s lawyer 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2013), demonstrating the power of such 
symbolism for Kurdish nationalism. 
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press prefer northern Iraq (‘Kuzey Irak’ in Turkish), the closest a 
description can go to the actual ‘Kurdistan Region of Iraq’ or KRG 
would be ‘the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq’. This type of 
naming sensitivity is not typical to Turkey, it resembles the Greek 
sensitivity towards naming of the Republic of Macedonia, as Greeks 
prefer using Northern Macedonia instead to distinguish it from their 
own region of Macedonia. This is of particular analytic significance 
for the ethno-symbolist approach, as it demonstrates the 
importance of symbolism in nationalist politics, particularly where 
identity is so highly politicized.  
 
The situation changed after 2003, with Iraqi Kurds engaging in a 
ruthless struggle against other political factions in Iraq and hostile 
neighbouring countries in an attempt to reshape the political map 
of Iraq along ethnic lines. Federalism, first adopted in the Kurdish 
parliament in 1992, was put forth as a precondition of negotiations 
in major meetings between the main Kurdish parties and other 
Iraqi opposition groups in the run up to 2003 the Iraq war; a 
position made possible by Kurds’ ability to maintain a position of 
strength among Iraqi opposition parties through providing a safe 
haven for the latter from 1991. Furthermore, territorial demands 
continued to play a vital role in Kurds’ relationship with the central 
Iraqi government. These culminated in the incorporation of an 
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article19 in the Iraqi constitution regarding the annexation of Kirkuk 
and other disputed areas to the KRI.20 
 
The preceding analyses show the traditional dichotomy within 
nationalism typologies; namely, civic nationalism as opposed to 
ethnic nationalism. The differentiating features are not always so 
apparent and, as Smith admits, ethnic ties are so common that 
they penetrate almost all cases of nationalism. These analyses also 
confirm the enduring power of ethnic ties, symbols and myths upon 
which ethnic nationalism relies. To delineate the conceptual 
boundaries of the two, Smith notes that: 
[t]he civic kind of nationalism is a nationalism of order 
and control, and it suits the existing national states. But 
it has nothing to offer the many submerged ethnic 
minorities incorporated into the older empires and their 
successor states. So they and their intelligentsia turn to 
ethnic nationalism and try to reconstruct their 
community as an ethnic nation. (Smith, 1996b, pp. 362-
363) 
                                 
19 Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 demands the 
‘normalization’ of the demographic situation in the ethnically mixed city 
of Kirkuk and large areas within provinces of Mosul, Diyala and 
Salahaddin. The article mandated the Iraqi government to continue with 
‘normalization’ processes through which Arab settlers would be given 
compensation in return for leaving these areas and returning to their 
original habitats in the south of Iraq. It is worth noting that the settlers 
were provided with financial incentives designed to encourage Arab 
settlement in the areas where the Kurds and Turkmen would otherwise 
constitute the majority of the population (Iraqi Interior Minsitry, General 
Directorate of Nationality, 2005). 
 20 Following the ISIS advance into Iraq from June 2014, Kurds have 
managed to take control of much of these disputed areas. However, the 
action has largely been a unilateral one from the Kurdish side and the 
disputes over these areas are yet to be settled. 
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This claim, however, should be a matter of empirical deliberation 
when applied to Kurdish nationalism in Iraq rather than a prima 
facie truth. As Abbas Vali notes, the dominant approach to Kurdish 
nationalist historiography among Kurdish nationalists is both 
‘primordialist’ and ‘ethnicist’. For the average Kurdish nationalist 
‘[t]he Kurdish nation is a primordial entity, a natural formation 
rooted in the nature of every Kurd, defining the identity of people 
and community through history.’ (Vali, 2003a, p. 59) 
 
Expanding on this, Vali suggests that ‘notions of Kurdish 
community and identity are both premised on the common national 
origin and defined in terms of a uniform Kurdish ethnicity.’ (2003a, 
p. 60-61) However, where the KRI is concerned, a close 
examination of discourses of identity since 1991 necessitates 
analysis of the dramatic transformations that have taken place, 
during which the identity of the political community has also 
transformed. Prior to 2003, Kurdish identity was characterised 
largely by ethnic traits, in the following years – and particularly 
since 2009 – this has lessened considerably. Since then, notions 
such as ‘civil rights democracy’, ‘nationalisation’ and ‘coexistence’ 
have risen to the forefront of Kurdish nationalism, challenging 
formerly popular enthno-nationslist terms such as ‘Kurdish-ness’ 
(‘Kurdayeti’ in Kurdish) and ‘to care for Kurds’ (‘Kurdperweri’ in 
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Kurdish). Whilst this new discourse shares some fundamental 
components with the previously dominant ethno-nationalist 
discourses, its differences are also significant and it incorporates 
elements that inform the transformations which have taken place 
since 2003. This ‘dislocation’ of Kurdish identity in the KRI is 
analysed in greater details in chapter seven, through the lens of 
political discourse theory.  
 
This analysis resonates with the modernist claim that social and 
economic developments significantly affect the formation and 
transformation of collective identities, an argument that finds a 
degree of acceptance in ethno-symbolism (Smith, 2009, p. 125). 
For modernists, these changes are animated through concepts such 
as popular sovereignty, which holds that the state’s sovereignty 
rests with the ‘nation’ and justifies the ‘nationalist’ identity of the 
state through popular participation via democratic means (Yack, 
2001, p. 517; Vali, 2003a, p. 68).  
 
The final point to make here is that ethno-symbolism – whist 
emphasizing the essential role played in nation formation by 
historical roots – acknowledges the inevitability of change in the 
way nations form and transform. Especially, the historical 
transformations occurred under modernity and the way the 
changes that affected the process of nation-formation are highly 
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appreciated by ethno-symbolism (Smith, 2009, pp. 114-131).  
4.5.5 Definitional remedies 
Having previously excluded non-state ethnic groups, Smith’s later 
work – Myths and Memories of the Nation (1999) and ‘When is a 
Nation’ (2002) turns to engage with them – perhaps compelled by 
the number of states that emerged from the formerly multi-ethnic 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after 1991. It is apparent that the 
failure of a number of ethnic groups to establish independent states 
during the Cold War affected Smith’s understanding of nationalist 
groups within major ethnic communities that had failed to achieve 
statehood, leading him to equate nations with states. In these later 
works Smith seeks to correct this, and classifies the emerging 
Kurdish nationalism of the early to mid-twentieth century under the 
rubric of ‘demotic ethnonationalism’, forms that ‘emerged from 
demotic “vertical” ethnies, which are forged by intelligentsias into 
ethnic nations through vernacular mobilisation of the masses.’  
(Smith, 1991, p. 20; Smith, 1999, p. 187) These ethnic nations 
(representing distinct ethnic communities at the heart of multi-
ethnic colonial nation-states) are mobilised following threats of 
‘extinction by the forces of modernisation and the bureaucratic 
state that in turn is often at the service of a dominant ethnie and 
its elite.’ (Smith, 1991, p. 20; Smith, 1999, p. 187) 
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Martin Van Bruinessen (2006, pp. 32-35) offers a different 
approach to mapping Kurdish nation formation. He suggests a 
lateral ethnie base for the Kurdish nationalism emerging at the 
beginning of twentieth century (Ibid, p. 32-6).21 In ‘When is a 
Nation’, Smith incorporated some substantial changes into his 
definition of ‘nation’, which are partially connected to the debate 
between Smith and Walker Connor on the nature of nations and 
nationalism (Guibernau, 2004, p. 127). Smith’s modified definition 
of ‘nation’ argues that the term refers to ‘a named human 
community possessing a historical territory, shared myths and 
memories, a common public culture and common laws and 
customs.’ (Smith, 2002, p. 15) Here, Smith comes closer to 
accepting ‘nations without states’ as nations by dropping the 
criteria of citizenship rights and a single economy from his earlier 
definition. Although the previously discussed changes to the status 
of the KRI (and Iraqi Kurds as a social and political community more 
broadly) may admit it into Smith’s earlier definition of the nation, 
this definitional shift affects the applicability of ethno-symbolism to 
identity formation in the KRI. This is analysed in the following 
chapter. 
                                 
 21 This point is highly problematic in light of ethno-symbolism and so 
demands careful consideration. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
An exploration of the ethno-symbolist approach of Anthony Smith 
demonstrates that there are elements in the theory that are of 
relevance for understanding the underlying dynamics of Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI (from 1991 onwards and more 
broadly), which has generally been understood as a form of ethno-
nationalism. The contingency and inconsistency of collective 
memory is also important to take into account here; as are the 
indivisible relationships between Kurdish nationalism’s political and 
cultural components. While historically the states with substantial 
Kurdish populations have engaged with ‘the Kurdish question’ as 
an ethnic issue, Kurdish nationalist movements have sought to 
present the Kurdish case as one of people and land. 
 
As with other approaches to nations and nationalism, Smith’s work 
has its limitations. In his earlier work he implicitly opposes nations 
and states, a dichotomy that is often untenable. Kurds, for 
example, fail to meet the criteria he lays down for nationhood in 
his early work (in addition to groups such as Catalans, Welsh, 
Palestinians and Tamils), due to their lack of a single economy and 
citizenship rights. Here, Walker Connor’s critique is pertinent: 
Smith’s criteria are overly rigid and technical; and fail to explain 
the subjective elements of ’nationhood’, which do not necessarily 
represent the actual facts (Connor, 1994, pp. 210-226). Even in his 
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later work – which attempts to address these criticisms – Smith 
does not free the concept of the ‘nation’ from its ties to the ‘state’, 
and so remains unnecessarily Eurocentric. 
 
Despite these concerns, ethno-symbolism can contribute to an 
understanding of the dynamics of Kurdish identity formation in the 
KRI since 1991. In particular, it is useful in establishing that culture 
and history have played an essential role; that various actors have 
participated in the process, including political parties, civil society 
organizations, artists, and intellectuals; that there has been 
significant fragmentation of the Kurdish identity, particularly along 
ideological grounds; and that the process of identity formation has 
been deeply affected by interactions with the ‘other’ ethnic and 
nationalist groups with which Iraqi Kurds interact. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 Cultural analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The analysis of existing literature on the KRI (in chapter two), 
demonstrates that forms of state-formation have been at work in 
the region since 1991, as evidenced by the political and territorial 
claims made by Kurdish political parties during this time. As it was 
mentioned in the historical background, since 1991 the political 
parties in KRI have been in a constant struggle primarily, vis-à-vis 
Iraqi central government and also in relation with other 
neighbouring states, in order to consolidate their political and 
administrative hold on the Kurdistan Region. 
 
Parallel processes have occurred on the cultural level. As Smith 
notes, ‘state-making requires, among many other things, a secure 
base in ethnic core from which elites can be drawn.’ (Smith, 1996a, 
p. 458) For him, the idea of the ‘nation’ and the associated 
collective identity create the ground upon which social solidarity 
and popular participation can be built. Therefore he contends that 
in attempting to create states nationalists will inevitably seek to 
capitalise on ethnic, cultural and historical factors. For Smith (and 
 185 
 
ethno-symbolists more broadly), this process materializes through 
three major process (discussed in chapter four): the purification of 
culture, the universalization of chosenness and the territorialisation 
of memory (1996a, pp. 549-555). To recall briefly, while the first 
process may entail practices and discourses attempting to show 
that the nation and people are unique and endowed with their 
authentic culture and tradition rooted in history, the second process 
is working to place the nation and people in its historical position 
among other nations and peoples. The third process in turn, creates 
and reconstructs links between the people and their shared 
memories with the historical homeland and territory that-that 
nation and those people are associated with (1996a, p. 549-555). 
The term ‘ethnoscape’ is used to describe this particular 
intersection of space and memory (1996a, pp. 453-454). In this 
chapter I consider Kurdish identity formation in the KRI through 
this lens.  
5.1.1 Hypothesis 
In order to undertake an ethno-symbolist analysis of culture and 
identity formation in the KRI, a range of primary and secondary 
data is utilized. Before engaging with this, however, it is worth 
revisiting the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter on 
ethno-symbolism, which posit that:  
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1. Cultural and historical tools have been essential to the 
process of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI since 1991.  
2. Various actors have participated in the process of Kurdish 
identity formation, including political parties, civil society 
organizations, artists, and intellectuals. 
3. Whilst Kurdish identity was characterised by ethnicity 
between 1991 and 2003, the following period has witnessed 
the emergence of a new trend in identity discourse, which 
promises to transcend traditional ‘ethnic’ lines to 
incorporate newer ‘civic’ features. 
4. Since 1991 the process of Kurdish identity formation has 
grappled with the Kurdish memory and symbolism. This 
threatens the consolidation of Kurdish identity. 
5. The Kurdish identity in Iraq suffers greatly from 
fragmentation, particularly on ideological grounds. 
6. The process of identity formation has been shaped by 
interactions with other ethnic and nationalist groups with 
which Iraqi Kurds interact socially and politically (namely 
Iraqi Arabs, Turkmen, Turkish and Iranian nationals). 
5.2 Signifying Kurdish identity 
Following 1991 a Kurdish song known as Her Kurd Ebin, (‘We Will 
Remain Kurds’) gained popularity. With lyrics by the legendary 
Kurdish nationalist leader Ibrahim Ahmed (1914-2000) it has 
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become one of the most widely played Kurdish nationalist songs, 
and is particularly common during times of high political tension or 
military confrontation between Iraqi Kurds and other groups or 
hostile states.1 Its lyrics depict dominant Kurdish nationalist 
ideology, incorporating its main cultural-historical, political and 
social imaginaries: 
Hate filled invaders 
Savages without conscience 
You can't force us not to be Kurds 
We have always been Kurds and always will be 
Kurds 
Before Islam 
Before Fireworshipping 
In imprisonment and in victory 
We have always been Kurds and always will be 
Kurds 
We Are Kurds, and always have been as such 
I am Not an Arab, not an Iranian and not a 
Mountain Turk 
History will sing with me 
That I am a Kurd, a Kurdistani 
I am not asking for anyone's land 
I am not trespassing on anyone's territory 
For the rights of my land and its People 
Until I am Alive...I will fight 
                                 
 1 A new video version of the anthem was produced by Kurdsat TV (which 
belongs to the PUK). It contains a number of images pertinent to Kurdish 
national struggle, including still images of historical Kurdish nationalist 
leaders; and videos of guerrilla fighting, tragic moments of Kurdish 
suffering and historical events.  
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Even if you flatten Mount Qandeel and Mount Agiri 
To the ground 
You can't force us not to be Kurds 
We have always been Kurds and always will be 
Kurds (Ahmed, 2006) 
 
A number of features of contemporary Kurdish nationalism are 
evident here. There are references to the ‘other’ as enemy; Kurdish 
ethnic roots; and ‘Kurdistan’ as a homeland (and ethnoscape). 
These elements as they influence Kurdish nationalism more broadly 
are analysed in proceeding sections in line with the methodology of 
ethno-symbolism. 
 
As noted above, ethno-symbolism and political discourse theory 
agree that it is ideology (or nationalist ideology) which bears the 
burden of collective identity formation. Consequently, in order to 
understand the dynamics of identity formation we need to examine 
the ways in which political ideologies portray that identity. Ethno-
symbolism argues that the key to understanding contemporary 
nationalism lies in the relationship between historical ethnic tropes 
and contemporary nationalism (Smith, 1996a, p. 447), and that 
this can be undertaken through analysing ‘the cultural elements of 
symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and traditions’ (Smith, 2009, 
p. 25). In so doing, Smith (1991, pp. 65-66) outlines a number of 
strategies used in nationalist discourse that account for the 
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formation and construction of the nation or its identity (Ibid, p.65-
66). In what follows, these strategies are utilised to analyse data 
collected. These analyses engage with common history and culture; 
Kurdish national mythology; educational programmes and the 
Kurdish flag. 
5.2.1 Common history and culture 
For ethno-symbolists the process of nation-formation is dependent 
on the role of nationalists in linking contemporary communities to 
their pre-modern and modern ‘ethno-histories’ such that these 
pasts ‘reconstruct the modern nation and locate it in time and space 
on firm and authentic foundations.’ (Smith, 1995, p.18) Thus, 
nationalism is understood as ‘a form of archaeology’ and the 
nationalist as ‘a kind of social and political archaeologist’ who 
attempts to link the past to the present in order to provide ‘a 
symbolic and cognitive basis or foundation for that community’ 
(Smith, 1995, p.18). The nationalist-archaeologist, then, 
‘reconstructs the modern community by altering its temporal 
perspective and self-view.’ (Smith, 1995, p. 14, emphasis added). 
Such ‘archaeological nationalism’ is manifested in the language and 
discourse of nationalism. In response to the instrumentalist 
proposition, which over-emphasizes the manipulative power of 
nationalism, Smith argues that there are limits to reconstruction. 
The process, he states, is limited by ‘particular ethno-histories’ that 
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are ‘determined by scientific, popular-political, and cultural-
symbolic criteria.’ (1995, p. 17). 
 
Dominant Kurdish forms of identity are grounded in real and 
fictional historical narratives. The form that has been formulating 
since 1991 is built on pre-modern and modern foundations. As 
ethno-symbolism proposes, it is informed by discourses of the 
golden age, glory, sacrifice and tragedy; and accounts of significant 
religious and nationalist leaders and events. Here, I analyse the 
role played by some of these discourses in forming Kurdish identity 
in the KRI. 
5.2.2 The Kurdish nationalist mythology 
Perhaps the most famous Kurdish myth is that of Kawa the 
Blacksmith, (as noted above, this is also celebrated as part of 
Newroz)2. Although the day has been widely celebrated in a 
nationalist manner since the 1930s, since 1991 it has become an 
essential annual event in the KRI, playing an important role in 
                                 
 2 Traditionally, Newroz has been an outdoor celebration. As it falls on the 
first day of spring, it is marked by communal picnics that see families 
heading to the countryside and mountains. On the eve of Newroz (i.e. 
20th March) people light fires in public (particularly on higher ground). 
Fire is an essential part of Newroz celebrations, and was banned by the 
Iraqi government prior to 1991 (it is still not officially allowed in Iran, 
Turkey and Syria). Wearing traditional Kurdish clothing is also part of 
the celebrations, and has particularly become a tradition especially 
among Kurdish women. Food plays a role too, and so Newroz has 
similarities to the two major Islamic festivals,(Ed al-Fitr and Ed al-Adha), 
at which special food is prepared and served. 
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developing Kurdish nationalist narratives on a public level.3 Since 
1991, the 21st March has been recognised as a public holiday in the 
KRI, spanning three (or more) days.4  
 
As discussed in the historical chapter, no plausible historical 
correlation between the ethnic Kurds and the mythical Kawa has 
ever been established. The myth seems to have been incorporated 
into Kurdish nationalist narratives in the early days of the Kurdish 
political and intellectual movement in early 1920s and 1930s, with 
its fusing with Newroz a more recent nationalist move.  However, 
both Newroz and Kawa have now become indisputable elements of 
the Kurdish nationalist narrative and have since then been 
employed to influence the public (with significant success) and to 
mobilise the public by the Kurdish nationalist parties during political 
confrontations.  
 
The myths of Newroz and Kawa have also been widely utilised in 
Kurdish literature and arts in the KRI since 1991. As well as the 
                                 
 3 The Poet Piramerd (1867-1950) is considered the leading figure in 
combining Newroz with Kurdish nationalism. A lawyer and intellectual 
from Slemany, he began to convert Newroz into a nationalist tradition 
in 1932 (Ashna, 2009, pp. 82-84). He is also the writer of the most 
famous Kurdish poem on Newroz (Em rojy saly tazeye), which I discuss 
below. 
 4 In the KRI – as in the rest of Iraq – public holidays are still not fixed in 
duration. In most cases details are announced just prior to their 
occurrence: sometimes just a few hours prior to midnight the day 
before.  
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popularity of older songs celebrating the former, a number of new 
works have been written. The Kurdish media – both partisan and 
independent – has also invested enormously in the dissemination 
and publicising of the myth. In short, Newroz has become a 
universally accepted and respected national holiday in the KRI.5 Its 
symbolic importance can be identified in various ways. In addition 
to providing a symbolic link with Kawa, Newroz also conjures up 
notions of Kurdish freedom and self-determination. The most 
popular Newroz song is by the legendary Kurdish singer Hassan 
Zirak and contains lyrics written by the poet Piramerd. A mythical 
combination of historical description and symbolic representation, 
it connects Kurds with historic struggles against enemies and 
fosters remembrance of past sacrifices for Kurdistan: 
The New Year’s Day is today. Newroz is back. 
An ancient Kurdish festival, with joy and verdure. 
For many years, the flower of our hopes was 
downtrodden 
The fresh rose of spring was the blood of the youth 
It was that red colour on the high horizon of Kurd 
Which was carrying the happy tidings of dawn to 
remote and near nations 
It was Newroz which imbued the hearts with such a 
                                 
 5 Newroz is also officially celebrated in Iran on the 21s t March, as it also 
marks the Iranian New Year. It is celebrated by Kurdish populations in 
Turkey and Syria but is not officially recognised by either state. 
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fire 
That made the youth receive death with devoted 
love 
Hooray! The sun is shining from the high mountains 
of homeland 
It is the blood of our martyrs which the horizon 
reflects 
It has never happened in the history of any nation 
To have the chests of girls as shields against bullets 
Nay. It is not worth crying and mourning for the 
martyrs of homeland 
They die not. They live on in the heart of the 
nation.6 
 
Furthermore, it is now traditional for political parties and politicians 
to issue celebratory messages to the people of Kurdistan on the 
first day of Newroz. It thus offers a unique opportunity for 
nationalist narrators to revitalise nationalist spirit and appeal Kurds 
collectively. The 2012 Newroz message by President Masoud 
Barzani is a striking example of how the day has become imbued 
with a profound nationalism: 
2500 years ago Kurds rose up and rejected dictatorship. 
Ever since, Kurds have existed in struggle and fight for 
the sake of their freedom and liberty…this means we are 
a living people that will not accept subordination and 
oppression from nobody. We are a people who must live 
                                 
 6 Translation by Kamal Mirawdeli (2002). 
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freely. This is a lesson for us and other people. 
(Xebat.net, 2012a, author’s translation) 
This shows how nationalists use Newroz to develop a uniquely 
Kurdish identity based on culture and history; in particular during 
times of tension between the KRG and the central Iraqi 
government, most notably between Barzani and al-Maliki, the Iraqi 
Prime Minister. (A detailed reading of this speech using political 
discourse theory is undertaken in chapter seven.)  
 
In recent years the KRG government has invested significantly in 
Newroz celebrations, turning the day into a fully-fledged national 
holiday in the KRI, with large concerts held in urban and rural areas 
where famous Kurdish artists sing nationalist songs to thousands 
of people who gather and wave the Kurdish flag, Figure 5.1. In 
addition to casting the popular Kawa the Blacksmith play in public 
venues during Newroz celebrations, a number of statutes have 
been placed in public areas depicting Kawa with his touch and 
hammer. Figure 5.2 shows a statutes of Kawa on a busy street in 
the KRI city of Slemany. 
5.2.3 Educational programs 
The relationship between power and education has been widely 
noted in the social sciences (Apple, 1993 and 2000; Crawford, 
2000; Hickman and Porfilio, 2012; Kirmanj, 2014). John Fiske 
argues that power functions in two key ways to shape discourse: 
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firstly, it constructs reality in a desired way; secondly, it circulates 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Newroz celebrations on the ancient Delal Bridge, over the 
River Euphrates in Zakho, near the Turkish border. Photo: 
KurdekIBenav  
 
  
 
Figure 5.2 Statute of Kawa the Blacksmith in the KRI city of Slemany. 
Source: Kurdipedia.com  
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this reality ‘as widely and smoothly as possible’ through education 
(cited in Apple, 2000, p. 43). In a similar vein, Michael Apple 
maintains that ‘education is deeply implicated in the politics of 
culture’ (1993, p. 222). Ethno-symbolism also notes the role played 
by public culture and educational systems in disseminating the 
nationalist image of the nation (or ‘imagining’ it, to use Benedict 
Anderson’s term). One way it does this is through incorporating 
nationalist narratives into educational textbooks and practices. 
Craig Calhoun notes this, stating that ‘[n]ations are produced 
mostly by social institutions like schools and media and 
communication, transportation and infra-structure, by all the 
things that connect.’ (Eliassi, 2014, p. 64).  
 
This can take a number of forms. History can be framed in 
accordance with nationalist narratives, with a focus on, for 
example, (supposed) golden ages, ancestral sacrifices, notable 
achievements and tragedies. This process of narrating the past 
‘enables subjects to become political actors of particular hue in the 
present.’ (Houston, 2008, p. 5) In addition, a set of symbolic 
references can be employed within educational settings and other 
public contexts. School textbooks thus function as a key terrain on 
which political, cultural, and economic battles are fought (Crawford, 
2000, p. 1). The waving of flags and singing of national anthems 
or nationalist songs in schools and public institutions is also 
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common. These practices have been utilised by nationalists in the 
KRI since 1991: the following sections provide analysis of 
examples. 
5.2.4 Flying the Kurdish flag 
My friends, you must know very well 
My enemies, you must know very well 
As much as I believe in Zoroaster, Avesta and God7  
I believe in raising the flag a thousand times as 
(Abdullah Peshew, 1970; quoted in Muhammed, 
2012) 
 
National flags play an important symbolic role in nationalism. For 
ethno-symbolists, they are distinguished from other national 
symbols as people are prepared to engage in ‘fighting and dying 
for the flag’ (Smith, 2009, p. 102). As with all nationalist 
discourses, the flag occupies a pivotal place in the Kurdish 
nationalist discourse. Geisler maintains that this is because the flag 
‘represents the authority invested in it by or on behalf of, the nation 
                                 
 7 Zoroaster refers to the ancient Iranian philosopher and the religious 
founder of Zoroastrianism, which some Kurdish nationalists consider a 
purely Kurdish religion (Leezenberg, n.d., p. 26; Meho, 1997, p. 43). 
Avesta is the holy book of Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism still has 
followers among Kurds in Iran and in the Kurdish diaspora more broadly. 
Studies also link Zoroastrianism to Yezidism, another religion with 
followers in Kurdish inhabited areas of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Armenia and 
Georgia (Mamkak, n.d., p. 1). There is less debate about Yezidism’s 
association with Kurdishness. 
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as a collective to people as individuals or subgroups ’ (2005, p. 
XXII). For ethno-symbolism, the flag offers both immediate 
symbolic significance and historical links to the nation’s past.  
 
Nationalist narratives locate the origin of Kurdistan’s national flag 
in ancient Medes and the flag is utilised in a variety of ways and 
places. The official flag of the KRI was approved by the Kurdistan 
National Assembly in 1998 and is a modification of the 1946 
Kurdish Republic of Kurdistan’s flag. It is commonly seen across 
the region and is widely liked: approximately 88% of respondents 
to the survey undertaken for this study would accept it either as 
the flag for all Kurds or for the KRI (see Table 5.1).   
Table 5.1 Response to the question about the Kurdish flag 
Answer choices responses percentage 
It is the flag of all Kurds and I 
accept it as the flag of Kurdistan 
Region 
220 61.62% 
It is the flag of Kurdistan Region 
only and I accept it 
95 26.61% 
It does not represent all components 
in the Kurdistan Region and I do not 
accept 
12 3.36% 
It is the flag of Kurdistan Region 
only and I do not accept it 
6 1.68% 
Other answers 24 6.72% 
 357  
 
This popularity means that the flag has been widely incorporated 
into Kurdish nationalist discourse. A striking example here is its 
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representation in Ey Reqib, the Kurdish national anthem (which is 
also the national anthem of KRI), which contains the following 
lines: 
Let no one say the Kurds are dead, 
The Kurds are alive 
The Kurds are alive and their flag will never fall. 
(KRG, 2012b) 
Whilst the Kurdish flag replaced the Iraqi flag in the KRI 
immediately after the 1991 uprising, it did not play a particularly 
visible role in the KRI until the end of the 90s. It was flown by few 
private individuals or businesses (on homes, vehicles, shops, etc.) 
and was rarely used by political parties. This was to avoid provoking 
neighbouring states, which were hostile to Kurdish nationalist 
symbolism; and resulted from the time required for Kurdish 
nationalist parties to come to terms with relative stability following 
years of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, continued disagreement 
between Kurdish nationalist parties meant that rather than 
fostering a unified nationalist culture around the flag there was a 
‘war of the colours’ or Şerre perro (‘rag fight’) (Laizer, 1996, p. 
123), with people commonly displaying the flag of their favoured 
party. This continued into the 2000s. 
 
Since 1991 attempts have been made to incorporate the Kurdish 
flag into public life in the KRI, increasing its visibility to citizens. It 
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is flown on public buildings (as well as an increased number of 
private businesses); and particular attempts have been made to 
incorporate it into schooling. Textbooks from primary level onwards 
contain the Kurdish flag (rather than the Iraqi flag); the school 
week begins with a flag-raising ceremony while pupils chant the Ey 
Reqib anthem; and the flag is drawn in art lessons and incorporated 
into other subjects, Figure 5.3. Nationalist songs and poems also 
feature on the curriculum. 
 
Figure 5.3 pupils at a primary school in Kurdistan Region-Iraq 
They are holding the Kurdish flag during a lesson. Photo: Kurdiu.org 
 
 
The current Kurdish national flag is a re-design of a version that 
dates from 1998 and was legally approved by the Kurdistan 
parliament in 2002 (Izady, 2008). The flag has been further 
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institutionalised in parliament by the 2009 designation of 17th of 
December as ‘flag day’, on which people are urged to show their 
respect of and veneration for the Kurdish flag in any way possible. 
Apart from numerous public exhibition of the Kurdish flag, be it at 
national days (Newroz, Raperin ‘uprising’, Halabaja and Anfal 
remembrance and so on), or at public rallies, concerts, sport 
events, national and international cultural events and festivals, the 
Kurdish flag has been inscribed onto many other public and private 
domains. 
 
Use of the flag is not confined to the public sphere; nor to flying or 
waving it. As Geisler notes, incorporating the colours of a flag into 
public and private life is a nationalist tactic (2005, p. xxix), and this 
has been commonplace in the KRI for a number of years. Figure 
5.4 shows a kilaw (a traditional Kurdish hat) knitted in the colours 
of the Kurdish flag, Figure 5.4 shows how a furniture company 
incorporates the colours of the flag into its identity and Figure 5.5 
shows a stamp used to promote Erbil’s status as Arab Tourism 
Capital 2014.8  
 
Although there is no official explanation for the use of red, green, 
yellow and white in the flag, most Kurds in the KRI are aware of 
                                 
8 This status was highly controversial, with many arguing that Erbil is a 
Kurdish, rather than Arabic, city.   
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these colours’ connotations; and an article on the government 
affiliated website ‘Sheqlawe Educational Directorate’9 outlines their 
importance in a highly nationalistic manner: 
 
 
Figure 5.4 A traditional Kurdish kilaw (hat) in the colours of the Kurdish 
flag. Photo by author 
   
Red, is a revolutionary sign of the blood of martyrs of our 
people for the sake of our rights; white, is a sign of peace 
and security, as the Kurdish people have always been 
peaceful; green, has come from the nature of Kurdistan 
and is a sign of revival; yellow, the twenty one stripe sun 
is a sign of the future of Kurdish people. Yellow colour 
was a sacred colour in the ancient Kurdish religions and 
the number twenty one was one of the sacred numbers 
among Zoroastrian Kurds’ (Sheqlawe Educational 
Directorate, n.d.), (author’s translation). 
 
                                 
 9 Sheqlawe is popular resort town in the Erbil Governorate of the KRI.  
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Figure 5.5 A furniture store advert using the colours of the Kurdish flag 
Source: Awene.com   
  
 
 
Figure 5.6 A postage stamp promoting Erbil’s status as the 2014 Arab 
tourism capital. Source: Mohammed, 2013 
 
 
The use of these colours throughout the KRI, then, shows the 
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popularity of Kurdish nationalism both publicly and privately. 
5.3 Contested and fragmented identity 
Nation states are produced by and reproduce ‘official knowledge’ 
(Apple, 1993; 2000) – widely prevalent and accepted 
understandings that do not reflect all components of their society. 
The process of constructing this is ‘always part of a selective 
tradition’ by particular group or groups of people (Apple, 1993, p. 
222 italics by author); and constitutes what political discourse 
theorists refer to as ‘hegemonisation’ or ‘universalisation’. It 
ensures that only particular forms of knowledge are understood as 
‘real’ and ‘right’ knowledge and are disseminated throughout 
society in a number of forms, including education (Crawford, 2000, 
p. 2). Whilst the KRI is not a nation-state as such, this process can 
be observed in the region.  
 
The historical overview provided above articulates the political and 
ideological divisions in the KRI. In the absence of a centralised state 
apparatus, the process of identity formation would naturally be 
expected to reflect existing societal and political divisions. Ethno-
symbolism shares the modernist view on the role of state 
institutions in the process of nationalist discourse hegemonisation. 
Despite the fact that the KRG unification process was apparently 
completed in 2012, signs of the dual-administration model remain, 
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meaning that identity formation is penetrated by party divisions 
and reflects their competing historiographies, divisions which 
penetrate deeply into society. Describing such a situation, Smith 
states:  
Where such memories, myths, symbols, and traditions 
are either lacking or negative—conflictual, ambiguous, 
and disintegrative—the attempt to create new 
communities and cultural identities is likely to prove 
painfully slow and arduous, especially where the new 
identities lack clear boundaries and must compete with 
well-established and deep-rooted identities and 
communities. (Smith, 1999, p. 19) 
 
Although the task in the KRI is not to create a community anew – 
but rather the transformation of an existing cultural community into 
a political community that can expand its autonomy – Smith’s 
analysis is still relevant given the difficulties in establishing identity 
as a result of competing interpretations of history from different 
social and political groups. Although this is exacerbated by the 
ability of other national communities in Iraq and beyond such as 
Iraqi Arabs and other national communities in neighbouring states 
to coalesce around a solid identity (in large part thanks to the state 
apparatuses they have access to), applying Smith’s approach 
would likely lead to an exaggeration of this factor due to its bias 
towards external influences. Three internal dimensions are 
particularly pertinent when analysing the fragmentation of Kurdish 
identity since 1991: the ideological, the political and the regional. 
I will now deal with each of these in turn. 
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The ideological dimension of the Kurdish identity fragmentation 
stems from the division of Kurdish political parties along ideological 
lines, as illustrated in Table 5.1. These divisions can be expected 
to produce competing historiographies that have a bearing on the 
symbolic domain of nationalism in the KRI, and this is illustrated 
by Figure 5.7 which, shows the polarised society in the KRI (this is 
discussed further in chapter seven, below). Whilst the previously 
discussed division between the KDP and the PUK is relevant here, 
a further ideological division is relevant here with the Islamic 
parties (the KIU and the KIG) promoting an explicitly Islamic 
historiography in contrast to existing nationalist accounts.  
 
Islamic Kurdish nationalisms have their own definitions of 
Kurdishness, which do not draw on pre-Islamic Kurdish histories 
(this is further analysed in chapter seven, below). Tensions with 
secular nationalisms have thus emerged, and in part play out on 
the symbolic level, with Ey Reqib subjected to critique. Kurdish 
Islamic groups have long refused to fully accept the anthem as a 
result of the line ‘our religious faith is the homeland’, a concept 
they consider kufir (‘heretical’). 
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Table 5.2 List of political parties in the Kurdistan Parliament. 
Political party Founding ideology MPS 
/111 
Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) 
Nationalist 38 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) 
Nationalist (social 
democratic) 
18 
The Change Movement 
(Gorran) 
Centrist, liberal, 
reformist 
24 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) Islamic 10 
Kurdistan Islamic Group 
(KIG) 
Islamic 6 
Islamic Movement in 
Kurdistan (IMK) 
Islamic 1 
Kurdistan Communist Party 
(KCP) 
Left nationalist 1 
Kurdistan Democratic 
Solution Party (KDSP) 
Pan-Kurdish 
nationalist 
0 
Kurdistan Workers 
Communist Party (KWCP) 
Communist 0 
 
Figure 5.7 Flags of political parties are sold on streets of the Kurdistan 
Region. Photo: Jenna Krajeski  
 
In interview, Ali Bapir, emir (leader) of KIG recounted discussing 
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the anthem with a nationalist opponent. Articulating his rejection 
of the anthem, he stated ‘It says “our religion is our homeland.” I 
said “the land cannot make religion, the land is prayed on. We have 
to save the land to practice religion on, we cannot make religion 
out of it.”’ (AB1) One KIG MP has rejected the anthem outright, 
stating a TV interview that ‘the Ey Reqib anthem is heresy’. 
(Rudaw, 2013). He can be seen in Figure 5.8, refusing to stand for 
the anthem in the Kurdish parliament (which is against the law). 
 
Islamic hostility to Ey Reqib can be found in society more broadly. 
While around 75% of survey respondents stated that they would 
accept it as the anthem for all Kurds or for the KRI region, just over 
9% of respondents would reject it on the basis of its anti-religious 
nature (see Table 5.3). Such hostility is met, however, with public 
support for the anthem. This can be seen in Figure 5.9, which 
depicts a publicly displayed slogan from supporters of Ey Reqib.  
 
The political division in Kurdish identity in the KRI stems from the 
differing regional, national and international alignments of political 
parties. Many of these have changed since 1991, meaning that 
former political allies are now enemies and vice versa. The need for 
these alignments stems from the relative power that other regional 
actors held over Kurds, which, as Andreas Wimmer (2002) has 
noted, means that Kurds were frequently ‘objects’ rather than 
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‘subjects’ of history. 
 
Figure 5.8 The playing of Ey Reqib at the Kurdish parliament, for which 
MPs should stand by law.A member of the KIG is refusing to stand. 
Source: xeber24.net  
 
 
Figure 5.9 A publicly displayed banner stating ‘so long as there is an 
enemy, the Ey Reqib will remain’.Source: Kurdipedia.com  
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Table 5.3 Response to the question about the Ey Reqib anthem 
Answer choice responses percentage 
It’s the anthem for all Kurds and I accept it 180 50.42% 
It is the national anthem of Kurdistan Region and  
I accept it 
88 24.64% 
It is the Kurdish nationalist anthem but I do not 
accept it as it contains anti-religious expressions 
34 9.52% 
It is the Kurdish nationalist anthem but I do not 
accept it as it lacks reference to other 
components in the Kurdistan Region 
33 9.24% 
Other responses 22 6.16% 
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Since 2003, however, Kurds have begun to shape history more 
actively (Stansfield, 2013). As it should be noted throughout the 
discussions in this study, post-2003 KRI can be regarded as the 
golden age for consolidating pillars of Kurdish identity. The 
implication of the ideological and political dimensions on the 
identity formation in KRI has been discussed in more details in 
chapter seven. 
 
A division between the regions of Soran and Bahdinan has also left 
its mark on Kurdish identity. This has historical roots but has been 
reinforced since 1991 by the political divisions between the KDP 
and PUK; and manifests itself most clearly in the problematic issue 
of unified official language. The Sorani dialect (sometimes known 
as ‘Middle Kirmanji’) is the current de facto official language in the 
KRI in both government and educational programs in Erbil, 
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Slemany and Germyan; whilst Bahdini (sometimes called ‘Northern 
Kirmanji’) is used for teaching and official communications in areas 
of Duhok province and the KRG run areas of Mosul. The debate is 
divided on two or three orientations, on the one side there is 
supporters of Sorani dialect for the formal language, on the other, 
the imposition of Sorani is rejected, instead either Badini is 
preferred or an alternative way is suggested where in each area 
the dialect of the majority to become the official language. Another 
parallel orientation can be found which backs a dual-standardised 
language of both Sorani and Bahdini10. This has been a key area of 
debate in the KRI since 1991 (Ghazi, 2009) and is an extremely 
sensitive issue.11  
 
In the survey conducted for this research, just over 46% of 
respondents stated they would prefer Sorani to be adopted as the 
official Kurdish dialect in the KRI, with 11% preferring Badini. 40% 
of respondents said they would prefer each dialect to be officially 
adopted in their respective regions (Table 5.4). In an attempt to 
resolve this issue, a number of academic and intellectual 
conferences were held after 2003 to discuss the issue. However, 
                                 
10 The suggested language name in this choice sometimes called 
‘Sormanji’ which is a combination of Sorani and Kirman/Badini. 
 11 A proposed law ‘for a formal language in the Kurdistan Region-Iraq’ 
was presented to the Kurdistan Parliament in May 2014. It has not yet 
been discussed by parliament. 
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no substantial proposals to overcome the difficulties have been 
formulated. I consider the issue further through the lens of PDT in 
chapter seven. This is useful, as PDT understands identity as an 
inherently contested concept. 
 
Table 5.4 Response to the question on preferred Kurdish dialect for the 
official language in the KRI 
Answer choice responses percentage 
Kurdish Sorani/Middle Kirmanji 167 46.91% 
Kurdish Bahdini/Northern Kirmanji 40 11.23% 
The dominant dialect in each area 
made the official language for that 
area 
107 30.05% 
Other answers 42 11.79% 
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5.4 Ethnic or civic identity? 
In chapter four I analysed the difference between ethnic and civic 
nationalism and argued that there has been a shift towards civic 
nationalism in the KRI (as defined by Smith, 1999, p, 190-196). 
This can most clearly be seen in discourse, but is not yet so clearly 
manifested in practice. The KRI’s draft constitution, which was 
approved in June 2009, portrays a multicultural region, stating that 
‘[t]he people of the Kurdistan Region are composed of Kurds, 
Arabs, Chaldean-Assyrian-Syriacs, Armenians and others who are 
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citizens of Kurdistan.’ (Kurdistan Parliament, 2009, p. 3). There is 
a quota of eleven parliamentary seats for Chaldean-Assyrian and 
Turkmen groups in addition to Armenians, which can be understood 
as an attempt to portray the civic character of the KRI. Other 
attempts have been made to demonstrate the multi-ethnic 
character of the KRI. Figure 5.10 shows the two guards stationed 
at the main gate of the Kurdistan Parliament, with one dressed in 
traditional Kurdish uniform and the other in traditional Assyrian 
uniform.  
 
 
Figure 5.10 Guards at the main gate of the Kurdistan parliament in Erbil. 
The guard on the right is in traditional Kurdish dress and the guard on 
the left is in traditional Assyrian dress. Photo: 
twitter.com/freekurdistan  
 
Despite these political and symbolic attempts to portray a 
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multicultural region – which are significantly greater than in 
neighbouring states – the dominance of Kurdish identity at the 
political, administrative and symbolic levels should not be 
discounted; and there are limits to the representation of minority 
identities in the KRI. This is partly due to the ambivalent nature of 
the KRI in the first place, as a post-conflict region and a nascent 
democracy. 
 
The identity of the political community of the KRI is largely 
symbolised through characters understood as ethnic Kurds, and 
who are deeply engrained in Kurdish nationalist ideology. Elements 
of Kurdish culture and history are utilised to develop nationalism, 
which then expands to encompass the collective identity of the KRI 
as a geopolitical entity. This is manifested in the symbolic 
foundations of the KRI: its flag, anthem, semi-official language, 
public culture and educational system have been built around 
Kurdish ethnic tropes, myths and symbols.  
 
A number of academic and intellectual debates have engaged with 
this issue since 2003. It is observed that the Ey Reqib anthem has 
been among the most debated subjects in this regard (Alsumaria, 
2013). Although, this was not officially adopted as the anthem of 
the KRI until 2006, it was chanted at every official opening of 
parliament prior to this. Attempts to regulate the anthem were 
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initiated in 2006 and finalised in 2011 with a parliamentary law 
(Kurdi, 2006; Kurdistan Parliament, 2011).  
 
Islamic criticism of the anthem has been noted, and it has also 
proven controversial with non-Kurdish inhabitants of the KRI as a 
result of the line ‘Oh foe, the Kurdish speaking people is still alive’. 
Both Ali Bapir an (of the KIG) and Abu-Bakr Ali (of the KIU) 
criticized the anthem on these grounds as well. Just over 9% of 
survey respondents reject the anthem for its lack of reference to 
other ethnic and national components in the KRI (see Table 5.3). 
This has repeatedly been raised at parliament, with the Islamic 
parliamentary faction proposing new lyrics to replace Ey Reqib, 
which have been strongly resisted by other parliamentary factions.  
 
Education has also been used to promote Kurdish identity (in 
addition to the incorporation of the flag, as discussed above). This 
began as early as 1992 but intensified post-2003 to include school 
textbooks from primary school up to university level (Kirmanj, 
2014). Figure 5.11 shows a poem titled ‘Kurdistan’ printed in a 
class three primary school (which targets 8-9 year old children) 
book from 2012. It reads: 
This beautiful Kurdistan 
Is our blood, heart and eyes 
I love it with all my heart 
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And will safeguard it like a rose (carefully) 
I am the soldier of land and people 
The vigilant and active child 
I will safeguard Kurdistan 
With all my force and ability 
To safeguard the homeland 
I will turn my chest into a shield 
(General Directorate of Curriculum and Publications, 
2012, translation by author) 
 
Figure 5.11 'Kurdistan', a poem included in a textbook titled Kurdish 
Reading, aimed at 8-9 year old students. 
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The name Kurdistan referred only to a geographical area in school 
books published during Ba’athist rule, but here it is portrayed to as 
a homeland, a country and as a place to be revered and defended 
with blood. Figure 5.12 demonstrates the shifting use and centrality 
of ‘Kurdistan’ in education. It shows a recently published class 
twelve history textbook entitled Modern and Contemporary History, 
with a map of greater Kurdistan on its cover. The book details the 
modern history of Kurds in the Middle East and replaced The History 
of the Arab Homeland, published during Ba’athist rule. 
  
Figure 5.12 The cover of Modern and Contemporary History (2012), a 
history textbook for 17-18 year olds.  
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5.5 Memories, heroism and victimhood 
Ethno-symbolists consider identity ‘a necessary element of the very 
concept of a nation’ (Smith, 1994, p. 2), with ‘memory’ playing a 
key role in forming this identity: Smith notes that ‘there can be no 
identity without memory (albeit selective), no collective purpose 
without myth.’ (1994, p.2) This is perhaps the central proposition 
in ethno-symbolism, which shows that the past – with its myths, 
glories and failures – is fundamental in processes of identity 
formation in the present. 
 
The bracketed ‘albeit selective’ reveals Smith’s partial agreement 
with social constructionist approaches regarding the manipulative 
potential of nationalist ideology. However, it also needs to be noted 
that not all memories are relevant to or conducive for nationalist 
narratives. Thus, while some memories are re-presented to 
produce nationalist identity, others are ignored or forgotten 
(Renan, 1996).  
 
An example of the pivotal role played by memory in identity 
construction can be drawn from the post-2003 Iraq. Whilst most 
Kurds are Sunni Muslims, the Kurdish struggle against the Sunni-
dominated Ba’athist regime prior to 2003 meant that Kurds aligned 
themselves with Arab Shi’ites rather than Sunnis. To a degree, this 
has continued since 2003, exacerbated by Sunni Arab nationalism 
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re-presenting Ba’athist rule as a ‘golden age’ for Iraq. It has, 
however, been weakened by the Shi’ite rule of Iraq; and has come 
close to sectarian fighting between forces belonging to the two 
camps, including – at times – the Peshmerga and the Iraqi 
military.12  
 
National memory is strongly tied to past glories and sufferings. 
While past glories create heroes and heroines for contemporary 
generations, national suffering is memorialised to boost the moral 
standing of those people who currently constitute the nation. As 
Smith notes, every nationalism ‘requires a touchstone of virtue and 
heroism, to guide and give meaning to the tasks of regeneration’ 
(Smith, 1999, p. 65).  
 
Interestingly, Smith seems to have no issue with the modernist 
view on the role of mass education in modern nationalism and 
national identity formation. For him, this is a processes adopted by 
modern nation-states in order to strengthen pre-existing collective 
sentiment. Running parallel to this, he notes, is ‘the inculcation of 
a spirit of self-sacrifice’ (1999, pp: 153-154). Much of this work 
occurs through education: primarily through the subjects of 
literature, history and geography (1999, pp. 153-154). 
                                 
 12 The Kurdish/Shi’ite tension is discussed in greater detail in chapter 
three. 
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Both of these trends can be identified in the KRI to varying degrees 
at numerous times in the KRI since 1991. The Kurdish scholar 
Sherko Kirmanj (2014) has undertaken a valuable research 
assessing official efforts to construct Kurdish nationalism through 
education between 1991 and 2014. He examines history and social 
studies textbooks published by the KRG government since 1991, 
with a particular focus on those published since 2005, and 
demonstrates their Kurdish nationalist orientation. Thus, despite 
the deep-rooted political divisions in the KRI since 1991, a semi-
unified politics of national identity-formation has occurred through 
education.  
 
As Smith’s theory predicts, it is history, geography and literature 
that have been primarily utilised to construct identity in the KRI. In 
the preceding section, examples from history and literature were 
shown. Here, I draw on examples from geography, further 
informed by Kirmanj’s claim that ‘geography is utilized as a tool to 
provide visibility to their [Kurds] homeland and demonstrate the 
boundaries of Kurdistan through cartography.’ (Kirmanj, 2014, p. 
274) This can be seen in Figure 5.12, which shows the front cover 
of a history textbook for class twelve, in which a Kurdish nationalist 
map of greater Kurdistan is drown. Figure 5.13 shows a map of the 
KRI in the geography section of a social studies textbook for class 
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nine foundation year (targeting 14-15 year olds). 
 
Figure 5.13 Map of the KRI in a social studies school textbook, for 14-15 
year olds.  
 
Memorisation of the nation’s past glories and sufferings is not 
confined to the educational system. It also takes the form of 
statutes of national heroes and heroines (including artists and 
literary figures); historical leaders (and their tombs); memorial 
places; the tomb of the unknown soldier; and places preserved as 
a result of their historical importance (battlefields, for example). 
Figure 5.14 shows the statute of Sheikh Mehmud Hafid (the self-
declared King of Slemany, 1920-1924), in the middle of a busy 
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street in Erbil; whilst Figure 5.15 shows the statute of Mir 
Mohammed in Rawanduz near Erbil. Born in the town, he was 
known as ‘the blind king’ and reigned the Kurdish Soran Emirate 
between 1825 and 1986 (McDowall, 2007, pp. 42-45).  
 
Figure 5.14 Statute of Sheikh Mehmud Hafid  (Self-declared King of 
Kurdistan) in Erbil. Photo: author 
 
A number of tombs of classic and modern Kurdish poets and artists 
can also be found in the KRI, among the most well-known of which 
is the tomb of the poet Dildar (1918-1948), the author of the words 
of Ey Reqib (figure 5.16). 
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Figure 5.15 Statute of Mir Mohammed of Rawanduzi. 
  
 Photo: author  
 
Shortly after the March 1991 uprising a wave of symbolic 
nationalism began in the KRI. Large portraits and statutes of 
martyrs (Shahid in Kurdish) were displayed in public spaces, 
streets and public buildings. Figure 5.17 shows  
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Figure 5.16 Tomb of the well-known Kurdish poet Dildar (1918-1948) In 
Koye, near Erbil. Photo: Rebin Photography  
 
a front page of the Erbil local paper Hewler from January 1993, in 
which a prominent article announces a possible statue of ‘Kurdistan 
martyrs’. Construction of this was, however, halted by political 
divisions between the PDK and PUK, with each party favouring 
particular heroes and historical symbols. The statue has still not 
been constructed. 
 
Two further examples demonstrate the extent of symbolic 
disagreement between the DKP and the PUK. The latter tends to  
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 Figure 5.17 A front page of the Erbil paper Hewler, 1993. The main 
headline reads ‘Millions of Bunches of Flowers and the Capital of 
the Kurdistan Region are Waiting for the Statue of the Kurdistan 
Martyrs’, 31st January 1993. 
 
 
pay more tribute to Ibrahim Ahmed: they organised the 
construction of his tomb in Slemany and named an area after him; 
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whilst the KDP venerates Mustafa Barzani: there is a large portrait 
of him hanging in the Kurdistan parliament and a number of urban 
areas, stadia and streets carry his name. These divisions were 
further intensified after the famous events of 31st August 1996, and 
penetrated into all areas of administration and public sphere from 
street naming to naming of public buildings and venues through of 
urban areas and sporting spaces. However, following KRG 
government unification in 2003 an attempt was made to nationalise 
these symbolic acts. Indeed, since 2009 one of the Change 
Movement’s main slogans related to expanding events of symbolic 
importance to the whole nation.  
 
The symbolisation of collective memory is, however, far more 
unified – and is perhaps the most universal element of Kurdish 
nationalism. Whilst political parties celebrate separate figures, 
people in the KRI are united by the abundant tragedies that have 
befallen them, across the present-day KRI. Thus, there is an 
abundance of memorials, monuments, tombs and statues of 
martyrs distributed across the country. Among the most well-
known of these are the monument to the Halabja martyrs in the 
city of Halabja, which memorialises the March 16th 1988 chemical 
attack on the town Figure 5.18; and the monument in Chamchamal 
near Kirkuk, which memorises the mass killing of Iraqi Kurds 
between 1987 and 1988, Figure 5.19. 
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Figure 5.18 Halabja memorial in Halabja. It depicts the father Omeri 
Xawer who died holding his baby as the result of the chemical attack 
in March 1988. Source: Kurdistani Niwe  
 
 
Figure 5.19 The monument of Anfal in Chamchamal, Germyan, near 
Kirkuk. Photo: Genocide Kurd (2014)  
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5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter processes of Kurdish identity formation have been 
explored through the lens of ethno-symbolism in order to reveal 
their inner dynamics. It has demonstrated that the nationalism of 
Kurdish intellectuals and government institutions has played a key 
role in the process of identity formation. They utilise Kurdish ethnic 
culture and history as a foundation from which to form identity. 
Despite the unstable and deeply divided nature of this process, it 
has managed to capitalise on Kurdish ethnic and historical roots, 
including myths of origin, tales of past glories and tragic events in 
Kurdish history. These cultural and historical repertoires are re-
appropriated and presented according the needs of contemporary 
nationalist discourse. 
 
This process has been helped by the political space opened by the 
KRI becoming a self-governing quasi-state. Despite its instability, 
government institutions have been widely involved in the process 
of identity formation through their attempts to create a public 
culture peculiar to the KRI. These attempts are especially evident 
in the educational and cultural domains. The incorporation of 
Kurdish nationalist historiography into the education system has 
been discussed along with attempts to introduce it public and 
private spheres. 
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The process has not been without problems, however, and the main 
engineers of collective national identity in KRI (the Kurdish 
nationalist parties and large public institutions) have also been 
obstacles to the transformation of Kurdish identity in the region as 
a result of the unstable nature of politics in the KRI since 1991. 
This has resulted in an ambiguous and fragmented identity.  
 
The final point to note is that from 1991 to 2003 the identity of the 
KRI could be defined as largely ethno-nationalist, but since 2003 it 
has shifted towards nationalism; and, since 2009, towards civic-
nationalism. This latest stage is a response to the newly emerged 
political, social and economic conditions and continues at the time 
of writing.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 Political Discourse Theory 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the second theoretical approach used to 
study Kurdish identity formation in the KRI: political discourse 
theory (PDT), mainly associated with the work of Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe (1985).1 It is devoted to a detailed discussion 
of the theoretical foundations of PDT and ends with a preliminary 
application of the approach to the issue of identity formation in the 
KRI in question at the end of the chapter. A comprehensive analysis 
using PDT follows in the proceeding chapter.  
 
As its name makes clear, PDT focuses on political discourse, 
although this is not limited to language. Nonetheless, language is 
considered important and is held to provide the only access to 
social reality (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 8), and an important 
feature in determining individual and group identity (Omoniyi, 
                                 
 1 At least three different terms have been used to describe the approach: 
‘discourse theory’ (Torfing 1999; Jorgensen and Philips 2002; Howarth 
and Stavrakakis 2000), ‘the Essex School of discourse analysis’ 
(Townshend, 2003) and ‘political discourse theory’ (Glynose et al, 
2009). As the most recent, I use the latter. 
 231 
 
2011, p. 260). The relationship between language and discourse is 
neatly demonstrated by Michael Billig in his well-known book Banal 
Nationalism: 
An identity is to be found in the embodiment habits of 
social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using 
language. To have a national identity is to possess ways 
of talking about nationhood. [Therefore it has been 
concluded that] the study of identity should involve the 
detailed study of discourse. (Billig, 1995, p. 8) 
 
PDT extends beyond this focus on the linguistic, however: discourse 
is not limited to language even in its broader terms (i.e. spoken, 
written, visual), but is understood to include action, cognition and 
even institutions, a point elaborated upon below. 
 
There are five reasons for utilising PDT in this study, and it is 
important to consider each of these. Firstly, Kurdish identity 
formation across Kurdistan is produced through an array of social 
and political relationships involving other ethnic and national 
groups (including Arabs, Persians, Turks, Turkmen and Chaldean-
Assyrians). It has long proven to be one of the most complicated 
social and political issues in the Middle East. Most existing research 
on the issue is premised on essentialist understandings of identity 
that utilise a positivist ontology. They also take the underlying 
political institutions and norms for granted, with no interrogation 
of concepts such as ‘the nation-state’, ‘the nation’, ‘ethnic identity’ 
and ‘national identity’; nor of the contexts in which they are 
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deployed.  
 
Accordingly, these studies adopt problem-solving approaches to 
Kurdish identity; and fail to produce substantive questions that 
explore the dynamics upon which the very notion of identity 
operates.2 Moreover, they frequently mistake political rhetoric with 
reality, understanding – for example – the rhetoric of Kurdish 
nationalists as the only medium through which to study the Kurdish 
politics3.  
  
A small number of studies have employed a robustly critical 
approach to exploring competing political discourses both within 
and outside Kurdish society.4 In brief, the problem-driven and 
critical approach of PDT speaks to the nature of the problem in 
question (i.e. the Kurdish identity construction).  
 
Secondly, political identity manifests itself primarily in the language 
                                 
 2 See Entessar’s Kurdish Ethnonationalism, for example (1992). 
 3 Brendan O’Leary, for example, spends the entire five pages of his 
introduction to Kirmanj’s Identity and Nation in Iraq appraising deceased 
KDP politicians. He makes no effort to assess their rhetoric against 
historical facts, nor to the reality he experienced as an advisor to key 
Kurdish leaders in the KRI after 2003. 
 4 In this regard, Jaffer Sheyholislami’s book Kurdish Identity discourse 
and new media (2011), and Karen Culcasi’s article ‘cartographically 
constructing Kurdistan within geopolitical and orientalist discourses 
(2006), stand out. Especially, both these studies use discourse analysis 
as their method of study. 
 233 
 
and practices of political actors. What justifies the selection of PDT 
here is the central role it gives to politics in its analysis of social 
and political phenomena: it stresses ‘the primacy of politics’ 
(Glynose, et al., August 2009, p. 5; Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, 
p. 13); and identity plays a fundamental role in this (Laclau, 1994, 
p. 3). PDT also stresses that context is essential when addressing 
political discourse.  
 
Thirdly, PDT’s rejection of essentialism allows a move beyond the 
primordialist approaches discussed in chapter four. PDT argues that 
individual and collective identities are not pre-given, but ‘are the 
result of contingent, discursive processes and, as such, are part of 
the discursive struggle.’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 34) 
 
The fourth benefit of PDT is that it stresses the importance of 
hegemonic practice in processes of identity formation (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007, p. 5). ‘Hegemony’ in this context refers to a 
particular social and political actor’s ability to impose a certain form 
of identity by presenting it as universal and objective. As it is 
empirically substantiated below, hegemonic practices in discourses 
of identity formation are common in the KRI. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the recent history of Kurdish nationalism has been 
produced through a struggle for hegemony over ‘Kurdishness’ 
between conflicting nationalist forces.  
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Finally, PDT acknowledges that the relationships integral to identity 
formation are primarily antagonistic, in that two or more forms of 
identity negate each other by asserting their own version of identity 
while denying others (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 14). This 
antagonistic character is clearly present in the KRI, where it 
operates on two levels: Kurds resisting Arabic nationalism on the 
Iraqi national level; and intra-Kurdish struggles over Kurdish 
identity.  
 
These five justifications outline the primary theoretical foundations 
of PDT (Howarth, 2005, p. 17) while, at the meantime, they 
represent the research objectives set out for PDT as a research 
programme (Howarth, 2005, p. 321). They demonstrate its 
suitability for researching the political aspects of identity formation 
in the KRI, with five essential elements: contingency, the primacy 
of politics, the relational character of identity, hegemony and 
antagonism, which constitute the theoretical working tools 
deployed in this chapter. In what follows I outline the ontological 
and methodological foundations of these four elements. Drawing 
from some elementary data, I later examine identity formation in 
the KRI using this theoretical framework.  
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6.2 Political Discourse Theory 
Political discourse theory mainly built upon the ground-breaking 
work Hegemony and socialist strategy, (1985) co-written by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The resultant theoretical 
framework of the book, which ‘comprises a fusion of recent 
developments in Marxism, post-structuralism, post-analytical and 
psychoanalytical theory’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 1), has 
been described by David Howarth, a leading discourse theorist, 
(2000, p. 317) not merely as ‘an empirical theory’ rather as ‘a 
research programme or paradigm’. For Howarth, Political discourse 
theory possesses ‘a system of ontological assumptions, theoretical 
concepts and methodological precepts (2000, p. 137). Therefore, 
the first task of this chapter should be to become familiar with the 
ontological, theoretical and methodological contours of PDT. 
 
The crux of political discourse theory, Howarth states, ‘centres on 
the idea that all objects and practices are meaningful and that 
social meanings are contextual, relational and contingent’ (2000, 
p. 137). Therefore, to put this in context, contingency, historicity, 
relationalty and power with politics are the four main components 
of social relations according to PDT (Laclau, 1990, p. 31-6 cited in 
Howarth, 2004, p. 317). While contingency stands against 
deterministic views to social reality characteristic of  major grand 
theories in social and political sciences( historical materialism as an 
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example), historicity rejects the essentialist approach to social and 
political relations and identities instead asserting that social 
relations and identities are products of historical creation rather 
than having perennial qualities.  Furthermore, social relations and 
identities are subject to limits of existing forms of power relations 
and all have an essential political character which dictates the way 
social reality is constructed. In the coming sections I will try to 
elaborate on these components more along other key elements of 
PDT. These fundamental features of social reality also represent 
the research objectives PDT, as a research programme, promises 
to address. David Howarth, reformulates some of these objectives 
as follows:  
The constitution of political identities; the practice of 
hegemonic articulation among particular discourses and 
subjectivities; the construction of social antagonisms and 
the establishment of political frontiers; the ways subjects 
‘gripped’ by certain discourses and not others; and the 
social fantasies which sustain such identifications... 
(2004:321) 
 
6.3  Social constructionism 
The question which may timely arise at this very moment it is: 
where we can locate PDT in the wider social science enterprise? 
Political discourse theory considered one among a range of 
discourse analytical approaches which all share the ‘concern of 
meaning and the centrality attributed to subjects in the 
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construction and apprehension of meaning’ (Glynose, et al., August 
2009, p. 6; Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 4). According to this 
claim, they all come under an umbrella approach called ‘social 
constructionist theories of culture and society’.5 In order to enter 
the field of PDT then, we need to provide some elaborations on 
what constitutes social constructionism.  
 
In a very powerful statement, Kenneth Gergen, one of the most 
well-known advocates of social constructionism draws a portrait of 
the approach helping to reveal its ontological and epistemological 
foundations. He states: 
…constructionist enquiry has demonstrated how claims 
to true and the good are born of historical traditions, 
fortified by social networks, sewn together by literary 
tropes, legitimated through rhetorical devices and 
operate in the service of particular ideologies to fashion 
structures of power and privilege. For the sophisticated 
constructionist, there are not invulnerable or 
unassailable positions, not foundational warrants, no 
transcendent rationalities or obdurate facts in 
themselves. (Gergen, 2011, p. 170) 
 
In their effort to outline the main tenets of social constructionism, 
of which all laid down in the statement above, four main premises 
have been outlined by Jorgenson and Philips (1995, p. 2-5, cited in 
Jorgenson and Philips, 2002, p. 5-6), and Vivien Burr (2003) based 
                                 
 5 In their review paper, Glynos et al. (2009) identify and outline the 
contours of six approaches to discourse study: political discourse theory, 
rhetorical political analysis, discourse historical analysis, interpretive 
policy analysis, discourse psychology and the Q methodology.  
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on Kenneth Gergen’s (1985, p. 266-275) seminal work The social 
constructionist movement in modern psychology as the ontological 
underpinnings of social constructionism in general. They are listed 
as follows: 
First: A critical approach to taken- for-granted knowledge. Implying 
that the knowledge we gain is not objective, as those on the 
positivist and empiricist front maintain, but it is a ‘product[s] of our 
ways of categorising the world…products of discourse’ (Burr 1995, 
p. 3; Gergen, 1986, p. 266-7 cited in Burr, 2003, p. 2 and 
Jorgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 5). According to this disposition, 
many taken-for-granted believes, categories and concepts are not 
too obvious and unproblematic as they may seem. They become so 
because people have come into terms with them and internalised 
them. Burr (2003, p. 3), brings an example from classifications of 
music to ‘classic’, ‘pop’ and other forms. He argues that the 
conventional division of music today does not mean that music 
itself is necessarily divided in this way. In fact, it is through a 
historical and social process of classification and categorisation that 
music has come to be divided in this way. It can be added to this 
point that this kind of music classification is not universal either. 
For example, the division either does not exist at all, as in Kurdish 
music, or when it does exist it is culturally specific.  However, this 
epistemological premise of PDT has made it vulnerable to fierce 
criticism from the part of opponents of social constructionism by 
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accusing it of being relativist in its approach to knowledge. The 
criticism maintains that if truth is relative then there will be no 
grounds upon which to base moral values and universal norms. 
Nevertheless, scholars of social constructionism including PDT 
scholars have had their response against this type of accusation. 
Responding to such criticism, Torfing, pushes a point maintaining 
that there is not a single all-encompassing truth claim out there 
which is able to prove its rightness. There exist competing claims 
of truth, each possessing their self-respected ‘values, standards 
and criteria’ for assessing truth and falseness (2005, p. 18-19). 
Accordingly, we do live in a world where the best we can obtain as 
knowledge falls short of providing a universal truth. Therefore, the 
absoluteness of knowledge is that what is rejected by social 
constructionism (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 175). More in the 
face of criticism, It has been argued that the above social 
constructionist disposition in relation to knowledge is far from being 
unpractical, as some critics of PDT may claim, it in fact, opens up 
the way for democratic deliberations in society (Jorgensen & 
Philips, 2002, p. 196). Likewise, the claim of absolute truth may 
leave no room for any type of difference and, ultimately excludes 
the differences from the field followed by discrimination and 
oppression based on various forms of identity or social categories.  
 
Second: Historical and cultural specificity (Burr 1995:3, cited in 
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Jorgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 5-6) this represents both the anti-
foundationalist and anti-essentialist disposition of social 
constructionism. Along the lines of social constructionism, the 
social world, including discourse, is socially constructed and it is 
historically and culturally specific (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002, p. 
4). The way we see and understand the world, Burr (2003, p. 3) 
argues, is bound to the social and historical condition in which we 
live. To bring an example as a way of explaining this position, Burr 
(Burr, 1995, p. 3 cited in Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 506) takes 
childhood as a notion. The notion of childhood has undergone 
massive changes even within the last 200 years.  Children in 
Charles Dickens’s time, she argues, were not the same to that of 
today or earlier times. People’s expectations from a child and 
parental responsibilities towards children have enormously 
changed since then. To elaborate more on this point, a cultural 
specificity element can be added here, which is too may determine 
people’s understanding and views towards childhood. In many 
Muslim and may be non-Muslim cultures girls can get married or 
forced into marriage at the age of 14 or even 11, as it is common 
in Yemen until today (Mansouri, 2013). However, girls and boys at 
that age are considered children in the West and many other 
countries around the world.  
 
As with the previous point this premise has subjected PDT – as part 
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of the wider social constructionist approach—to even stronger 
criticism than the previous one. The critics conclude from this 
philosophical standing of PDT that it is an idealist perspective which 
is shared by social constructionism. This line of criticism may have 
sprung from the assertion from the part of PDT on the discursive 
character of all social and political events and existence. The critics 
arrived at a point claiming that, as discourse is the horizon through 
which PDT sees and analyses the social and polit ical worlds then 
this consequently leads us to reduce everything to discourse 
leaving nothing for the real existence of things. Against the 
backdrop of this line of argument PDT theorists like Laclau and 
Mouffe and Torfing counter-argue that the physical and real 
existence of things—be they material, social or political—is by no 
means denied by PDT. They maintain that it is undeniable these 
things do have physical occurrence outside any discourse. 
However, they do not hold any real meanings and values outside 
human and social interaction and language. It is through the 
horizon of particular discourses that each particular set of objects 
take on different meanings and values. Laclau and Mouffe bring the 
example of an earthquake explaining that it does exist in the real 
world. However, the very same geological event may take up 
various—even competing—meanings according to different 
discursive formations. An earthquake could be seen as a sign of 
God’s curse on humanity through a religious discourse. While the 
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same earthquake would be explained in a scientific manner 
according to a scientific discourse. The mere happening of the 
earthquake, in this case, will not have any social meaning. (Torfing, 
2005, p. 18; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 108). When translated into 
PDT terms, this premise of social constructivism has contributed in 
the PDT’s view of the social as ‘contingent’. We will come back to 
this point later. 
 
Third: Link between knowledge and social processes (Burr, 1995, 
p. 2-5 cited Jorgensen and Philips, p. 5-6). This perspective stands 
against the foundationalist approach to knowledge. According to 
the foundationalist epistemology, our knowledge about the world 
can correspond to the very actual things in reality (Jorgensen & 
Philips, 2002, p. 175). In a sharp contrast to foundationalism, social 
constructionism, treats knowledge as something that does not 
necessarily reflect ‘reality out there’, it rather reflects the social 
world and the interactions happening in that world. Human 
knowledge is not transferred onto human mind directly without 
human intervention. Instead, the knowledge we gain passes 
through social interaction via the medium of language and in 
discourse. For that reason, social interaction and language play 
great roles in knowledge production. As Burr puts it ‘what we 
regard as truth, which is of course varies historically and cross-
culturally, may be thought of as our current accepted ways of 
 243 
 
understanding the world’ (Burr, 2003, pp. 4-5). 
 
Four: Link between knowledge and social action, According to social 
constructionism, particular social actions reflect specific world 
views and constituted by them. (Burr, 2003, pp. 4-5) This 
relationship between Knowledge and practice is essential to 
Foucault’s definition of discourse. While not underestimating the 
linguistic component of discourse, he postulates discourse as the 
product of knowledge through the medium of language (Hall, 2003, 
p. 72). To apply this on the relationship between discourse and 
practice, Hall (1972, p. 29 cited in Hall, 2003, p.72) suggests that 
‘all practice has a discursive aspect ’. This characteristic reaches its 
peak in the ontology of PDT leaving no room between knowledge 
and the social. Reasserting Laclau and Mouffe’s ontological 
disposition, Torfing argues ‘…discourse is co-extensive with the 
social’ (1999, p. 94). It also implies that within specific discursive 
contexts certain actions are allowed while others may not have the 
same opportunity. To make this position a bit clearer Burr recalls 
the example of drunkenness (apparently in Europe), in older times 
drunkenness was considered a crime and the drunk person seen as 
a criminal and blamed or, ultimately put in prison for drinking. 
While today the very drunkenness per se (precisely alcoholism) is 
not considered a crime but an illness worthy of treatment. The 
same issue of drunkenness produced two different types of 
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response from the part of the government, imprisonment and/or 
treatment. This is fundamentally linked to the two different 
discourses on drunkenness at two historical periods of time. 
Interestingly, the same issue of drunkenness and drug-use are still 
considered crimes in certain cultural settings today, as in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, leading to particular responses from the part of the 
society or the government in question. 
6.4 Framing PDT 
Now, after giving a general idea about social constructionism to 
which PDT has established ontological and epistemological links, it 
is time to locate the theoretical and methodological underpinnings 
of PDT. Drawing from Howarth’s earlier statement, one can imagine 
a picture drawn by PDT of social reality the picture offers the main 
themes of which in part represent the ontological basis of PDT. 
These themes will be explored here in order to pave the way for 
later operationalization of PDT on the ground. The themes can be 
listed in no particular order as follows: discursive, contingency, 
political primacy, antagonism, hegemony, relationalty and subject 
positions among the main pillars of PDT that need to be explored 
before engaging in any kind of analysis based on PDT. In the next 
section the conceptual components of PDT will be explained and 
critically examined along the lines of these themes. 
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6.4.1 Discourse and discursive 
The concept of discourse that takes centre-stage in PDT requires 
mapping conceptually. First we need to identify the very term 
‘discourse’ and outline the way it is going to be used in this study. 
Jorgenson and Phillips (2002, p. 1) define discourse as ‘a particular 
way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of 
the world)’. However, discourse is not limited to conversation and 
understanding per se. For PDT, discourse widens its boundaries to 
include practice as well as the language in use and cognitive 
aspects of human life.  Laclau and Mouffe (1985) along with Torfing 
(2005, p. 9) match discourse with the social as they state 
‘discourse is co-extensive with the social’. Earlier Heidegger  had 
taken discourse further away by widening its horizon by suggesting 
that ‘human beings are “thrown into” a world of meaningful 
discourses and practices, and it is this world that enables them to 
identify and engage with the objects they encounter’ (1985, p. 246 
cited in Howarth 2000, p. 9). In the same vein (Graesser et al) go 
as far as saying that ‘discourse is what makes us human’ (1997, P. 
165, cited in Wodak and Krzyzanowski 2008, p. 1). For Howard and 
Stavrakakis discourse is seen as ‘systems of meaningful [practice] 
that form the identities of subjects and objects’ (2000, p. 5 
emphasize added). To get closer to the main point, and, as it makes 
the major theoretical element of PDT, it is timely to bring in a 
definition of discourse provided by Michel Foucault. Jorgenson and 
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Philips summarise Foucault’s definition of discourse as follows: 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as 
they belong to the same discursive formation 
[….Discourse] is made up of a limited number of 
statements for which a group of conditions of existence 
can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, 
timeless form [….] it is, from beginning to end, historical- 
a fragment of history [….] posing its own limits, its 
divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its 
temporality. (Foucault 1972:117 cited in Jorgensen and 
Philips, 2002, p. 12)  
 
The above definition by Foucault fleshes out the main 
characteristics of discourse as a term. Discourse accordingly 
represents a framework operating according to specific rules 
(conditions) through which it produces particular meanings while 
excluding others. ‘The historical rules of the particular discourse 
delimit[ing] what is possible to say’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 
13), while what is not possible to say rendered obsolete in 
discursive terms. This point will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
 
Working on the same lines, for PDT discourse is an attempt in the 
way of meaning-fixing within a particular domain; but it is a partial 
fixation through articulation anyway (Jorgensen, 2002, p. 26). Any 
attempt to close the social and declare totality of its identity and 
meaning is a self-defeating practice as it goes against the nature 
of the social understood by PDT ( which is the space of 
impossibilities) (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 111). Therefore, 
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discourse is seen as ‘a reduction of possibilities’ (Jorgensen and 
Philips 2002, p.  27). in this process of meaning-fixation other 
possibilities are always excluded and pushed to a place called ‘the 
field of discursivity’ (2002, p.27 italics in the original). The field of 
discursivity is the sum of ‘the surplus of meaning’ [out of all 
acceptable and possible meanings] left out in the process of 
discourse formation (Torfing, 1999, p. 92).  So, discourse is always 
an attempt to close the social and fix meanings of the subject and 
objects. To make this idea a little bit more concrete, we can say 
that a particular discourse of identity attempts to fix the meaning 
of that identity around certain values and features. However, the 
very field of discursivity is a condition which helps in ‘the 
articulation of a multiplicity of competing meanings’ (Torfing, 1999, 
p. 92). The impossibility of ‘social closure’ made possible by the 
very existence of other possibilities, meanings and identities. 
Competing definitions of ‘Kurdish’, ‘English’ or ‘Arab’ mean that it 
is not possible to arrive at a final, once-and-for-all definition of 
these identities. The nature of discourse in PDT, then, is of 
considerable relevance for the study of identity. This disposition 
takes us straight to the nature of identity in PDT terms.  
6.4.2 Contingency 
Contingency and historicity represent the keystones of PDT. The 
approach shares these two notions with the wider social 
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constructionist tradition in social sciences. The foundationalist 
approach to social science maintains that knowledge possesses 
concrete foundations which transcend history and social conduct 
(Burr, 2003, pp. 2-3; Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 5). This implies 
that the researcher can discover the truth about the world merely 
by observing the world out there and the knowledge she gains 
represents the exact reality out there. In the contrary, social 
constructionism -including –PDT- invalidate this foundationalist 
epistemology by arguing that our knowledge is not a direct 
reflection of reality but it is rather socially constructed and 
historically contingent. In postulating the social construct ionist 
outlook as regards the nature of knowledge and the social reality, 
Gergen states: 
The terms in which the world is understood are social 
artefacts, products of historically situated interaction 
among people. From the constructionist position the 
process of understanding is not automatically driven by 
the forces of nature, but is the result of an active, 
cooperative enterprise of persons in relationship. (1985, 
p. 267) 
 
In the above statement both the ontological and epistemological 
dispositions of social constructionism can be identified, with which 
PDT shares most of its theoretical foundations. The epistemological 
disposition was discussed in the previous lines as it stood in 
opposition to the foundationalist disposition in the realm of 
epistemology.  As for the ontological outlook of social 
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constructionism, the above statement by Gergen entails the key 
terms of that outlook. As it has been argued, the claim that ‘social 
world is constructed socially and discursively implies that its 
character is not pre-given or determined by external conditions’ 
and more importantly, it implies ‘that people do not possess a set 
of fixed and authentic characteristics or essences ’ (Jorgensen & 
Philips, 2002, p. 5). 
 
Perhaps, a point which may hold more importance to this study is 
the social constructionist/ PDT’s position as regards the nature of 
identity. According to foundationalism, as mentioned earlier, 
people’s identity is fixed and compact hence, the researcher can 
trace their historical journey by mere observation. In the contrary, 
social constructionism treats the social reality, including identity 
and categories, as historically and culturally contingent. To put 
these terms in a more concrete form, the following example may 
illustrates the social constructionist position better:  the study of 
‘madness’ in western societies may give a very good example to 
that end. Michael Foucault (2001) in his work Madness and 
civilization: a study of insanity in the age of reason, argued that 
‘madness’, as a category, has undergone several changes through 
various historical phases. Since the renaissance up to the modern 
era, Foucault claimed, madness has gone through fundamental 
changes as to its essence and nature. Consequently, at each stage 
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of development of the notion of madness, people’s attitudes and 
institutional policies have also undergone dramatic changes. While 
during the Renaissance mad men were seen as possessing a kind 
of wisdom, in the classical age the condition was regarded as wrong 
and bad choice by people just like prostitution and vanguard, 
something which led to their confinement to keep them away from 
society. In the later stage of development of the notion of madness 
Foucault argued, madness was regarded as an illness worthy of 
treatment.  
 
Thus, contingency is of great importance to PDT. As political 
discourse theory takes identity as contingent thus socially, 
historically and discursively constructed through social interaction. 
It maintains that there can never be fixed and compact identities. 
It also implies that Identities are always in flux due to the ongoing 
social interaction. The fluidity and contingency of identity results in 
the impossibility of having a society with fixed and compact 
characters. In other words, it implies the impossibility of the society 
to reach its final formulation and closure. There is always different 
claims of identity from competing social agents and institutions. 
The competition is conducted, according to PDT, through discursive 
struggles. At the heart of the struggle stands politics. Therefore, 
the role of politics is considered paramount in the discursive 
struggles in society. Now it is time to turn to another important 
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theme of PDT which is the status of politics. 
 
6.4.3 Primacy of politics 
While in historical materialism it is economy (the ‘base’) that 
determines the social and political structure (the ‘superstructure’), 
PDT gives politics the determining status instead. This 
reorganization of the roles by PDT was first initiated by Gramsci. 
For Gramsci although the base has priority and it is the base that 
determines the superstructure, at the meantime, the 
superstructure can also have influence on the base (Jorgensen & 
Philips, 2002, p. 3). To transfer this equation into their discourse-
based explanation of the social reality, Laclau and Mouffe maintain 
that every particular discourse tries to construct the social life in a 
particular way attempting, at the meantime, to exclude other 
possible ways. This kind of action is what politics imply in PDT 
(Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 6). The very process of articulation, 
which produces the whole social life is, according to PDT, a political 
action. (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 6) Here politics is not to be 
taken in its narrow conception as for instance, party politics, but it 
rather should be understood in the very broad meaning of politics 
(2002, p. 36). In other words, politics to be considered ‘as a first 
order principle for the ordering of the social ’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 
121). However, that order is re-appropriated in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
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conceptions as ‘the organization of society in a particular way that 
excludes all other possible ways ’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 36).  
 
The exclusionist nature of politics is very important to our 
understanding of PDT, as the hegemony means to impose one’s 
own way of organization of society and meaning on the other/s. 
The hegemonic struggle always creates antagonism among 
competing agents. If we take the struggle to the realm of 
competing identities we can explain the situation as such: for each 
identity to fully realise its own potential it requires the negation of 
other identities. From this, Torfing (1999, p. 121) concludes that 
‘politics is inextricably linked to antagonism’. (Italics in the original) 
in other words, politics according to PDT is always characterised by 
the existence of two antagonistic forces (us vs. enemy). Moreover, 
the full realization of one social, ethnic, political agent requires the 
exclusion of the other/s. However, this does not mean that by 
excluding other meanings and forms of identity the hegemonic 
discourse can close society over its own portrayal of it. In the 
contrary, any meaning fixing is temporary and it is always subject 
to dislocation by the ‘constituted outside’ or other excluded 
discourses.  
 
Another important point to make clear is when PDT uses discourse 
as a substitute to agents or forces, this should not imply it is the 
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reduction of everything to discourse or language. PDT has a strong 
position in this regard implying that although the agents do exist 
in both social and physical forms ‘but our access to them is always 
mediated by systems of meaning in the form of discourse’ 
(Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 35). 
6.4.4 Identity as relational 
As it has been discussed earlier, against the essentialist view to 
identity (as a form of social), which views identity in solid and 
finished terms, PDT offers an alternative approach to identity 
characterised by being contingent and fluid and instead of seeing it 
as pre-given, it is taken as one that is socially constructed 
(Glynose, et al., August 2009, p. 7). In the same vein, PDT 
challenges the rationalist view which implies that individuals 
possess objective identities and are always self-interested 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 9). The starting point for 
postulating identity in this manner may be implied in Laclau’s 
distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ (the latter 
normally associated with psychoanalyst approaches). To elaborate 
on this distinction, Laclau explains ‘if agents were to have an always 
already defined location in the social structure, the problem of their 
identity...would not arise or, at most would be seen in a matter of 
discovery or recognizing their identity, not of constructing it’ (1994, 
p. 2 Italics in the original). This understanding derived from the 
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ontological standing of PDT based on impossibility of social 
phenomena reaching a finishing form or totality or for meaning to 
be fixed (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 24). Another statement by 
Laclau may make this disposition slightly clearer, where he states: 
No identity is closed in itself but it submitted to constant 
displacements in terms of chains of combinations and 
substitutions, they are constituted through essentially 
tropological processes which do not refer to any ultimate 
transcendental foundation. (Laclau, no date) 
 
As Jorgenson and Philips (2002, p. 24) suggest ‘this opens up the 
way for constant social struggle about definitions of society and 
identity, with resulting social effects ’. Therefore, the theoretical 
viability of PDT in studying questions of identity in general and 
collective or national identity sounds very promising. Normally, 
collective or national identity formation as processes, entail more 
than one actor, and more often, rival actors in a state of 
competition or conflict.  
 
The discourse theoretical postulation of terms such as ‘nation’ 
informs the mentioned ontological outlook above. Unlike 
mainstream theories of nations and nationalism which each has a 
compact, ready-made and concrete definitions in hand for terms 
such as ‘nation’, associating an objective character to it (Smith, 
2008; Connor, 1994; Gellner, 1983), for political discourse theory 
in general the term ‘nation’ contains a rather fluid meaning. In this 
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regard, Torfing (1999, p. 202) defines the term as ‘….empty 
signifier symbolizing an absent fullness, i.e. a cultural and political 
community that is imagined precisely because it is not fully 
realized’. This definition could equally be applied to state and non-
state communities. Nationalism, as a doctrine, reflects the very 
nature of ‘nation’—in its discourse theoretical formulation – so it 
has been defined in the same vein as ‘a myth that provides the 
empty signifier of ‘‘the nation’’ and ‘‘the people’’ with a particular 
substantial embodiment’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 193). Furthermore, the 
presentation of ‘nation’ is almost always conducted in a relational 
manner in its relation to an ‘outside other’ (Torfing, 1999, p.193). 
The hegemonic articulation of the nation is dictated by the nature 
of available antagonistic relations, this follows that the form and 
substance of ‘nation’ is a product and outcome of the on-going 
competition over meaning fixation among various competing social 
and political actors. In other words, the identity of the nation is 
decided by the hegemonic discourse which prevails in the struggle 
among competing actors and/or discourses. It is now time to turn 
to another more important theme in PDT which is the notion of 
hegemony. 
6.4.5 Hegemonic practice in processes of identity 
construction 
At any particular period and in any particular context there may 
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exist a number of competing claims of identity. However, more 
often than not, a particular identity manages to prevail over others 
and occupy a hegemonic position within the wider society. 
Hegemonic practices in social and political spheres gain great 
attention from the part of PDT. As Glynos and Howarth put it 
‘discourse theorists have developed- and are continuing to develop 
and refine- the conceptual grammars with which to account for the 
way certain political projects or social practices remain or become 
hegemonic’ (2007, p. 5).  
 
The medium through which hegemonic practice processed is called 
articulation. Articulation is the mechanism with which agents within 
particular discourses try to push to the forefront particular desired 
identities, meanings and values while undermining and subverting 
undesired ones (Torfing, 1999, p. 101). In turn, articulation is 
defined by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 105) as a ‘practice 
establishing relations between elements such that their identity is 
modified as the result of the articulatory practice ’.  Furthermore, 
PDT, through employing some theoretical tools as the ‘logic of 
equivalence’ and the ‘logic of difference’ endeavours to explain the 
way particular hegemonic practices operate. (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, in Torfing, 1999, p. 120-31). To give a brief outline as to the 
content of these two logics I shall recall a rather short explanation 
of them provided by David Howarth (2000, p. 107). Howarth 
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outlines these two logics as follows: 
whereas a project principally employing the logic of 
equivalence seeks to divide  social space by condensing 
meanings around two antagonistic poles, a project 
mainly employing a logic of difference attempts to 
displace and weaken antagonism, while endeavouring to 
relegate division to the margins of society.  
 
To elaborate more on this explanation by Howarth, the logic of 
equivalence entails attempts to group those on the ‘other’ side of 
‘us’ at a single pole, no matter their differences. At the meantime, 
the logic of difference attempts to eradicate the internal differences 
available in the ‘us’ side and present it as a single, undisputed 
entity. In this way the process of hegemony made easier as the 
frontiers of the self and the other, ‘us’ and ‘other’ or the friend and 
enemy are clear. This may explain the drive behind attempts by 
rival states and groups to expose to their public or members the 
picture of the enemy or the adversary. 
 
As for a definition of ‘hegemony’ in discourse theoretical terms, 
which also, as mentioned, makes one of the fundamental 
components of the theory, it has been defined by Torfing (1999, p. 
101) as ‘the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a 
dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of 
articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a 
context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces ’. To put this abstract 
description of hegemony into more concrete terms it can be said 
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that among a number of identified discourses within a context a 
particular one or more may reach to a prevalent position by means 
of fixing, otherwise, unfixed identities, values and features into a 
fixed totality, the outcome which may be a dominant form of 
identity, social or political practice, or institution. To put it bluntly, 
among many competing forms of a particular national identity, a 
discourse adopted and disseminated by a particular group may 
dominate the social and political context and become ‘hegemonic’ 
while pushing other less powerful forms of identity to the margins 
of society. For example, arguably, in the context of the Arab part 
of Iraq post-2003, the religious form of Iraqi identity has 
maintained the dominant status among all other competing forms 
such as ethnic, nationalist or class forms. While in the context of 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq the ethnic or the nationalist form of identity 
still prevails over other forms.  
 
To conclude this section, it is time to point out that the struggle for 
hegemony is always engrained with negation attitudes among 
conflicting actors creating an atmosphere of antagonism.  
6.4.6 Antagonism 
Antagonism makes another pole upon which PDT builds its 
ontological structure. Jorgenson and Philips maintain that ‘the 
starting point for political discourse theory is that no discourse can 
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be fully established, It is always in conflict with other discourses 
that define reality differently’ (2002, p. 47).  
 
Conflict is a legacy of the Marxist roots of PDT. Accordingly, PDT 
portrays the social as a domain where the relationship between the 
actors runs through antagonistic moments. Competing discourses 
produce and being produced by antagonistic practices. However, 
unlike the orthodox Marxist paradigm, according to PDT, 
antagonism is not necessarily based on class and economic 
grounds, instead other forms of difference also make up for the 
antagonistic relations and practices in society (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8). These forms may range from social, class 
to ethnic, national, gender and other possible forms (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985, pp. ix-x). As it has been mentioned in the previous 
discussion of hegemony, social antagonism (in its wider sense), 
results from hegemonic practices by particular discourses. In turn, 
hegemonic practices involve ‘negation of identity’ among 
competing actors, therefor, each social actor struggles to negate 
the subject and the object of the identity of their rivals (Torfing, 
1999, p. 120). Subsequently, each actor finds the existence of 
others as a threat to fulfilment of its own identity. Thus, the process 
of self-assertion is always accompanied by negating others. In 
other words, the process of hegemonization always produces 
antagonism among competing agents and discourses. We should 
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remember this happens through discursive practices.  
 
Political actors may employ various mechanisms in order to oppose 
or maintain their hegemonic version of identity. To put this 
theoretical portrayal into solid practical terms, a preliminary 
example from the case in question is presented here. A strategy 
has been used by the dominant political parties in the KRI to 
establish an antagonistic relationship between the Arab part of Iraq 
on the one side and the West on the other, while presenting Kurds 
as a true ally of the west by associating democracy and secularism 
to the Kurdistan Region, they were depicting the rest of Iraq as 
religious and non-democratic, the dominant Kurdish political 
parties have been struggling to establish or maintain their 
hegemonic political identity discourse in Iraq in the post-2003 era. 
Expressions like ‘the other Iraq’, ‘safe heaven’, ‘the beacon of 
democracy’ and the like, which used to describe Kurdistan Region-
Iraq inform this kind of strategy.6 At the other side of the conflict, 
some Arab forces and political parties, especially, after 2003, have 
been in a constant effort to portray the Kurds and expose it to the 
outside world, especially to the Arab and Muslim world as not being 
true Iraqis or true Muslims but allies of the occupying forces (i.e. 
                                 
 6 These expressions have been widely used by some in the West and 
then resonated in the Kurdish media and political discourse (Fifield, 
2008; Mackinnon, 2014; Schorn, 2007; The Other Iraq, n.d.). 
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USA and British in particular). This attempt has arguably, hit the 
highest spot with the emergence and advancement of ISIS in the 
region. The depiction of Kurds, or at least all secular Kurdish 
political parties and the Peshmerga as infidels (‘Kuffar’ in Arabic) 
or least, apostates (’Murtad’ in Arabic) and collaborators with the 
Crusaders.  Torfing (1999, p. 199) points to a similar strategy 
adopted by the Slovenians just after the independence of Slovenia 
where Slovenians were constructing an antagonistic relationship 
between Balkans and Europe associating communism to Balkan 
and democracy to Slovenia.  
 
It is now time to deal with a notion which, should be considered the 
core of PDT as regards the question of identity, namely ‘subject 
positions’.  
6.4.7 Subject positions 
For PDT theorists, then, the identity of subjects – their ‘subject 
position’, to use Laclau and Mouffe’s term—is neither determined 
by the structure (as per structuralist perspectives), nor by rational 
subjects (as per rationalist perspectives) (Benton & Craib, 2011, p. 
164), Rather, it is constructed in discourse, which itself is created 
through social interaction in a relational manner to other agents in 
conditions characterised by antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe has 
shown a firm position as regards the question of the subject by 
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arguing: 
Whenever we use the category of ‘subject’ in this text, 
we will do so in the sense of ‘subject positions’ in a 
discursive structure. Subjects cannot, therefore, be the 
origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense 
of being endowed with powers that render an experience 
possible – as all experience depends on precise 
discursive conditions of possibility. (Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985, p. 115) 
 
The picture of ‘subject’ provided in the above statement resembles 
that of ‘signs’ in the structuralist model of language developed by 
Ferdinand de Saussure. For Saussure, the ‘structure of language 
consists of signs and the rules which govern the combination of 
signs’ (Benton & Craib, 2011, p. 165). We must remember that, 
the structure of signs in Saussure’s model was consisted of 
‘signifiers’, the material component, visual and sound elements of 
language (Benton & Craib, 2011, p. 164) and ‘signified’, the related 
concept. As for the meaning of individual sings, it is determined by 
their relation to other sings. (2011, p. 164) 
 
This model was developed further by Jacques Lacan, who argued 
that the unconscious – increasingly considered essential for 
understanding the subject – resembles language. He argued, 
however, that it is the signifier that is indispensable, rather than 
structure (Benton and Craib, 2011, p. 165). This shift from 
structure to the signifier, Benton and Craib argue, was the moment 
at which structuralism became post-structuralism (2011, p. 167). 
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The intellectual development of linguistics, pioneered by Saussure, 
was transformed by Michel Foucault, who substituted the centrality 
of the signifier for ‘discourse’. This made discourse and discursive 
formations central to identity, and necessitated a focus on 
‘fragmentation’, which argues that the identity of a subject  cannot 
be seen from a single angle, but is fragmented along ‘discourse 
horizons’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 41).  
 
In an attempt to finalise the fundamentals of PDT’s understanding 
of identity, Philips and Jorgenson produce the following list, which 
provides the theoretical and methodological foundations for PDT 
research into identity: 
 The subject is fundamentally split, it never quite becomes 
‘itself’. 
 It acquires its identity by being represented discursively. 
 Identity is thus identification with a subject position in a 
discursive structure. 
 Identity is discursively constituted through chains of 
equivalence in which signs are sorted and linked. These stand 
in opposition to other chains; and define how the subject is 
and how it is not. 
 Identity is always relationally organised; the subject is 
something because it is contrasted with something that is 
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not. 
 Identity is changeable, just as discourses are. 
 The subject is fragmented or decentred; it has different 
identities according to those discourses which it forms part.  
 The subject is overdetermined; in principle, it always has the 
possibility to identify differently in specific situations. 
Therefore, a given identity is contingent – that is possible but 
not necessary. (2002, pp. 43, italics in the original) 
 
6.5 Kurdish identity construction in discourse theoretical 
terms 
The practical starting point for the application of PDT – as for critical 
discourse analysis and discursive psychology – is that ‘our ways of 
talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social 
relations but rather, play an active role in creating and changing 
them.’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 1) Howarth and Stavrakakis 
outline the practice as that of ‘analysing empirical raw material and 
information in discursive forms’. This would include, they state ‘a 
wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data-speech, reports, 
manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas…….as 
texts’ (2000, p. 6).  
 
The manner in which ‘text’ is perceived in PDT owes largely to the 
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often-cited supposition by Jacque Derrida ‘there is nothing outside 
text’ (1974, p. 158 cited in Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 6). 
Probably, the ‘discursive formation’ in Foucault’s terms is what 
widens the scope of empirical data available for the researcher. For 
Foucault, discourse should not be confined to a single text, 
statement, practice or source, rather ‘the same discourse…will 
appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a 
number of different institutional sites within society’ (Hall, 2003, p. 
73). Research in this programme would have a wide range of 
available data from which the researcher can draw, responding to 
and informing the theoretical tools in operation.  
 
The analysis of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI since 1991 
can be undertaken through the methods of PDT, as described 
above. Arguably, the objectives set for this research, which implied 
in the dynamics of Kurdish identity formation within a particular 
historical period, can be effectively channelled through employing 
the methods set to address the above objects of PDT. As the 
targeted research question at this stage of my research revolves 
around the political dimension of Kurdish identity formation, (i.e. 
how Kurdish identity manifest itself on the political level?), 
examining the political discourse of various political agents in the 
region is imperative and it will guide us to the right direction 
towards identifying the dynamics of Kurdish identity formation on 
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its political level. This by no means should imply that politics is 
ruled out or downgraded in the assessment of the other level of 
analysis (i.e. cultural-historical level). In the contrary, it is safe to 
argue that politics play a determining role in both fields, this is 
proven by the manipulative power of political parties in the cultural 
sphere as well. The extent of the play of politics in each field has 
been dealt with in related chapters. 
 
To start with, the story of Kurdish identity construction is part and 
parcel of the major story of Iraqi politics since 2003, a story which 
has been defined as ‘a story of identity conflict’ (Al-Qarawee, 2010, 
p. 34). This process of identity construction, I would argue, has 
been operating upon articulating particular discourses each running 
through and around a number of signifiers or ‘nodal points’ in 
discourse theoretical terms. For example the signifier of federalism 
which has been at work since 1992 (when the Kurdish parliament 
adapted federalism)7 through to Iraqi opposition conference in 
Salahaddin, Kurdistan Region in 1992 and in London in 2002, then 
around the 2003 Coalition invasion of Iraq and lastly in its 
constitutional approval in 2005 to what has followed then up until 
the present day (Al-Qarawee, 2010; Brancati, 2004) but it had not 
                                 
 7 The then newly created Kurdistan Parliament unilaterally adopted 
federalism as an accepted form for the relationship between the KRI and 
the central government in Baghdad in 1992 (O'Leary, 2002). 
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been as salient as it has been since 2003, this, still -active 
discourse, makes an ideal example here.8  
 
While the signifier of federalism has been articulated on particular 
grounds from the part of Kurds, for example, the ethnic and 
geographical identity of Kurds, democratic rights and historical 
claims backed by historical facts, at the beginning, and still, this 
signifier has been confronted by counter-discourses pertinent to 
the sharp opposition from the part of Arab majority represented 
mostly but not solely by both Sunni Arab political parties and 
figures and some major sections of majority Shi’ite Arabs.9 
However, for reasons to do with the superior hand which Kurds 
political parties managed to maintain in Iraqi politics just before 
and after 2003 events, the Kurds were able to incorporate 
federalism in the new Iraqi constitution approved in 2005 in a 
referendum. Since the approval of the new Iraqi constitution the 
signifier of federalism gained a new momentum by adding to its 
                                 
 8 This is due to the uncertain and unstable situation inside the KRI, 
exhibited in the political instability that spans from 1994 to the 1998 
Washington pact between the KDP and the PUK (Anderson & Stansfield, 
2004, pp. 155-184). Following this – and subsequent events including 
the founding of the KRG and the 2003 invasion – the discourse of 
federalism takes a new shape and comes to the forefront of Kurdish 
political party discourse. 
 9 Al-Qarawee argues that Arab opposition to federalism in Iraq stems 
from a belief among Muslims (Sunnis in particular) that ‘federalism 
means partition, an implicit betrayal of the “imagined” Iraqi community.’ 
(Al-Qarawee, 2010, p. 37) 
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constituting elements the element of ‘constitution’. Since then 
whenever disputes arise between the central Iraqi government and 
KRG, the Kurdish political parties stress on the constitutional rights 
of federalism.  
 
However, as the case with almost all signifiers in discourses of 
identity (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 12) the signifier of 
‘constitution’ exists because of its very absence. Although, the 
constitution gained the majority of Iraqi people’s votes, however, 
due to the counter-federalism discourse of the Arab part in Iraq, 
the constitution has never wholeheartedly embraced by the Arab 
political factions in Baghdad. There have been calls for 
amendments in the constitution as recent as the year 2008 and 
2009 by the then Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, some major 
Sunni fronts and political parties and figures claiming to represent 
the Turkmen minority in Iraq (Malazada, 2008; Voice of Iraq, 
2009).   
 
To account for the two logics used in discourse theoretical analysis 
of identity (i.e. the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference), 
in the Kurdish discourse on federalism and constitution, a logic 
used to make equivalent all none-Kurdish others (Shi’ite Arabs, 
Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, with their various strands) and putting 
them in an opposite side to the Kurds. While, despite the already 
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visible polarities in the Kurdish social and political life, the Kurdish 
identity which portrayed (articulated) in the federalist discourse 
was that of a common and compact identity, in PDT terms, pushing 
all internal differences to the margins of Kurdish society. In other 
words, this process included making hegemonic the particular 
political identity of the Iraqi Kurds (needed for that particular 
context), of course, among other ‘possible’ ones. While this process 
accompanied by creating antagonism between the Kurds and their 
‘others’, it at the same time suppressed some other internal 
antagonisms which may otherwise have surged to the surface in 
different political and social circumstances. 
 
The signifier of federalism is by no means the only and a self-
standing signifier at work in the context of KRI. A closer 
examination of the situation may lead to identifying various other 
signifiers floating around. At this point, for the sake of argument 
we can mention the signifier of ‘independence, the homeland and 
the people, Kirkuk’10, and so on. Along these signifiers and nodal 
                                 
 10 Kirkuk an oil-rich city in North of Iraq, it is a demographically diverse 
city where Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs reside. Historically, it has been a 
centre of conflict between Kurdish political parties and the Iraqi 
government. While Kurds claim it as their own, Arabs (supported by 
Turkmen) reject this. The city has seen dramatic demographic changes 
since the Ba’ath party came to power in 1963, when a large number of 
Kurdish and Turkmen residents of the city were forcefully relocated or 
expelled from the city to be replaced by Arab families (most of whom 
came from the south and centre of Iraq). Since 2003 the city has once 
more come to the forefront of political debates and experienced ethnic 
tension. For further details see Astarjian (2007); Anderson and 
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points there exists a number of other signifiers such as ‘Peshmerga’ 
and ‘four part or greater Kurdistan’. The content and meaning of 
each of these signifier is in a constant state of articulation by 
competing political discourses in KRI. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
According to PDT, identity is socially constructed through 
interaction between various actors. The social relationship is 
intrinsically political, with various forces competing over the 
articulation of meaning; and producing conflicting discourses 
around identity, values and institutions. Discourse refers not only 
to what is said or performed through language or text. It 
constitutes social life by allowing particular manifestations of our 
being in the world, particular values, particular meanings and 
identities; and is itself constituted by social life.  
 
This social life is understood as a ‘field of impossibility’, meaning 
that there is not a fixed, closed and total social world: competing 
discourses constantly attempt to fix meaning and produce solid 
identities. Through the process of ‘articulation’, various elements 
combine to produce specific moments, which become ‘compact 
                                 
Stansfield (2004).  
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discourses’ through hegemonisation. This converts particularities 
into universalities, a process naturally accompanied by force and 
coercion (Torfing, 1999, p. 120). Through it, elements which 
cannot be entered into a particular discursive field are excluded, as 
the very process of discourse is said to be ‘a reduction of 
possibilities’ (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 27).  
 
The process of hegemonisation is conflict-ridden; meaning that it 
creates antagonism between the hegemonic power and actors 
whose identities do not reflect the dominant identity. Building on 
Laclau and Mouffe, Torfing argues that ‘a discourse or discursive 
formation, establishes its limits by means of excluding a radical 
otherness that has no common measures with the differential 
system from which it is excluded’ (1999, p: 124). Any claim of 
fullness, then, whether by of a particular identity claiming 
universality – or by a society claiming to have reached a fixed state 
of being is false – as other possibilities, meanings and identities 
always exist.  
 
The concept of the ‘empty signifier’ is used to denote the state of 
emptiness in taken-for-granted notions. A ‘nation’, for example, 
exhibits the characteristics of an empty signifier or, what is named 
a ‘nodal point’ by Laclau and Mouffe (1985): it exists simply 
because it does not exist; its presence proved by its absence. This 
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can be evidenced in the definitional difficulties facing those who 
study nations: the term is ‘notoriously difficult to define’ (Ozkirimli, 
2000); and where definitions are offered they relate to socially 
constructed, rather than objective, characteristics. PDT is useful 
here then, as it reminds us that we should not conflate the 
subjective with the material: ‘nations’ have geographical 
boundaries, flags, currencies and national anthems. Yet beyond 
these material properties what remains is that which can be 
constructed through imagination (Anderson, 2006). It is only 
through the discourse that the notion of ‘nation’ acquires meaning. 
Thus, while PDT does not deny the existence of some objective 
traits from which any given nation is formed, such as historic ethnic 
roots, physical objects and ‘cultural tools’, it acknowledges that the 
identity of this nation is ultimately constructed through social 
processes that are subject to contemporary historical and political 
conditions. This means that its identity is never closed: there will 
always be competing articulations of the nation. 
 
In the next chapter, I build on this reading of PDT and the 
preliminary analysis conducted above by drawing on the primary 
and secondary data that have been gathered in the KRI in order to 
further analyse identity formation in the KRI. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 Political discourse analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I apply the theoretical and methodological 
foundations of political discourse theory to provide a detailed 
analysis of the major hypotheses which I arrived at-at the end of 
the first section in the previous chapter. In so doing, I outline the 
analytic themes upon which my data analysis is undertaken. These 
are drawn from the theoretical assumptions of PDT and directly 
related to the hypotheses below: 
1- Identity is a human creation that is socially constructed 
and contingent. 
This hypothesis draws on the social constructionist elements of 
PDT. It does not rule out the existence of objective features in the 
real world, but examines the manipulative power of political actors 
in subjectively and discursively constructing group or collective 
identity.1   
2- In constructing Kurdish identity, particular ‘signifiers’ are 
                                 
1 As discussed in chapter six. 
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of relevance. 
Actors in the KRI use particular signifiers that function as ‘nodal 
points’, ‘master signifiers’ and ‘myths’ (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002, 
p. 50). These are discursively organised around particular social 
contexts and are designed to provide meaning to the process of 
Kurdish identity formation. Signifiers of relevance here include ‘the 
Kurdish nation’, ‘independence’, ‘Kurdistan as homeland’ (Greater 
Kurdistan and Iraqi Kurdistan)’, ‘Kirkuk’, ‘enemy’, various national 
symbols and the myth of Kawa the Blacksmith.  
3- The Kurdish nationalist discourse clearly portrays the 
boundary between Kurds and ‘others’, whilst the internal 
differences of Kurds are paid insufficient attention. 
Whilst Kurds use the ‘logic of equivalence’ to name a single enemy, 
they simultaneously use the ‘logic of difference’ to subvert internal 
differences in their own camp. However, there is no a single Kurdish 
essence, but a number of contested claims regarding what it means 
to be Kurdish. These claims revolve around ethnicity, religion, 
country, nationalism and pan-nationalism. Terms such as ‘Kurd’, 
‘Kurdish Muslim’, ‘Muslim Kurd’, ‘Iraqi, Kurdistani’ and ‘Greater 
Kurdistani’ are utilised by different approaches.  
4- There is no single uncontested claim to Kurdish identity, 
but there are efforts to ‘hegemonise’ specific forms of 
Kurdish identity. 
Processes of hegemonisation can be identified in Kurdish 
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nationalism. These seek to universally impose a particular 
articulation of Kurdish nationalism. Pre-existing power relations are 
essential in this process, as the actors in positions of relative power 
stand a better chance of achieving such a hegemony. 
 
5- Kurdish identity is constructed relationally. 
Kurdish identity is constructed in relation to non-Kurdish ‘others’ 
(mainly Iraqi Arabs, Turks, and Persians). Drawing on PDT, it can 
be hypothesized that Kurdish identity functions in opposition to 
these non-Kurds; and in particular to those who form majorities in 
states neighbouring the KRI. The failure to realise Kurdish identity 
can be linked to the attempts by these non-Kurds to establish their 
own identity while denying Kurdish identity.2 
6- The creation or evocation of antagonisms is utilised in the 
construction of Kurdish identity.  
To assert Kurdish identity, Kurdish political actors will sometimes 
seek to create antagonism between the Kurds and their ‘others’.  
 
Two further hypotheses connect PDT with ethno-symbolism: 
1- Collective symbols play an important role in the process 
of identity formation regardless of their historica l 
                                 
 2 For Abbas Vali this situation, characterised by denial and resistance 
‘defines the political form of Kurdish national identity’ (2006: p. 49). 
Furthermore, as Kurds reside in different geographical and political 
jurisdictions where they share the country with other groups, a 
fragmented Kurdish identity is to be expected. 
 276 
 
accuracy.  
2- The role played by these symbols is socially and 
historically constructed, and varies depending on the 
political, cultural and historic context. 
 
The second of these hypotheses in particular develops the overlaps 
between PDT and ethno-symbolism, which states that there will 
always be different versions of the nation and its past, as the nation 
is produced through and by various actors and peoples (Smith, 
2009, p. 33). 
 
In the following sections I utilise primary and secondary data to 
analyse these hypotheses. These includes spoken, written and 
visual forms; personal interviews with politicians from major 
political parties in the KRI; and the online survey. 
7.2 Personal interviews 
The main sources of data in this chapter are the personal interviews 
conducted with a number of politicians in the KRI, and the online 
survey.3 The interview format used for personal interviews is based 
on the semi-structured interview method. I asked fixed questions 
to interviewees, with some specific questions for particular 
interviewees. For the online survey, a range of qualitative questions 
                                 
 3 The interviews were conducted between June 2012 and December 
2013. 
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was used in order to identify respondents’ views on issues pertinent 
to collective identity in the KRI. Interview and survey questions are 
provided in the appendices. 
7.3 The online survey 
As part of the data collection process, an online survey was 
conducted in November and December 2014. The survey was 
conducted in both Kurdish and Arabic and consisted of 24 questions 
(see appendix 4). The respondents were reached through Facebook 
via a link generated by the well-known Survey Monkey programme. 
Just over 400 Facebook users responded: their demographic details 
are shown in Tables 10.1-10.6. 
7.4 Themes in operation 
In light of the above hypotheses I have chosen a number of themes 
through which to carry out the analytical work. Drawing from the 
personal interviews, the online survey and other data collected for 
the purpose of this research, below I address the main themes 
selected for the data analysis. 
7.4.1 Identity crisis 
According to PDT, a crisis of identity occurs when a dominant 
discourse fails to become hegemonic. When this occurs, it attempts 
to impose its articulation of identity through its constitutive 
properties and symbolic characters and boundaries. Such attempts 
 278 
 
are almost always faced with counter-discourses seeking to 
establish alternative meanings and possibilities, creating a situation 
of ‘undecidability’, in which antagonistic forces of discourse 
formation come face-to-face. These other possible meanings are 
normally excluded and subsequently marginalised by the dominant 
discourse (Norval, 1994, p. 117).  
 
Thus, I would argue that although Kurdish identity is largely taken 
for granted by all political parties and ordinary Kurds (this is evident 
in political party manifestos as well as in the discourse of ordinary 
people in the KRI), the exact nature of that identity is highly 
ambiguous. In PDT terms, Kurdish identity represents an absence 
in the reality of the KRI. Every politician interviewed in this study 
strongly asserted an indisputable Kurdish identity, regardless of 
their ideological affiliation. They also argued that Kurds should be 
free to assert their right to statehood and independence.4 Although 
they made every effort to articulate Kurdish identity – in some 
cases supporting their claims with historical references – it is easy 
to identify differences between these understandings of Kurdish 
identity. 
 
                                 
 4 This belief is frequently expressed in Kurdish nationalist politics. It can 
be found, in various forms, in the manifestos of all Kurdish parties across 
Greater Kurdistan. Every Kurdish politician interviewed for this research 
expressed similar sentiments. 
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Attempts to hegemonise a particular form of Kurdish identity can 
be identified in the discourse of all Kurdish political parties, but are 
particularly visible in the discourse and practice of the KDP, which 
has been able to take advantage of power relations in the KRI since 
KDP forces took control of Erbil on the 31st August 1996.5 This is 
evidenced by the fact that the KDP’s discursive hegemony 
immediately became more active in imposing its official political 
vision on KDP controlled areas (i.e. most parts of Erbil and Duhok 
provinces). In other words, its control of Erbil not only changed the 
military balance of power, but allowed it to redraw the political map 
in the KRI. Erbil was the most highly populated city in the KRI and 
the site of its main legislative and executive institutions (i.e. the 
parliament, the KRG’s Council of Ministers).6 Almost immediately, 
the PUK established a version of the KRG in Slemany – the second 
largest city in the KRI which, they controlled – but this was 
secondary compared to Erbil’s institutional status, political power, 
strategic location and economic strength.  
                                 
 5 After more than two years of fighting the PUK, KDP forces took control 
of Erbil as a result of significant support from the Iraqi military – for a 
short time pushing PUK forces back to the Iranian borders. PUK forces 
later managed to expel the KDP from Slemany and a number of towns 
and areas, but the KDP retained control of Erbil, giving it an upper hand 
in political and administrative negotiations with the PUK ever since 
(Stansfield, 2003a, p. 133). The events following that crucial day have 
fed into the ‘double administration’ of the KRI, discussed above. 
 6 PUK MPs refused to attend meetings but the parliament continued to 
function through the attendance of the KDP MPs and 11 MPs affiliated to 
the minorities. 
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The relationship between political and discursive power has been 
well studied by Teun Van Dijk, who distinguishes between two 
major power holders in society: the ‘political elite’ and the ‘symbolic 
elite’ (1989, p. 22), who co-ordinate to maintain existing power 
structures. This can be seen throughout the short history of the 
KRI, where the KDP’s attempt to impose its version of Kurdish 
identity was evident in the cultural and symbolic domains. Although 
the KDP and PUK had their own historiographies of the KRI and 
Iraqi Kurds in general prior to 1996, neither was in a position to 
impose them nationally.  
 
The political and administrative division between the KDP and the 
PUK was paralleled by antagonisms on the cultural and symbolic 
levels. One of the KDP’s main symbolic actions in this regard was 
to hang pictures of Mustafa Barzani – the iconic Kurdish leader, 
former KDP leader and father of the current KDP leader and current 
KRI President Masoud Barzani – in all government offices and 
directorates.7 This was controversial, as Mustafa Barzani does not 
hold an equal nationalist value and respect by all Kurdish political 
                                 
 7 Masoud Barzani’s term in office as the President of the KRI was due to 
end on the 20th of August 2013. However, in an apparently hurried 
move, The KDP and the PUK blocks in parliament introduced and passed 
a law granting him a further two years in office on the 30th of June 2013. 
This was described as unlawful by other parties, who strongly opposed 
the move – leading to physical confrontations in the parliament building 
between rival MPs (Awene.com, 2013b). 
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parties. In fact, for some political parties outside the influence of 
the KDP, Barzani was at best a failed Kurdish leader who failed to 
gain the respect of all Kurds and, at best, he was merely a failed 
leader of the KDP: a belief that can partly be explained with 
reference to the political history of the KRI from the early 1960s 
(this was discussed in details in chapter three). Whilst this conflict 
is over, its impact remains and is detectable on a number of levels 
and in different forms. In the survey, respondents were asked 
which three figures they would most like to see as national leader: 
Mustafa Barzani was the third most popular choice on 30%, behind 
the jailed PKK leader Abdulla Ocalan on 34% and Ghazi Muhammed 
(president of the short-lived Republic of Kurdistan in 1946) on 48% 
(Table 7.1). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Image of Mala Mustafa Barzani. Source: (Ghzlji, n.d.) Table 
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7.1 Reponses to the question about preferred historical leaders  
Answer choice Responses Percentage 
Salahaddin Ayyubi 55 15.36% 
Sheikh Abdullah Nahri 60 16.75% 
Sheikh Said Piran 79 21.50% 
Sheikh Mahmud Hafid 81 22.62% 
Ghazi Mohammed 171 47.76% 
Mustafa Barzani 106 29.60% 
Jalal Talabani 61 17.03% 
Abdulla Ocalan 120 33.51% 
Masoud Barzani 68 18.99% 
All  56 15.64% 
None of them 41 11.45% 
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As noted earlier, shared glories and suffering are important aspects 
of nation-formation. Disagreements over these can thus be taken 
as an indication of antagonism in the process. To ascertain the level 
of agreement in this regard, the survey asked respondents to select 
the three most unpleasant events in the history of the KRI (Table 
7.2). The results of this indicate that – contrary to the outward 
projections of dominant nationalists – there are significant social 
and political divisions in the KRI, with a number of different events 
featuring in respondents’ answers. The frequency with which 
‘Kurdish fratricide’ featured in responses (at almost 60%) is 
evidence to this regard. Additionally, there is an unequal amount 
of importance placed on different events. 
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Table 7.2 Respondents’ three most unpleasant historical events. 
Historical incident Responses Percentage 
Collapse of Eylul revolution in 1974 25 7.83% 
Anfal of the Barzanis in 1983 30 9.40% 
Death of Mala Mustafa Barzani in 
1979 
13 4.07% 
Chemical bombardment of Halabja 
in 1988 
207 64.89% 
The Kurdish fratricide 191 59.87% 
The tragic massacre in Shingal and 
Yazidis in 2014 
127 39.81% 
The arrest of Abdulla Ocalan in 1999 40 12.53% 
The campaigns after 1986 141 44.20% 
Other incidents 5 1.56% 
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In response to the survey question asking respondents to list the 
three most ‘pleasant’ historical events in Iraqi Kurdistan, the 
historic March 11th accord (9%) and the ‘resurgent of armed 
struggle in 1976’ (11%), featured significantly less than the March 
1991 uprising (70%), the end of the Kurdish fratricide (55%) and 
the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in 2003 (50%) (Table 7.3). The 
picture becomes clearer if we remember that the former two events 
are largely associated with the KDP and PUK, while the latter two 
are celebrated more universally.8 To look at this division on the 
symbolic level, it is necessary to analyse more recent historical 
                                 
8 While the March 11th accord is largely associated with the history of 
KDP, the post-1976 resurgent of Kurdish armed struggle is primarily 
associated with the PUK, as it was founded in 1975 and was the first 
party to resume armed struggle following the collapse of the Eylul 
Revollution. 
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events. 
 
Table 7.3 Respondents’ three most pleasant historical events. 
 Historical incident Responses Percentage 
The 11th March 1970 accord 29 9.11% 
Resubmission of Kurdish armed struggle 
after 1976 
37 11.63% 
The 1991 uprising 223 70.12% 
The end of fratricide in 1998 174 54.71% 
Collapse of the Ba’athist regime in 2003 158 49.68% 
The execution of former Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein 
47 14.77% 
First parliamentary elections in Kurdistan 
Region in 1992 
51 16.03% 
Other incidents 3 0.98% 
 
Whilst Kamal Kirkuki, the former KDP head of the Kurdish 
parliament, hung a portrait of Mustafa Barzani in his office (Figure 
7.2), his replacement – the PUK’s Arsalan Baiyz – removed this 
immediately upon taking office in February 2012 (PUK leadership 
Council, no date) (Figure 7.3). This move was seen as provocative 
by the KDP, who expressed their anger publicly and privately – 
accusing the new head of parliament of disrespecting a national 
Kurdish symbol and ‘spiritual father of Kurds’ (Awene.com, 2012). 
This view of Barzani is offered by KDP politburo member Mahmud 
Muhammad, who argued that: 
Barzani is a personality of our country; he is also an Iraqi 
personality. If some people prefer not to hear that-that 
would not reduce from this person’s charisma. Barzani as 
a symbol in Kurdistan who was able to lead the Kurdish 
liberation movement for decades is something 
undeniable. Therefore, if we don’t politicise and 
partisanise everything, we can decide more calmly on 
these issues… if we or anybody else, do not pull Mala 
Mustafa Barzani into KDP slot; if you see him as a leader 
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of Kurdish liberation movement as at a point of history; 
we cannot erase history because this or that party is not 
happy with it. (MM.8) 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Office of president of Kurdistan parliament. Kamal 
Kirkuki, then KDP President of the Kurdistan Parliament, with guest in 
the Presidential Office (2012). Photo: KurdPress.com  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Office of president of Kurdistan parliament. The same 
office during the Presidency of Arsalan Bayiz. The portrait of Mustafa 
Barzani has been replaced by a joint portrait of Jalal Talabani and 
Masoud Barzani. Source: Awene.com  
In addition to demonstrating the identity crisis in the KRI, this 
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shows the logic of difference in action, with internal differences 
marginalised in the face of a ‘constitutive outside’ (in Iraq and 
beyond). The logic of equivalence can also be seen here: while 
there are major political and social divisions in the ‘others’ camp 
(Iraqi Arabs with various Sunni and Shi’ite factions  and possibly 
Turkmen), nationalist discourse attempts to group all these 
differences into a single ‘non-Kurd’ other, often figured as ‘enemies 
of the Kurdish people’ or ‘the enemies of our people’.9 It is to these 
depictions of the enemy that I now turn. 
 
7.5 Depiction of the enemy 
 
Figure 7.4 A Facebook post by Jawad Mella, a well-known Syrian 
Kurdish politician, writer and activist. Source: 
Facebook.com/jawad.mella 
 
                                 
 9 This term is largely used by (although is not exclusive to) the two major 
parties in the KRI, and is widely used among the public in the KRI. Very 
few statements by the major political parties fail to include it.   
 287 
 
Figure 7.4 shows a post from the official account of the Syrian 
Kurdish politician Jawad Mala. The Post reads as follows: 
Kurdistan has been the homeland of the Kurdish people 
since the beginning of time and it will remain the 
homeland of the Kurdish people. For ever. It is ought to 
raise the slogan for the independent of our homeland 
Kurdistan and to build the Kurdish state soon or later 
despite the hatred of haters. […]. 
Facbook.com/jawad.mella 
 
The post contains signifiers typical to the Kurdish nationalist 
discourse whether in the KRI or beyond. The signifiers are 
emphasized to show their relevance to the current discussions. The 
signifier of enemy stands out though, as it is evidenced by 
expression ‘hatred of haters’. 
 
As discussed earlier, theorists of relationality consider the depiction 
of enemies as a common method of identity construction. It is also 
at the heart of the political domain of social life and – as we have 
seen – the ‘primacy of the political’ is of fundamental importance 
for PDT. Intrinsic to the political is the friend/enemy dichotomy, as 
noted in the work of Carl Schmitt, to which PDT is highly indebted. 
For him, dichotomies are central to social life: in the moral realm 
we talk of ‘good’ and ‘evil’; in the aesthetic realm of ‘beauty’ and 
‘ugliness’. The main point to make here is that the identity ‘us’ is 
always constructed and reconstructed in relation to an ‘other’, 
which PDT labels the ‘constituted outside’. This relationship is 
charged with antagonism, with identity potentially negated by its 
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other and the very realisation of one’s identity necessitating the 
negation of that ‘other’s identity. This relationship with the other is 
essential to the discursive construction of identity and 
complements self-representation (Gard & Rojo, 2008, p. 6). More 
importantly, the process of identity construction through discourse 
operates mainly through the logics of equivalence and difference. 
 
These two logics can be identified in a speech made by Masoud 
Barzani. Speaking at a gathering in memory of the Anfal campaigns 
in Bahidnan on the 2nd of September 2012, he stated:10  
The enemy has not differentiated between Kurds from 
Zaxo to Khanaqin11, therefore, we should not be 
different; only being a Kurd was a crime for the enemy. 
To that end we need further alignment and unity. (Xebat, 
2012: 1, emphasis added) 
 
Here, Barzani seeks to delineate the boundaries between the 
Kurdish people and their enemy. The Kurds are seen as one, 
                                 
 10 Bahdinan or Badinan, in Kurdish )نانیداب) is the second geographical and 
dialectical area of Kurdistan Region-Iraq at the northern part, which is 
dialect also called (Badini/ Bahdini or more formally, Northern Kirmanji) 
(Gunter, 2003, p. 28). It contains large areas including the city and 
province of Duhok and parts of Mosul province. The area is the birth 
place and inner constituency of KDP. The other geographical and 
dialectical area is Soran which, consists of areas belonging to Erbil, 
Slemany and large areas within and around Kirkuk, Salahaddin and 
Diyala provinces (Bruinessen, 2007). 
 11 Zaxo is a border town in the northern KRI near Turkey. Khanaqin is a 
Kurdish dominated town near Baghdad. While Zaxo falls within the 
administration of Kurdistan Regional Government, Khanaqin is in a 
disputed area (areas which are ethnically mixed and whose governance 
is disputed by the Iraqi government and the KRG). 
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regardless of their internal differences. This is only possible 
because the ‘other’ or the enemy is present. This is, I would argue, 
a clear manifestation of the logics of equivalence and difference.  
 
To elaborate further, the logic of difference is premised on 
antagonisms where there is the possibility of creating unity. The 
elements of a system may be different to each other, but as their 
relation to the outside is equally negative they can form a unity 
against that outside (a ‘system’, in the language of PDT) (Laclau, 
1996, pp. 40-41). Thus, although Kurds might be ‘different’ from 
each other at various levels and on diverse grounds, the very fact 
that they are all equally subject to oppression by the enemy (in the 
case of the above message by Barzani, the previous Ba’ath regime 
and its current counterparts) unites them. Thus, the very thing that 
divides them, paradoxically, is that which also unites them. In 
effect it results in the subversion of differences. 
 
The signifier ‘enemy’ has been articulated in various ways by 
Kurdish nationalists in the KRI. It is sometimes utilised in an 
abstract and universal manner, functioning as a ready-made label, 
as in an interview response by Arsalan Baiyz, who stated that ‘[i]t 
is the enemies who principally do not believe in Kurds rights’ 
(ABZ.4). On other occasions, it is used to refer to specific groups 
or parties, as in an interview response by Najiba Ahmad (from the 
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KDSP): 
In principle, both Sunni and Shi’ite have the same 
viewpoint on the Kurdish issue. Each in its own part has 
a chauvinist [nation-worship] rational and do not account 
for the willing of Kurdish people. (NA.5, emphasis added) 
 
Here, the signifier ‘enemy’ refers to two other national or ethnic 
groups.  
Additionally, there is always ample room in the ‘enemy’ signifier for 
inclusion. In another statement by Najiba Ahmad, the role of 
‘enemy’ is ascribed to global superpowers, regional and 
neighbouring states: 
 A shared policy of the dominant states and at the 
meantime, the dominant global superpower states who 
are not with annexation of what has been cut off from 
Kurdistan or ‘those disputed places’ as it has been 
written so in the constitution. (NA.1) 
 
Laclau maintains that in any system of signification the full 
representation of that system is possible only if the logic of 
difference is secondary to the logic of equivalence. Accordingly, if 
we take the signifier of ‘enemy’ as a system of signification we find 
the logics of differential and equivalence operating simultaneously. 
However, to enable the full representation of the system and to 
give ‘enemy’ its full meaning, the logic of equivalence should 
dominate.  
 
Since 1991, a small number of occasions when ‘enemy’ was fully 
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(or near fully) constituted can be identified. When the Kurdish 
uprising erupted in March 1991, Kurdish parties and people were, 
at least for a short period of time, able to forget their differences 
and unite in the face of a common enemy. From then on, almost 
all Kurdish political parties (who had Peshmerga forces in the 
mountains) and also Jash auxiliary forces did participate in the fight 
against the Iraqi government in the KRI. Iraqi forces then 
retaliated, regaining control over areas in the majority of liberated 
towns and cities, leading to an exodus of Kurds (Lawrence, 2008, 
pp. 51-52). Here again, fear overrode internal differences and 
united Kurds in the face of the enemy. During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003, fear of the Iraqi government produced a similar 
atmosphere. This was soon replaced by the desire for revenge, 
uniting almost all Kurdish political parties against a ‘common 
enemy’ (ABC News, 2003).  
 
Another juncture at which the signifier ‘enemy’ was fully 
manifested occurred at another moment at which the ‘enemy’ was 
back in 2003 when the Turkish government decided to intervene in 
Iraqi affairs through the northern borders. The move was 
understandably conceived by Kurds as threatening and was 
considered an excuse by Turkey in order to intervene in KRI and 
prevent any undesired moves towards independence by Kurdish 
political parties. The situation united Iraqi Kurds around a common 
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‘enemy’. It has been suggested that this reaction resulted in the 
Turkish government abandoning their plan (International Crisis 
Group, 2003, p. 8). The event was another rare historical moment 
at which the logic of difference was undermined in Kurdish political 
discourse and the signifier of enemy was filled by the signified 
(Turkey).  
 
The rapid advance of ISIS and its confrontations with Peshmerga 
forces in Iraq since June 2014 provides another example, with ISIS 
functioning as the ‘enemy’ for Kurds. This is evident in the public 
and private discourse of Kurdish political parties and in the 
discourses of KRI residents more broadly. Although signs of political 
division remain, ISIS is understood as an undisputed enemy of all 
Kurds and has worked as a unifying factor for almost all Kurdish 
political and social factions.  
 
It is worth noting that in the crisis of 2012 (resulting from 
disagreements between the KRG and the central Iraqi 
government), the signification functions of ‘enemy’ were not fully 
realised. This failure, I contend, was mainly due to dominance of 
the logic of difference over the logic of equivalence in Kurdish 
political discourse: the differences between Kurdish political parties 
were strong enough to undermine their commonality. The situation 
resulted from the conflicting attitudes of Kurdish political parties 
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towards Iraqi President al-Malik. Masoud Barzani sought to depict 
al-Malik as a dictator, opening his Newroz speech on the 20th of 
March 2012 by stating that:   
2500 years ago Kurds rose up and rejected dictatorship. 
Ever since then, Kurds have struggled and fought for the 
sake of their freedom and liberty…this means we are a 
living people who will not accept subordination and 
oppression from anybody. We are a people who must be 
free and live freely. This is a lesson for us and other 
people. (Xebat.net, 2012a, translation by author) 
 
Portrayals of al-Malik as an enemy of Kurds and Kurdistan were 
common in the PDK’s political and media discourse, but many other 
parties – including the PUK and the Change Movement – were less 
forthright in their criticisms (although the KIG and KIU supported 
Barzani) (Joel, 2012). Even Jalal Talabani, himself a Kurd, did not 
support Barzani’s move to topple al-Malik: when Barzani intensified 
his efforts to unseat al-Malik, Assabah (a newspaper widely 
considered to be al-Malik’s official organ) carried the headline 
‘Talabani: the alternative to al-Malik is al-Malik’ (Assabah, 2011, 
p.1). This issue has once again revealed the divided nature of 
Kurdish political discourse.  
 
In sharp contrast to the critical language used by the KDP when 
referring to al-Malik, the language of prominent PUK members was 
neutral at best. Interviewed by the newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, 
Adel Murad – a member of the PUK’s politburo – dismissed 
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Barzani’s attempts to obtain a no-confidence vote against al-Malik, 
even going so far as to suggest that ‘the current reality requires us 
to stand against any attempts to replace al-Malik, who is one of our 
closest allies.’ (Sheikhani, 2012) 
 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, of the Change Movement, responded to this 
issue by stating that: 
We don’t know what the fight is about…one day the 
President of the Region got angry… he did not come to 
us, he did not ask us saying let’s fight over Kirkuk; let’s 
go fight over Oil and Gas law. We still don’t know… how 
much gain the foreign companies get from the oil and 
gas deals, what is the share of Kurdistan, where does its 
revenue go, how the money is spent. A fight which is not 
mine, I will not go to take it. (NM.1) 
 
Prominent members of the PUK and KDP displayed contrasting 
attitudes when asked about their opposing positions on al-Malik. 
Mahmud Muhammad of the KDP downplayed the seriousness of this 
political division, stating that ‘what is important is that while there 
might be different views we should not have different positions’ 
(MM.1). More realistically, Arsalan Baiyz of the PUK admitted the 
existence of a division in Kurdish political discourse, stating ’it is 
true, there is not a unified Kurdish discourse on this case’ (ABZ.2). 
 
Interestingly, al-Maliki and his allies also sought to depict the 
‘other’ negatively. Here, there was a particular focus on Barzani, 
but this was implicitly directed against Kurds in general. For 
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example, in 2011 the Kurdish newspaper Hawlati reported that al-
Malik had said that ‘the Kurdish politicians are guests in Baghdad; 
it is time to cut the hands of some of them’ (Hawlati, 2011). 
Speaking to the Kurdish TV channel NRT in May 2012, al-Malik 
accused Barzani of trying to strengthen Kurdistan while weakening 
Iraq. He also accused Barzani of breaching the Iraqi constitution in 
various ways, and in particular through illegal oil exports (NRT-TV, 
2012).12  
 
To reiterate, the division of policy and attitude in the KRI towards 
the depicted enemy ‘al-Maliki’ and The State of Law Coalition (SLC) 
was most felt in the failure of Masoud Barzani and his allies from 
smaller Shi’ite and Sunni parties in withdrawing confidence from 
al-Maliki’s government and forcing him to step down. (Dodge, 
2012) 
 
The signifier ‘enemy’, then, acquires a particular meaning at certain 
historic junctures, but is essentially empty of substance. In other 
words, it can mean many things whilst providing no meaning itself. 
The very emptiness of ‘enemy’ is the condition of its existence. By 
using the term along with other signifiers, dominant Kurdish 
                                 
 12 Oil and gas have been among the most troubling areas of 
disagreement between the Iraqi government and the KRG since the 
establishment of the new Iraqi government after the 2003 invasion. 
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nationalist discourse is able to enact the logic of equivalence such 
that all non-Kurdish others are presented as a single front. Kurds 
can then be positioned as the opposite of this front, creating a 
complete opposition between the two sides. The depiction of an 
enemy in this way is essential for discourses of political 
nationalism, and Kurdish nationalist discourse is no exception.  
 
The identity of the ‘enemy’ for Kurds in the KRI varies through time. 
At times the Iraqi government which, represents the majority 
group has functioned as the enemy; at other times the majority 
group (national or/and ethnic group) has functioned as the enemy. 
Neighbouring states could well represent the enemy at a wider 
level, particularly given their hostility towards Kurds and their 
political ambitions. In addition, other minority groups may function 
as the ‘enemy’, as when the Iraqi Turkmen Front opposed Kurdish 
claims to Kirkuk.13 Most consistently, however, it is Arabs who 
function as the ‘enemy’ for Kurds: something supported by the 
survey results. When asked about which group was closest to them, 
Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs received the fewest votes – just 3% and 
2% respectively (Table 7.4).  
                                 
 13 Since their foundation in 1995 the ITF – made up of Turkmen in Erbil 
and Kirkuk – have largely supported Turkish foreign policy in Iraq. They 
do not use terms such as ‘Kurdistan’ and ‘Kurdistan Region’, instead using 
‘Northern Iraq’ (a term disliked by Kurds). The tension between the ITF 
and Kurdish political parties (in particular the KDP and the PUK) furthered 
heightened after 2003 when Kurds came to dominate city administration. 
(Anderson & Stansfield, 2009) 
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The groups that have functioned as ‘enemy’ over time can be 
grouped into ‘external enemies’ and ‘internal enemies’ (or ‘the 
enemy within’). The latter has, at different times, included 
opposition parties or people who fall outside the hegemonic 
discourse. In the various texts analysed in this research, ‘enemy’ 
is utilised in a number of ways and to describe different groups. In 
 
Table 7.4 Respondents’ preferred ethnic and national groups 
Ethnic or national group responses percentage 
Sunni Arabs 10 3.01% 
Shi’ite Arabs 7 2.10% 
Chaldea- Assyrian/Christians 67 20.18% 
Muslim Kurds 191 57.53% 
Kurdish Yazidis 136 40.96% 
Kurdish Kakaiy 153 46.08% 
Turkmen 22 6.62% 
All of the above 47 14.15% 
None of them 32 9.63% 
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In the next section I analyse this phenomenon further. 
7.5.1 Enemy at the symbolic level 
Ey Reqib – the national anthem of Kurdistan and the KRI – is 
interesting to explore for its symbolic depiction of the ‘enemy’, not 
least as its title means ‘oh foe’ and features in the first line of the 
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anthem:  
Oh foe who watch us, the nation whose  
Language is Kurdish is alive 
It cannot be defeated by makers of weapons  
Of any time (KRG, 2010b) 
 
The term ‘foe’, then, is central to this particularly public discourse. 
In these lines the existence of the Kurds is positioned against the 
signifier ‘enemy’ (‘foe’), operating at its highest, abstract form (no 
reference is made regarding the identity of the enemy and, as 
before, the signifier itself is empty of meaning). ‘Enemy’, here, is a 
‘floating signifier’ that can be filled with a specific meaning drawn 
from a variety of discourses.14  
 
The meaning of ‘enemy’, then, is entirely dependent on the scope 
and limits of the discourse being articulated. Since 1991 a variety 
of historically produced discourses have articulated different 
enemies. The Iraqi government was considered the major enemy 
of Kurds immediately after 1991, and was referred to using a 
                                 
 14 Following de Saussure’s structural linguistic approach, a ‘sign’ is a 
fundamental unit of linguistic analysis composed of the ‘signifier’ (steam 
of sounds) and the ‘signified’ (the concept) (Laclau, no date). Laclau and 
Mouffe make use of the term ‘floating or empty signifiers’, defined by 
Laclau as ‘signifier[s] without a signified’ (Laclau, 1996, p. 36). 
However, they are not empty in a strict manner but rather ‘are the signs 
that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own 
particular way’ (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002, p. 28). In other words, the 
empty signifiers are discourse specific.  
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variety of terms, including ‘the Ba’ath regime’, ‘the fascist regime’, 
‘the Baghdad dictatorial regime’ and ‘the Ba’athist government’.15 
This lasted until the establishment of the first Kurdish regional 
government in May 1992, when an internal ‘fifth column’ also 
functioned as ‘the enemy’.16  
 
During the intra-Kurdish conflicts between 1993 and 1997 the 
nature of the ‘enemy’ varied depending on the party discourse. For 
instance, when fighting broke out between the PUK and the 
Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM) in December 1993, Islamists 
came to function as the ‘enemy’ in PUK discourse, which portrayed 
them as collaborating with Iran (Stansfield, 2003b, p. 97). When 
fighting between the PUK and KDP occurred in May 1994, each 
party depicted the other as the enemy of the Kurds and Kurdistan 
(Stansfield, 2003b, p. 97), often using the term ‘Jash’ or referring 
to them as ‘those who sold themselves to the enemy’. Also 
important to note here are the struggles between the KDP, the PUK 
and the Kurdistan Workers Party in early and late 1990, which saw 
the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan declared ‘the enemy’, 
particularly by the KDP (Bird, 2004, p. 99).  
                                 
 15 Figure 7.5 is a depiction of Saddam Hussein, the then Iraqi President, 
as the enemy of Kurds. 
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Figure 7.5 A cartoon mimicking former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, 
Kurdistani Niwe 24th April 1992. The speech bubble reads ‘Kurds, I am 
asking you in a fully democratic manner: which one do you want?’  
 
In the 2000s, the rhetoric of the ‘global war on terror’, impacted 
on ‘enemy’ construction in the KRI, with ‘terrorists’ functioning as 
a powerful manifestation of ‘the enemy’. Two key incidents in 2001 
also contributed to this: the assassination of Franso Hariri – a 
veteran Christian Assyrian KDP politician and the Governor of Erbil 
Province – by the Islamist terrorist group Jund al-Islam in February 
(Gunter, 2003, p.63; 2011, p. 114); and the murder of 42 
Peshmerga fighters belonging to the PUK in the village of Kheli 
Hama by the same group in September (Muir, 2003).   
 
The events of 2003 that brought the end to the Ba’ath party regime 
in Baghdad contributed largely in the enduring picture of the enemy 
which has always been there with varying intensity to that of the 
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Ba’ath party regime.  
 
Following the Strategic Agreement between the KDP and the PUK 
in 2007, the manner in which internal ‘enemies’ had been 
constructed in the language and discourse of these two major 
parties has changed. The popular Change Movement now occupied 
a less intense form of internal ‘enemy’. Indeed, the term ‘enemy’ 
was not used alone to depict the Change Movement: this would be 
inappropriate given that many of its prominent figures were 
formerly members of the PUK. Rather, terms such as ‘enemies of 
our experiment’, ‘opponents of our people’ and ‘failed leaders’ were 
employed.  
 
‘The enemy’, then, is a signifier that floats in circles of articulation. 
It is given content through particular discourses at particular 
historic moments. Since June 2014 the term has been used to 
depict ISIS. Despite the floating nature of ‘the enemy’, its presence 
has been of significant importance for the Kurdish nation and its 
people.  
7.5.2 Articulation of symbols 
PDT and ethno-symbolism both note that the symbolic power of 
national and ethnic symbols is important to consider when 
analysing processes of identity formation. Those whose discourses 
 302 
 
produce the ‘nation’ are also aware of their importance. In 
particular, depicting national leaders in symbolic forms is of 
paramount importance (Conversi, 1995, p. 74; Smith, 2009, p. 
33). In order to analyse this, PDT focuses primarily on the 
instrumental character of symbols and the ‘power of articulation’, 
which theorises how discourses are endowed with symbolic power. 
PDT also acknowledges the inevitable – and potentially constructive 
– role played by myths in grounding action, even though they are 
often historically inaccurate. Ethno-symbolism, meanwhile, 
acknowledges the productive power of symbols in processes of 
collective identity formation. By utilising these two approaches 
alongside each other, it is possible to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the importance of symbolism in process of national identity 
construction.  
 
It is important to note that the symbols used by nationalists may 
not be historically accurate (Smith, 2009; 1999, pp. 63-65). This 
does not necessarily affect their influence, however. Rather, 
symbols are re-constructed by specific actors in particular contexts. 
There is no universal concept of Newroz, for example; nor is it 
exclusively celebrated by Kurds.  Since the early 1930s, however, 
it has played an important role in Kurdish nationalist politics (Aydin, 
2005, pp. 45-56). Historically, it simply marked the Kurdish and 
Iranian New Year and the end of winter, but Kurdish nationalists 
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re-articulated it after the First World War. Since then, Newroz day 
(March 21st) has served as a day to celebrate (potential) Kurdish 
freedom. Due to its long historical roots, it has been widely 
accepted by major Kurdish political and social groups as the 
Kurdish day of freedom, achieving a level of approval that has 
evaded national figures such as Mustafa Barzani: 88% of survey 
respondents accepted Newroz either as a Kurdish national feast or 
as the national feast of the KRI (Table 7.5).  
  
Table 7.5 Respondents' view on Newroz 
Answer  Responses Percentage 
It is a Kurdish national feast and I 
consider it my own feast 225 
63.02% 
It is a Kurdish national feast but I do not 
consider it my own feast 
20 
5.60% 
It is a national feast in the Kurdistan 
Region and I consider it my own feast 
53 
14.84% 
It is the beginning of spring but I do not 
consider it my own feast 
47 
13.16% 
Other responses 12 3.36% 
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Mustafa Barzani’s relative unpopularity can partly be explained by 
the aforementioned conflicts between the KDP and the PUK. Also of 
importance is the fact that his historical legacy is much more recent 
(it is less than a half century old). Indeed, a large number of 
current Kurdish politicians were personally involved in the intra-
Kurdish conflicts of the 1960s or experienced them in one way or 
another. This results in what I call the ‘fragmentation of memory', 
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which has two main consequences: collective symbols can play a 
great role in the process of identity formation regardless of their 
historical accuracy; and the place and role of these symbols is 
socially and historically determined.  
 
For PDT, then, the symbols utilised by Kurdish nationalists are 
floating signifiers that can be filled with contested meanings and 
contents. In analysing the role currently played by the symbol 
Mustafa Barzani, for example, it is important to explore Islamic 
Kurdish political discourse. Since this emerged in the mid-1980s 
and especially, since the establishment of the Kurdistan Islamic 
Movement (KIM) back in 1986, a number of historic Kurdish leaders 
(including Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh Mahmoud and Qazi Muhammad) 
have been appropriated to construct a specifically Islamic Kurdish 
history, which claims that almost all historic Kurdish nationalist 
leaders had an Islamic background and were ‘educated from the 
mosque’.  
  
As noted above, the contested depictions of Newroz (a historical 
event) and Mustafa Barzani (a political leader) are best analysed 
through linking ethno-symbolism and PDT. Although both of these 
symbols have historic roots, their contemporary symbolic power is 
contingent upon the social, political and historic context of the KRI. 
Each particular discourse – whether nationalist, religious or neither 
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– fills these ‘signifiers’ with different (and often conflicting) 
meanings.  
7.5.3 The complex issue of independence 
Independence has been a goal for Kurds since the creation of the 
first Kurdish political movement in the modern period. However, in 
the KRI the issue has increased in importance since the Iraqi 
general election in January 2005, when the ‘Kurdish Referendum 
Movement’ – consisting of activists from Kurdistan and across the 
Kurdish diaspora – conducted an unofficial referendum, which 
asked Kurdish voters in Iraq ‘whether they favour being part of Iraq 
or an independent Kurdish state’. In a press release issued from 
London on the 8th February that year they claimed that 98% of 
voters favoured an independent Kurdish state, and announced that 
they had handed a 1.7 million signature petition demanding a 
referendum on independence for the KRI to the United Nations 
(Aliraqi.org, 2010; UNPO, 2004). In recent years, Masoud Barzani 
has occasionally referred to the right of Kurdish statehood: he has 
asserted the right of Kurds to an independent state on more than 
one occasion and in 2012 stated that if ‘Iraq [is] plunged back into 
dictatorship we will return to our own people to decide its fate.’ 
(Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012b) In the same year, he also 
framed Kurdish independence as: 
a decisive issue. It is a natural right for us, it is a 
legitimate right for us, but it depends on how and when 
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we are able to practice it. It should be at a time that will 
be stable and suitable. It cannot happen through 
emotions. Nor is it a sin to talk about. If we don't make 
a decision about it, nobody will. The world is changing 
fast. Nobody knows what will happen in the next 2-3 
years. We have to step carefully. (Malpress, 2012: 
emphasis added, translation modified)17 
 
He reiterated his position on Kurdish independence at a conference 
of Kurdish youth From the Four Parts of Kurdistan’ 15th in 2012, 
stating that:  
The whole world should know that it is a normal right, a 
lawful right, a Godly right that he has given to us. I am 
not with saying that a certain state or government can 
give us our right. (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012a, 
translation by author). 
An overwhelming majority of survey respondents (85%) stated 
that they are in favour of independence for the KRI (Table 7.6). 
Similarly, all political party leaders and high-ranking party 
members interviewed clearly articulated the Kurdish right to 
independence (see table 7.7). However, some of them spoke of the 
importance of paying attention to contemporary political realities 
and current possibilities. For instance, Arsalan Baiyz stated that ‘it  
is the right of every Kurd to aspire to a state for their nation and 
work for it, however, we should know that to have a state we need 
to get prepared for it.’ (AB.1) 
 
                                 
 17 The articulation of ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ rights are frequently used 
in Kurdish nationalist discourse across the political spectrum. Indeed, 
every politician interviewed for this research uses at least one of these 
terms (Table 7.1).  
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Table 7.6 Responses to the question on independence for KRI 
Answer choice Responses Percentage 
Yes 302 84.59% 
No 26 7.28% 
Don’t know 29 8.12% 
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Table 7.7  Kurdish politicians on independence. 
Politician Statement on independence 
Mr. Abu-Bakr Ali 
(KIU) 
‘In terms of principles, self-determination is the right 
of every nation and we consider the people of 
Kurdistan a nation therefore, self-determination is 
their right.’ (AA.1) 
Mr.Ali Bapir 
(KIG) 
‘According to Islam, Kurdish people have the right to 
statehood.’ (AB.1) 
Mr.Arsalan 
Bayiz (PUK) 
‘It is the right of Kurds to dream about a Kurdish 
state and work for it.’ (ABZ.1) 
Mr.Balen 
Abdulla (KTP) 
‘The only way is the way that has also been paved 
for by the universal declaration of human rights. This 
has given Kurds the right to decide whether they 
want to stay within Iraq or not.’ (BA.1)  
Mr. Dana Said 
Sofy (PUK) 
‘…but it does not mean that there is not such an 
intention, desire and dream from the side of the 
political forces.’ (DS.1) 
Mr.Mahmud 
Muhammad 
(KDP) 
‘Talking about the creation of a Kurdish state is 
neither haram nor a shame, it’s not something out 
of the international norms and law.’ (MM.2) 
Miss.Najiba 
Ahmed (KDSP) 
‘The Kurdish people like all other nations it is their 
right to become independent and live 
independently.’ (NA.1) 
Mr. 
Nawsherwan 
Mustafa (CM) 
‘It is a natural right for the Kurds for their aim to be 
the establishment of a state.’ (NM.1) 
Mr. Osman haji 
Marif (KWCP) 
‘Not an independent Kurdish state but an 
independent state in Kurdistan.’ (OM.1) 
Mr.Samir 
Saleem (KIU) 
‘It is the right of Kurds, like any other nation to have 
its own state and its own independence. It is true in 
the legal and human rights terms as it is true in the 
religious terms.’ (SS.1) 
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In his short 2012 Newroz message the CM leader Nawshirwan 
Mustafa outlined his party’s vision for independence (the topic took 
up more than half of his speech), articulating a unique identity 
discourse in the process. Notably, like other Kurdish politicians, he 
defended the KRI’s right to statehood, but implicitly questioned its 
ability to realise this in the contemporary climate. This gave voice 
to the concerns of other major Iraqi Kurdish opposition parties and 
independent Kurdish intellectuals. This tension can be illustrated in 
the following extract: 
My second message is about our wholesome vision for 
our highest national aspiration, which is the independent 
Kurdistan and the establishment of the State of 
Kurdistan. It is for this aim that many generations have 
risen, an aim that tens of thousands of our citizens have 
bequeathed their lives to, and for which the whole nation 
and country have endured mass destruction and 
genocide. But the independent Kurdistan is not 
something that can be achieved by rhetoric. It is an 
establishment, the pillars of which have to be laid on the 
ground. The Independent Kurdistan should be built as a 
political establishment, with a written national accord in 
the format of a constitution and a set of laws, that enjoys 
the support of the citizens, with the objective of 
organising the political process and the competition 
between the different political groups, under the 
auspices of a set of national institutions, such as national 
administration, national army, national security and 
national high courts, all of which should belong to the 
people collectively and not to the ruling elites only. In 
addition to the political establishment, the Independent 
Kurdistan should also be a social and an economic 
establishment, that requires strong economic 
infrastructure and necessitate the prevalence of the 
social harmony between the different sections, classes 
and regionalised, in order that every single citizen of 
Kurdistan Region feels content with the dominance of at 
least minimum levels of social justice, to be enjoying 
access to equal and appropriate opportunities to better 
themselves, and to benefit from the national treasures 
and the over and underground riches of the country. 
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The Independent Kurdistan should also be a civic and 
cultural establishment that harnesses a formal language, 
national press and national universities. It requires the 
emancipation of the civic society by liberating the 
individuals from the narrow tribal and regionalised 
allegiances and adopts a comprehensive allegiance to the 
Nation and the Homeland. (Kurdishmedia.com, 2012, 
emphasis added) 
 
The counter-discourse evident here emerged after the 
strengthening of Kurdish opposition following the emergence of the 
CM in 2009. Prior to this, the nationalist discourses of the PUK and 
KDP had dominated the political field, with occasional dissent from 
the two major Islamic parties and smaller parties (including the 
Iraqi Workers Communist party); and from some prominent 
Kurdish intellectuals both home and abroad. This dissent arose 
from ideological and historical differences, but given the limited 
support or reach of these actors it was unable to make a significant 
impact on the political map and remained at the margins of political 
life. This changed with the emergence of the CM, whose dissenting 
discourse posed a serious threat to hegemonic discourses of 
independence in the KRI18.  
 
                                 
18 The CM’s participation in the KRG government following the September 
2013 elections has subjected the party to fierce criticism from both 
within and outside the party. The party has, at some points, been 
accused of compromising over some of its own political and 
administrative principles, values and promises. The criticism may be 
seen as an indication of the existence of some form of civic society in 
KRI which is capable of transcending the dominant Particracy discussed 
earlier in this study. 
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This division on independence is not confined to the former 
opposition parties, however. The PUK’s Jalal Talabani – the closest 
ally of Barzani – has, in recent years, repeatedly dubbed 
independence for the KRI as ‘a poetic dream’ and ‘impossible’ 
(Reuters, 2009). He is also associated with the well-known claim 
that ‘a Kurdish state is a poetic imagination’. This has been fiercely 
criticised by other parties and by grassroots actors. A Facebook 
page has been set up called ‘Kurdish State is Not Impossible’, for  
 
Figure 7.6 The Facebook page 'Kurdish state is not impossible'. 
 
Example (Figure 7.6).19 The self-description statement of the page 
says: 
                                 
 19 This page was created in 2010. Many different groups and pages were 
created later, some belonging to Kurdish political parties and others 
claiming to be independent. They serve as major public forums to 
disseminate political views from competing political and social fronts in 
the KRI (and beyond). At times, they become ‘virtual battlefields’, with 
arguments between members or supporters of rival parties; and 
between ideological, cultural, ethnic and national rivals. 
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The purpose of this page is to protest against some 
remarks by Jalal Talabani (the current Iraqi president 
and secretary general of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-
Iraq), especially remarks expressed during his latest 
interview with TRT Arabic (a Turkish state channel) in 
which he stated ‘the Kurdish state is impossible’. We 
would like to express our disapproval of his remarks and 
stand against any similar political standing which denies 
Kurds the very basic right of deciding their fate like any 
other nation in the world. (Kurdish State is Not 
Impossible, 2010)  
 
At the time of writing, the hegemonic nationalist discourse in the 
KRI has been threatened with dislocation by alternative political 
discourses that seek to fill the signifiers ‘nation’, ‘independence’, 
‘homeland’, ‘Peshmerga’ and others, with new content. This 
counter-discourse was clearly evident in the poems of Sherko 
Bekas especially, around and after the 2009 national elections in 
the KRI. Regarded as one of the prominent poets of Kurdish 
nationalism, he unequivocally supported this new current in 
Kurdish political discourse. His poem ‘Now a Girl is My Homeland’ 
contains the lines:  
We will strip this history totally down 
We will review its words from the beginning 
We will ask the mountain anew 
Who says you are a hero? 
We will say to snow, who says you are pure? 
We will tell the songs, who says you are sacred? (Bekas, 
2013) 
 
This narrative presents a clear challenge to hegemonic Kurdish 
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nationalist discourse, demystifying a number of its ‘taken-for-
granted’ political myths. It also problematizes dominant nationalist 
narrative, which has long been considered to be ‘objective’; and 
touches on the founding ideological signifiers of the nationalist 
discourse, which can be traced back to the 1961 September 
Revolution: history, military struggle, political leaders and 
historical symbols. The mountains of the poem ostensibly, 
represent military struggle (mountains have provided shelter to the 
Peshmerga and fleeing Kurds); whilst political leaders are 
represented by snow and historical leaders are invoked through the 
reference to songs.  
 
This dislocating discourse is – like the dominant one – divided along 
political and ideological lines. Along with the ambiguous ideological 
stance of the Change Movement,20 there exist a number of 
competing ideologies, with Islamism featuring prominently. The 
survey results support this: whilst independence is widely accepted 
as a desirable goal by the public and political parties, more 
‘everyday’ concerns are also deemed of significant importance. 
                                 
 20 The Change Movement has been widely criticised for its ideological 
ambiguity. Its members are largely drawn from former members of 
other parties who had grown discontented and so far it has been 
reluctant to formulate a clear ideology. Many of its members are former 
members of the two main Islamic parties (the KIU and KIG): critics 
maintain that they have shifted the ideological balance of the Change 
Movement in favour of Islamic religious principles.  
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When asked which statements they most closely associated with, 
47% of survey respondents chose ‘I am with democracy, freedom 
and social justice before anything else’; whilst 40% chose ‘I am 
with the independent Kurdistan state before anything else’ (Table 
7.8). 
Table 7.8 Response to preferred expression of support  
Expression Response
s 
Percentag
e 
I am with the independent Kurdistan 
state before anything else 
136 40.10% 
I am with freedom, democracy and 
justice before anything else 
152 47.05% 
I am with the establishment of Shari ’a 
law before anything else 
34 10.52% 
None of the above 1 0.30% 
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7.5.4 Political Islam and Kurdishness 
We have seen, then, how the dominant Kurdish nationalist 
discourse in the KRI has struggled to hegemonise its discourse of 
Kurdish identity, and has been in near-constant conflict with 
competing discourses. As Philips and Jorgensen note, to 
understand ‘a particular discursive construction of the social ’, it is 
necessary to analyse its counter-discourses (2002, p.38). To this 
end, it is necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of Islamic 
parties’ religious discourses, which have developed dramatically 
since 1991 and differ – sometimes fundamentally – from those 
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produced by nationalist and secular Kurdish political parties. These 
differences have recently been foregrounded by the Arab Spring.21  
 
Islamic parties draw on the Islamic elements of Kurdish identity 
whilst disregarding its pre-Islamic elements. This is apparent in the 
discourse used by the Islamic parties; and is manifested in the 
forms of culture they promote and in their political and religious 
discourse. Ali Bapir, the leader of the KIG occasionally emphasises 
on the Islamic characteristics of Kurdish identity whilst criticising 
mainstream nationalist and ‘secularist’ trends in the KRI. He, along 
with party members, have also acted provocatively on the symbolic 
level. On more than one occasion he has refused to stand for the 
Ey Reqib anthem (as is customary in the KRI) and he has expressed 
his disapproval of the anthem, labelling it haram as a result of the 
(supposed) inappropriate expression in the line ‘our religion and 
faith is the homeland only’ (Salim, 2014).22 When interviewed, he 
further explained this by recalling a discussion he held with a 
Kurdish nationalist: ‘It says “our religion is our homeland.” I said 
                                 
21 Islamic parties use the term A’elmanyekan (‘the seculars’) to describe 
non-Islamic political parties and individuals in the KRI. This term is 
mostly used in a derogatory manner equally to ‘unreligious’ in a mostly 
traditional Kurdish society in KRI. 
 22 Bapir also offered a more secular reason for refusing to rise for Ey 
Reqib, stating that it addresses the Kurds rather than the nation or the 
country; and so ignores non-Kurdish members of the KRI such as 
Turkmen and Assyrians. He suggested that a national anthem should be 
inclusive to all people who live in the KRI. (AB.6) 
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“the land cannot make religion, the land is prayed on. We have to 
save the land to practice religion on, we cannot make religion out 
of it.”’ (AB.6). 
  
The more popular Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) adopts a more 
moderate understanding of Islam, holding to an understanding of 
Kurdish identity that derives from their interpretation of Islam as 
both a religion and a political ideology. In their party constitution, 
they include the following among their main principles: 
The Kurdish people in terms of nationality, is unique, 
while in terms of religion is part of the Islamic Ummah, 
and it has an equal right with all other nations to include 
the right of self-determination. Islam, Kurdish-ness and 
Kurdistani-ness are the three main elements of the 
identity of Kurdish people.’ (Kurdistan Islamic Union, 
n.d., emphasis added). 
 
Here, Kurdish Islamic discourse shares some elements with 
mainstream Kurdish nationalist discourse: Kurds constitute a 
unique nation and have the right of self-determination, for 
example. However, it differs fundamentally in its cultural and 
ideological outlook, with the idea of Ummah – a pan-Islamic nation 
– central. This resonates with contemporary Islamic political 
discourse and particularly resembles the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
which the KIU is affiliated.  
 
This link is made clear by a post on a KIU linked Facebook page 
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entitled  ‘Shaqam ماقەش’ ( ‘The Street’), which details a rally held in 
Erbil by supporters of the KIU and KIG to condemn violence against 
supporters of the ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi (of 
the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood). The post reads ’Today Erbil 
said: I am part of the body which called Islamic Ummah, anyone 
who will not accept that is not from me and is a bastard Kurd.’ 
(Figure 7.10) This is similar to the portrayal of Kurds as ‘the 
orphans of the Islamic Ummah’, which was common in the official 
discourse of the KIU during the mid-90s, and constituted an 
attempt to connect Kurds to global Islamism (Mine, 1994).  
 
 
Figure 7.7. A 2013 post on the Facebook page ‘Shaqam/ماقەش’, associated 
with the KIU. Source: facebook.com/Shaqam  
 
By linking the Kurdish nation to the Islamic nation, the KIU seeks 
to counter attempts by secular nationalist discourses to dissociate 
Kurdish identity from characteristics perceived as Islamic; and from 
 317 
 
attempts to ‘modernise’ Kurdish identity. Such attempts by secular 
Kurdish nationalist parties have so far failed in practice. Phrases 
such as ‘Kurdistan: the centre of coexistence’, rhetoric that 
positions Kurdistan as ‘the haven or beacon of democracy’ 
(Bruinessen, 2005, p. 19; Stansfield, 2003b, p. 184) and the 
framing of Kurdistan as ‘an American and the West ally’ are widely 
used in mainstream nationalist discourse in the KRI; and are 
accompanied by references to Kurds’ pre-Islamic roots. This clearly 
demonstrates the areas of contestation between the mainstream 
nationalist discourse and Islamic nationalist discourse in the KRI.  
 
It is also important to note that the discourse of the Islamic political 
parties retains a number of phrases associated with secular 
nationalist discourse, however. The current politburo member of 
the KIU, Abu-Bakr Ali, is considered among the more moderate 
leaders in the party’s history. When asked whether he considered 
himself a Kurdish Muslim or a Muslim Kurd he responded: 
I am a Kurdish Muslim... this because it is a fact, before 
Islam came to this country Kurds existed. My Kurdish-
ness is a fact. I was a Kurd then took the Islamic religion 
up. Kurdish-ness and Muslimness are two dimensions of 
my identity. They are not mutually exclusive. They are in 
fact complementary. (AK.1) 
 
This question of self-definition was incorporated into the survey for 
those who identified as Kurdish and Muslim. Only 12% of 
respondents identified as ‘Muslim Kurdish’, whilst just over 40% 
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identified as ‘Kurdish Muslim’. A further 19% believed there was no 
difference between these labels (see Table 7.9). This can be better 
understood if the results are compared with language and discourse 
 
Table 7.9: Self-descriptors used by those who identify as both 
Kurdish and Muslim. 
Answer  Responses Percentage 
Kurdish Muslim 127 41.50% 
Muslim Kurd 38 12.41% 
Kurdish 82 26.79% 
There is not a difference between 
the two 
59 19.28% 
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of other fundamentalist Kurdish Islamic figures. In one of his 
popular public speeches in 2013 the Erbil mosque preacher Mala 
Mazhar triggered a public outcry by stating that ‘[o]ur land and 
country, the governor and administrator and the police al l may 
sacrifice to Hazrat Omar’s shoes  .’23 (MalmoKurd, no date) Thus, 
while Islamic political discourses on Kurdish identity bear some 
resemblance to nationalist discourse, there are fundamental 
differences in that camp as well. There are visible attempts to bring 
the Islamic and Kurdish national characters together. Figure 7.8 
demonstrates a striking example of such attempts. 
 
                                 
 23 This refers to Omar Ibn Al-Khattab (579-644), the second Caliph in 
Islamic history who accompanied Muhammed. 
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Figure 7.8: Kurdish pilgrims in the holy city of Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
Following the methodological guidelines of PDT, this chapter has 
analysed primary and secondary data regarding Kurdish identity 
formation in the KRI. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘crisis’ 
is the master variable in PDA. In the case of Kurdish political 
discourse in the KRI, an ‘identity crisis’ explains the processes of 
articulation utilised by political actors. The Kurdish nation – like any 
other – lacks an ‘objective’ reality outside the social relations of 
competing political actors. It can, in other words, only function as 
an empty signifier, allowing the main political actors in the KRI to 
spend considerable effort (re)constructing their own articulation of 
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Kurdish identity, and attempting to hegemonies it. Utilising what 
PDT refers to as ‘the logic of equivalence’ and the ‘logic of 
difference’, they group ‘others’ together to create a ‘constitutive 
outsider’; whilst simultaneously supressing internal differences in 
favour of their construction of Kurdish identity.  
 
Thus, there is a paradox at the heart of Kurdish identity in the KRI: 
whilst political actors are central to its creation, they are also the 
source of the identity crisis. Having failed to create a physical 
Kurdish nation they transfer struggle to the realm of discourse, 
where they seek to give meaning to a series of empty signifiers, 
including ‘nation’, ‘independence’, ‘enemy’ and various national 
symbols. How they do this varies according to their ideological and 
religious persuasion. These issues are distributed across the 
various political factions in the KRI. They are relevant for the main 
secular parties (the KDP and the PUK) as well as for religious and 
(somehow) liberal parties such as the Change Movement.  
 
Whilst Kurdish identity construction draws on a set of pre-existing 
tools (as per ethno-symbolism), then, its precise manifestation 
differs according to the historic, political and religious context. This 
resonates with the social constructionist claims of PDT, which sees 
identity as something that simultaneously operates through 
continuity (there are objective substances which underpin the 
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process of identity such as ethnic characteristics, cultural tools and 
materials) and change (which gives shape to identity through the 
political re-articulation of signifiers of identity). The relevant 
cultural tools in the KRI include Kurdistan as a geographical 
homeland, Newroz as a mythical tool, the Kurdish language and 
various national symbols. However, Kurdish identity has never 
been fully realised and is largely ambiguous and fragmented. Its 
precise manifestations – particularly since 1991 – are contingent 
upon the historic and social context in which it operates. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8 Conclusions 
8.1 Structure 
This thesis has utilised two major theoretical approaches to 
examine processes of Kurdish identity formation in the Kurdistan 
Region-Iraq between 1991 and 2014. In this chapter I present the 
concluding remarks in order to answer the core questions of this 
research:  
1) What constitutes and determines Kurdish identity in the 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq?  
2) To what extent is Kurdish identity in the Kurdistan Region-
Iraq determined by cultural and historical factors or political 
agents? 
3)  What kind of collective Kurdish identity is formed in the 
Kurdistan Region-Iraq?  
4) What are the main trajectories of that identity? 
 
Additionally, the converging points between ethno-symbolism and 
political discourse theory will be identified; and the relevance of 
this research to the understanding of Kurdish identity formation in 
the KRI and the Middle East more broadly will be demonstrated. 
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8.2 Cultural and historical analysis of Kurdish identity 
formation 
In chapters three and four, I showed how ethno-symbolism 
considers history and culture to be central to the production of 
collective identity (whether ethnic or national). For ethno-
symbolists, collective identity formation draws on the historical 
ethnic roots of the identity in question, which are (re)presented 
through a series of cultural mechanisms. National identity is, 
therefore, largely dependent on the nature of the links between the 
‘nation’ and its historical ancestors (whether factual or mythical); 
and their glories, sufferings, achievements and setbacks.  
 
This research has found that Kurdish identity formation utilises a 
range of cultural and historical mechanisms described by ethno-
symbolism. The major actors in producing Kurdish identity utilise 
as many historical and cultural tools as possible. Since 1991, this 
process has largely been ethno-nationalist, being grounded in 
Kurdish ethnic culture and history. The use of ethno-symbolist 
methods in chapters six and seven supports this, and shows that 
this has occurred on both the political and symbolic or cultural level. 
The primary political actors have been the Kurdish nationalist 
parties and Kurdish nationalist intellectuals. The result is an almost 
exclusively Kurdish political culture and public realm: the national 
flag and education, for example, are entirely Kurdish.  
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8.3 The three phases of Kurdish identity formation 
The process of Kurdish identity formation in the KRI has gone 
through at least three major historical phases. The first of these 
lasted from 1991 to 2003 and it was largely characterised by an 
ambiguous form of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The second was 
between 2003 and 2009, and saw Kurdish nationalism prevail; 
whilst the third covers the period up until the end of 2014 and sees 
new civic forms of Kurdish identity challenge previously hegemonic 
forms.  
 
These shifts were largely determined by changes to the political 
and cultural conditions in the KRI, although these cannot be 
considered in isolation from the KRI’s external relations . In the first 
period these were characterised by political instability, internal 
rivalry and economic constrains; resulting in an ambiguous ethnic-
nationalist identity and discourse. However, the political, cultural 
and economic conditions created following the collapse of the 
Ba’athist regime in 2003 gave rise to a new form of Kurdish 
identity. This was characterised by a broader nationalist discourse, 
which responded to newly emerging political conditions in Baghdad 
which, focussed on political, cultural and economic reconstruction.  
 
During this period, Kurdish nationalism was faced with renewed 
‘Iraqi Arab’ nationalist discourses from the Iraqi government, which 
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was actively involved in a nation-building process (I note the 
importance of such external factors below). The final phase results 
from the emergence of issues such as nationalisation, human 
rights, social justice, democracy, freedom of speech and 
transparency within the KRI. These have been demanded by a new 
political generation and have left their mark on the process of 
identity formation. The Change Movement has been central here, 
and has presented a fundamental challenge to previously dominant 
and hegemonic discourses of Kurdish identity, offering a much 
more civically-minded counter-hegemonic discourse.   
 
As noted above, the politics of the KRI cannot be isolated from its 
relationships with external actors; and these have also been 
important in determining the nature of Kurdish identity formation 
in the KRI. This is particularly relevant for the second phase, when 
the KRI’s relationship with the Iraqi government was a dominant 
factor. Prior to 2003 and since 2009, however, external factors 
have been less influential on the political, cultural and economic 
conditions in the KRI.  
8.4 The political construction of Kurdish national identity  
The political and cultural realms are closely related, sometimes so 
much so that it is impossible to draw a clear boundary between 
them. At the theoretical level, both ethno-symbolism and PDT 
 326 
 
argue that processes of identity formation are simultaneously 
political and cultural processes, with different contexts determining 
which factors are key.  
 
At the political level, five main conclusions can be drawn from this 
research. Firstly, the process of identity formation in the KRI has 
suffered from an enduring crisis. Terms that form the foundations 
of nationalism might ordinarily be taken for granted, but they lack 
concrete meanings and so are open to contestation and ambiguity. 
This includes terms such as ‘Kurdish nation’, ‘homeland’, ‘Kurdish 
state’, ‘Greater Kurdistan’, ‘Kirkuk’, and ‘the enemy’, all of which 
have different meanings for different groups or individuals 
throughout the KRI. In PDT terms, they are ‘floating signifiers’, 
over which contesting discourses constantly struggle, with each 
trying to ‘fill’ these with their own particular meanings. For 
instance, ‘Kurdish nation’ can be understood in secular, ethnic or 
civic terms within the domain of secular Kurdish nationalist 
discourse. Meanwhile, there is a constant struggle between local or 
autonomous forms of nationalist discourse propagated by the KDP 
and the PUK and the pan-nationalist variant proposed by the PKK 
and its affiliated parties in the KRI, which rejects the creation of 
small Kurdistans within existing state boundaries and instead 
argues for the creation of a Greater Kurdistan. Kurdish Islamic 
discourse, meanwhile, views the ‘Kurdish nation’ as part of a 
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greater Islamic Ummah. In addition, ‘Kurdish nation’ is also 
discursively produced through its relationship with political values 
such as democracy, human rights and freedom. The later form has 
been presented by the newly emerged social, cultural and political 
conditioned mainly associated with the Change Movement, other 
opposition forces and the civil society in the KRI. Each discourse 
competing to provide meaning associates it with different concepts 
and produces it through pre-existing contexts. In short, there are 
multiple Kurdish identities in the KRI. This should not be 
understood as an anomaly, however: according to PDT all collective 
and national identities are constituted by crisis and ambiguity, 
albeit with varying degrees of intensity. 
 
The second conclusion regarding the political dimensions of Kurdish 
identity formation in the KRI is that it is extremely fragmented, 
with splits along at least three major fault lines: ideology, politics 
and culture. The former is the result of different worldviews: it is 
upon these splits that political and social life in the region has 
fragmented. The main ideological trends involved in processes of 
identity construction in the KRI are Iraqi Kurdish nationalism, pan-
Kurdish nationalism, Islamism, liberalism and communism. The 
fact that there are more than thirty political parties in a region of 
around five million population is a significant indication of the level 
of this ideological split.  
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Political polarisation may be demonstrated through the differing – 
and frequently opposed – political allegiances of Kurdish political 
parties. Various political orientations can be detected in the region, 
including the Iranian-Shi’ite orientation the Turkish-Sunni 
orientation, the Islamic Ummah orientation, the pan-Kurdish 
orientation and so on. This political polarisation has been a feature 
of the KRI since the early days of the March uprising in 1991 and 
has continues into the year 2014, showing no signs of stopping at 
the time of writing.  
 
Cultural splits are also of great significance and can be seen in the 
lingual and regional divide that is paralleled by the enduring 
political divide between the KDP and the PUK. This divide has been 
framed by some as ‘Barzanistan vs. Talabanistan’ (Cordesman, 
2003). 
 
Thirdly, although the Kurdish nationalist narrative is hegemonic, 
since 2009 a counter-hegemonic narrative has emerged through 
popular protests and political movements, largely – but not 
exclusively – represented by the Change Movement. Whilst the 
traditional, nationalist narrative is characterised by Kurdish ethnic-
nationalist features, this counter-hegemonic narrative is grounded 
in more civic and nationalist issues. Since its first election 
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campaign, one of the Change Movement’s most frequently used 
phrases is ‘the nationalisation of issues’ (this has particularly been 
the case since the campaign for regional elections in September 
2013). These ‘issues’ include the nationalisation of Peshmerga 
forces, external relations and symbolic events. The widely-used 
term ‘Kurdistani’ can also be related to shifting nationalist 
discourses post-2009 and is partly associated with the Change 
Movement’s emerging counter-hegemonic discourse. 
 
Fourthly, the main political actors in the KRI utilise a number of 
strategies to enhance their articulation of a particular form of 
Kurdish identity. Chief among these strategies are the logic of 
difference and the logic of equivalence. Through the former, they 
seek to suppress internal differences in Kurdish society in order to 
present Kurds and the Kurdish identity as a single, undisputed 
identity. Utilised parallel to this, the latter is used to construct those 
who oppose the ‘Kurdish people’ (or ‘the people of Kurdistan’, as 
they are sometimes framed) as a homogenous, undifferentiated 
(‘equivalent’) mass.  
 
Finally, Kurdish identity construction is characterised by 
antagonism. The full realisation of Kurdish identity is conditioned 
by suppression of and enmity with non-Kurdish ‘others’, including 
Iraqi Arabs, Turks, Persians and other Arab national groups, 
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although the particular object of ‘othering’ varies according to the 
historical context. In order to construct a sense of Kurdishness, 
actors utilise various cultural tools to encourage hostility towards 
these groups. During the 1990s, for example, the Ba’athist 
government of Iraq came to fully represent the ‘other’ or the 
‘enemy’. Since terrorist killings in the KRI in 2001, the figure of ‘the 
terrorist’ and ‘terrorist groups’ have been constructed as ‘others’. 
Yet in the absence of the Ba’athist regime, this ‘other’ required 
supplementation by the newly empowered Shi’ite Arabs and less 
powerful Sunni Arab groups in Iraq. However, since the 
advancement of ISIS into the KRI in August 2014, they have 
become Kurds’ main ‘enemy’ and serve as an ‘other’ against which 
Kurds can identify.  
8.5 Civic vs. ethnic identity 
It would be an overestimation to argue that collective identity in 
the KRI has acquired a fully civic character in the sense defined by 
ethno-symbolists such as Anthony Smith, in which members of the 
community associate with the identity purely for civic or legal 
reasons, rather than because they perceive affiliation to a particular 
ethnic or national group. Kurdish ethnic and cultural traits still play 
a central role in the formation of Kurdish identity in the KRI. 
However, since 2009 new forms of Kurdish identity have emerged. 
These are more inclusive and accommodating of the ethnic and 
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national differences among citizens in the KRI.  
 
In other words, it can be said that collective identity formation in 
the KRI has recently developed features that could potentially 
transform the Kurdish identity into a civic identity. This would be a 
substantial change from its history as an ethnically dominated 
identity. The shift can partly be related to the emerging counter-
hegemonic Kurdish nationalist political discourse and partly to new 
cultural and economic developments in the KRI.  
 
To expand on this last point, it is important to note that since 2003 
the KRI has experienced an enormous economic boom, 
accompanied by visible changes in the cultural sphere. 
Furthermore, deteriorating security conditions in other parts of Iraq 
mean that the KRI is an area of relative safety: it houses hundreds 
of thousands of domestic refugees (‘Internally Displaced People’) 
from central and southern Iraq, who mostly belong to other non-
Kurd ethnic groups; whilst rapid economic development has 
transformed the region into an affordable tourist destination for 
Iraqi nationals and citizens of other countries. These economic 
developments have been accompanied by social and cultural 
transformations, resulting in a more open and tolerant society for 
non-Kurdish ‘others’ when compared to other parts of Iraq. 
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8.6 The interaction of political and cultural dynamics: 
concluding remarks 
The entirety of this research has been developed around two core 
analytical spheres: the cultural and the political. The tools utilised 
to analyse these were primarily formulated from the theoretical 
approaches of ethno-symbolism and political discourse theory. 
These two approaches have proven complementary, and have 
combined well to enable a detailed analysis of the core research 
questions of this study.  
 
In short, this analysis has shown that the Kurdish identity in the 
KRI has been formed and constructed through a set of dynamisms 
utilising both cultural-historical and political tools. It draws heavily 
on historic ethnic Kurdish symbolism; with Kurdish national culture 
and history, symbols, myths, glories and tragedies utilised, 
appropriated and re-constructed. However, this process has been 
supported by the equally important dimension of political discourse 
generation. Given that the meaning of these historical symbols is 
neither fixed nor undisputed, there are struggles over their 
meaning once they enter the realm of political discourse. There, 
the hegemonic powers will seek to present dominant discourses of 
Kurdish identity as fixed and unproblematic, but this very attempt 
to fix identity is a sign of a crisis of identity.  
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This research has analysed a constant process of collective identity 
formation throughout the short history of the KRI (beginning in 
1991 and continuing to the year 2014). Whilst the main trajectories 
of that identity have been possible to detect, analyse and group 
into three separate stages, the inner dynamics of the process are 
embedded with an ongoing crisis that is produced by and 
reproduces competing political discourses. These are able to 
transform identity, and have moved it away from an ambiguous 
ethnic-nationalist identity towards an equally ambiguous and 
deeply split nationalist identity. They have not, however, been able 
to fix Kurdish identity. In other words, the traditional revolutionary 
ethnic Kurdish identity, with its origins prior to 1991, has been 
transformed into an ambiguous Kurdish nationalist one, but 
Kurdish identity remains a battlefield for fiercely competing 
ideological, cultural and political discourses. There may be Kurds 
who speak, sing, dance, eat and socialise in Kurdish; but there is 
still no single answer as to what constitutes Kurdishness 
 
This understanding of the process of identity formation in the KRI 
should aid our understanding of the wider picture at both the Iraqi 
and the Middle Eastern level. The extremely troublesome political 
and social environments of the region at this moment of history 
may best be animated as grappling with an enduring crisis of 
identity among its main components. The international handling of 
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the crisis in Iraq has so far failed to fully appreciate the above 
reality. The success or failure of any future attempt towards 
containing the current crisis is most probably tied to the extent to 
which processes of identity formation are understood and fully 
appreciated. 
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10 APPENDICES 
10.1 Appendix 1. 
 Survey statistics 
 
Demographic information of survey respondents 
  
Table 10.1: Gender distribution of respondents 
Gender Responses percentage 
Male 342 84.65% 
female 62 15.34% 
 404  
 
 
Table 10.2: Respondents' age groups 
Age group Respondents percentage 
13-35 years old 267 65.12% 
36-50 years old 113 27.56% 
51 and above 30 7.31% 
 410  
 
Table 10.3: Respondents' place of residency 
Place of resident responses percentage 
Erbil and surrounding areas 142 34.63% 
Slemany and surrounding areas 112 27.31% 
Duhok and surrounding areas 45 10.97% 
Halabja and its surrounding areas 7 1.70% 
Kirkuk and disputed areas 19 4.63% 
Kurdish from other parts of 
Kurdistan living in the Kurdistan 
Region 
1 0.24% 
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From Kurdistan Region but living 
abroad 
79 19.28% 
Other areas 5 1.21% 
 410  
 
Table 10.4: Education level of respondents 
Education level responses percentage 
Primary school 10 2.43% 
Secondary and preparatory school 52 12.68% 
College and University 246 60% 
Masters and PhD 101 24.63% 
Religious education 1 0.24% 
 410  
 
 
Table 10.5: Ethnic and national belonging of the respondents 
Ethnic and national group responses percentage 
Arab 3 0.73% 
Kurd 397 96.82% 
Chaldean-Assyrian 4 0.97% 
Turkmen 2 0.48% 
Other ethnic and national groups 4 0.97% 
 410  
 
 
Table 10.6: Religious affiliation of respondents 
Religion responses percentage 
Muslim 308 75.12% 
Christian 6 1.46% 
Yazidi 6 1.46% 
Kakaiy 11 2.68% 
Zoroastrian 2 0.48% 
No religion 77 18.78% 
 410  
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10.2 Appendix.2 
Personal interview questions 
1- At more than one occasion in the last two years the president 
of Kurdistan Region (Masoud Barzani) hinted to the issue of 
independent for Kurdistan Region. What is your opinion on 
that issue? Do you think Kurdistan Region is ready for 
independent? Don’t you think that the form of federalism 
which is in place now in Iraq is enough for Kurds in Iraq? 
2- Mr Arsalan Baiyz, the current president of Kurdistan 
parliament, when he first took over the presidency from his 
(KDP) predecessor the first thing he did was to remove the 
image of Mela Mustafa Barzani. Did you agree with that action 
at the time? Should Barzani be considered as a legendary 
Kurdish leader by all Kurds? If not Barzani’s image, who 
else’s do you think should be there in such public place like 
parliament? 
This question asked to Mr Arsalan Baiyz himself in this form: 
“This question has a personal association with you, the issue 
of removal of Barzani’s picture in your office...”1  
3- Who do you think is closer to Kurds in Iraq, Sunnis or Shiite 
people? And why? 
4- Is it OK for Kurds to align themselves to a neighbouring 
country over the other? As majority Sunnis, Kurds may be 
closer to Turkey than to Iran, do you agree with this view? 
5- In case article number 140 ‘regarding the status of Kirkuk’ is 
not applied what other options do you have in mind for the 
status of Kirkuk? …would a separate region for Kirkuk be an 
                                 
 1 Mr Baiyz refused to answer this question. As I had indicated to him 
before asking the question that it was going to be the last question, he 
practically ended the interview and said “I will not answer this question”. 
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acceptable option? 
6- In your opinion why Kurdish parties failed to create a unified 
Kurdish front in Baghdad? 
7- Recently, after the Al-Ta’akhy list (a Kurdish representative 
group in the governorate of Mosul) returned to meetings of 
the Mosul governorate assembly some Yazidi and Shabak 
(two none-Muslim groups who ethnically, considered to be 
Kurdish) decided to boycott the assembly meetings. What 
impact do you think this move will have on the status of 
Kurds in Mosul? Why some Yazidis and Shabaks align 
themselves to Arabs rather than to Kurds? 
8- Recently some Turkmen groups (a minority ethnic group in 
the Kurdistan Region) complained for being marginalised by 
Kurds, how justified their claims do you think? Does the same 
thing apply to the Christians or not? 
9- How would you describe the people ofKRI, Muslim Kurds or 
Kurdish Muslims? (a question to Ali Bapir, the leader of the 
Islamic Group of Kurdistan and Samir Salim and Abu-Bakr Ali 
politburo members of Kurdistan Islamic Union). 
10- The main political parties ruling in Baghdad are 
religious Arab parties, will that make Iraq a typical Muslim 
country? Can Kurds live peacefully in a stronger Muslim 
country like Iraq rather than a weak Kurdish state? ( a 
question to non-Islamic party leaders) 
11- There have been disputed on some symbolic and 
historical aspects of Kurds like in the last six months or so, 
President Barzani at a conference held for the purpose of 
appointing a national day under (Peshmerga day) suggested 
11th September for that purpose. However, this suggestions 
created a controversy among political parties here and other 
Kurdish parties in (Iran, Turkey and Syria), what is your 
opinion in this regard? 
 366 
 
 
10.3 Appendix 3. 
Cited personal interview transcripts 
 
1- Mr Nawsherwan Mustafa, leader of the CM 
Q1. The issue of independence, recently, you are aware that the 
president of The Region (Kurdistan Region in Iraq) addressed the 
issue of independence. You too delivered a message for Newroz 
(the Kurdish New Year) where you talked about the issue of 
independence and Kurdistan’s movement towards independence. 
Can you tell me your opinion about this? I wonder, whether The 
Region is ready to become independent? I wonder, is there a need 
for such a demand, isn’t federalism enough for Kurds in Iraqi 
Kurdistan? 
NM.1. Me, my opinion may be different to that of many people on 
the issue of Kurdistan’s independence. I think that the 
independence of Kurdistan is an aim. It is neither an ambition nor 
a hope not a dream or an imagination that all people have 
especially those people that have been under prosecution and have 
been in a situation where their national identity have not been 
recognised from the part of those states and their aim is to express 
themselves in one way or another, the best way to express is the 
establishment of a state. Therefore, it is a natural right for the 
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Kurds for their aim to be the establishment of a state.  
Q.5. your party and other opposition parties criticised for not going 
with the main stream like the issue of Nouri al-Maliki in which you 
did not support Masoud Barzani in his fight against al-Almalik… 
NM.5. We don’t know what the fight is over… one day the president 
of the Region got angry… he did not come to us, he did not ask us 
saying lets fight over Kirkuk; let’s go fight over Oil and Gas law. 
We still don’t know… how much gain the foreign companies get 
from the oil and gas deals, what is the share of Kurdistan, where 
does its revenue go, how the money is spent. A fight which is not 
mine, I will not go to take it. 
 
2- Mr Mahmud Mohammed, member of politburo (KDP)  
Q.1. on the background of ‘No confidence’ attempts against Nouri 
al-Malik, it has been said the Kurdish voice is not united. What is 
your response to this? 
 
MM.1. Such problems are expected in Iraq, a multi-national, multi 
view, multi religion and multi sect country…there would be different 
views and positions as to the way we perceive these problems and 
their solution in accordance to political, national and religious 
interests. Changes happen to the views while the solutions differ. 
In the country of Iraq, as I have always said and would say which 
was created by English by mistake, the complications to political 
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processes emerge very often. This is because all those people live 
in Iraq they are neither a single nation nor a single religion nor a 
single sect and each of them wish a way of life which is different 
from each other. The wishes of none of them is realised completely. 
For these reasons that is why often disruptions happen in Iraq and 
these complications are not solved easily. This has also resulted in 
other countries to get involved with their interests in these issues 
and make them even more complicated or take up other 
dimensions. What is there in Iraq, of course, has positive and 
negative reflections in Kurdistan as well. In Kurdistan as well, 
sometimes the same divisions emerge over difference in view. .. 
what is important is that while there might be different views we 
should not have different positions, especially over national issues… 
there have been different views as to solution of the problems, 
however, at the end, the large majority of Kurdistan people and 
those who represent the people of Kurdistan within the frame of 
the available parties a kind of union was seen in the posi tions. 
Although, it is not the hundred present of Kurdistan because some 
of them have not established their position but both main parties 
and both Islamic parties who are on the opposition… the position is 
that the time has come to withdraw confidence from al-Malik. 
However, Goran has not determined their position. So the gap that 
is there it may that Goran has not determined their position. 
Because we do not have a single party in Kurdistan we should 
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expect that we will have different views.  
Q.2. About the issue of independence of Kurdistan. In the last two 
years the president of IK hinted to the issue, the possibility of 
announcing independence of IK. However, KDP’s very ally, PUK, 
there is a widely known statement by the head of PUK considering 
the independence of Kurdistan as something which more of a poetic 
dream. Or other opposition parties have different views on the 
same issue. Some of these parties say that we should look inwards 
before looking outwards to the issue of independence; we need to 
talk about the establishment of that state inside Kurdistan first. Or 
creating the Kurdish citizen, they think the Kurdish citizen is yet to 
be created. What is your opinion? 
MM.2. What the president Barzani has done was to tear off the 
barrier which considered talking about the Kurdish independence 
as something prohibited. He established that, yes, talking about 
the creation of a Kurdish state neither haram nor a shame, it’s not 
something out of the international norms and law. Many new states 
were created in the last few years which may not have the 
requirements of statehood as much as Kurds have. But the 
circumstances, either political or international were suitable for 
them to announce statehood. The announcement of the Kurdish 
state needs some foundations. These foundations must be created 
in terms of social, economy and political, before we announce the 
Kurdish state. When we say social we mean the reediness of our 
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people to face the difficulties of announcing independence. 
Economic readiness as to how these people live, it is about how to 
secure food security, employment and income for this country. In 
terms of the political, a kind of agreement and feeling should be 
reached among all political parties to feel that the state belongs to 
all. In terms of the social side, there lives in Kurdistan other people 
a part from Kurds, they should be reassured where they will be in 
that state and how much happy they will be. 
Q.8. about the move by Mr Arsalan Baiyz in Kurdistan parliament 
by removing the picture of Mustafa Barzani and replacing it with 
another one. How do you assess that move? 
 
MM.8. Barzani is a personality of our country; he is also an Iraqi 
personality. If some people prefer not to hear that-that would not 
reduce from this person’s charisma. Barzani as symbol in Kurdistan 
who was able to lead the Kurdish liberation movement for decades 
is something undeniable. Therefore, if we don’t politicise and 
partisanise everything , we can decide more calmly on these 
issues… if we or anybody else, do not pull Mala Mustafa into KDP 
slot; if you see him as a leader of Kurdish liberation movement as 
at a point of history; we cannot erase history because this or that 
party is not happy with it… 
 
3- Mr Arsalan Baiyz, member of PUK politburo, president of 
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the Kurdistan parliament (2012-2014) 
Q.1. on Kurdistan Region independence 
ABZ.1. There are few people like Kurds in the Middle East and in 
the world who have a large population and sizeable land but have 
no state. That is why now all around the world Kurds mentioned as 
an example for not having their own state. Therefore, it is the right 
of Kurds to dream about a Kurdish state and work for it because to 
take just the Iraqi people, they have as much population as Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Qatar combined and has a larger size land to that of 
these countries. However, these four states have their own flags at 
UN but Kurds have nothing. But everything needs preparation. 
However, so far neither from the psychological side nor in terms of 
requirement of a Kurdish state, Kurds do not have such 
readiness…one of these pillars is the union of Kurds. Unfortunately 
so far Kurds do not have that union; for all to have a high 
committee to study the situation and plan for it collectively. There 
is now a strategic relation between PUK and KDP. But this strategic 
relation sometimes cracks over relations with the Iraqi government 
or with neighbouring countries. On the other hand there is a major 
gap between today’s authority in Kurdistan (KRG) and the 
opposition. So far we have not been able to find a shared language 
to solve the problems between the Kurdish authority and opposition 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, if a people have not been able to 
create a union within and to have psychological preparation as an 
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essential pillar, how it can establish a state? The second point is 
that having a state requires a strong economic foundation. So far, 
our economy is bound to the Iraqi government’s budget. If the Iraqi 
budget cut from Kurdistan the Kurdish administration may not be 
able to give salaries to the people of Kurdistan… it is not the old 
times when the Iraqi government withdrew its administration form 
Kurdistan, when the Peshmerga had just descended from the 
mountains, where people had a lot of enthusiasm for the Kurdish 
cause and towards Peshmerga. Now people are looking after their 
personal things. Now people go after finding fortunes and their 
needs. I don’t think we still have the old spirit of people of that time 
as to accept not being paid by the Kurdish authority or for their 
daily life needs not be met. If Kurds want to announce 
independence they have to secure a strong independent economic 
base without relying on the budget of Iraqi government.  
The third point is we need to have friendship with the Arab nation 
so that they agree through a referendum like the one took place 
for South Sudan or we need to negotiate with the Iraqi 
government; to agree with Arabs to have a referendum to see how 
Iraqi government backs this move or not. The other point is to 
create such relationship with the neighbours, because parts of 
Kurdistan, parts of Kurdish people are in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. 
Because, if there is a Kurdish state it may affect them positively 
and negatively and these states may not stand idle. They are all 
 373 
 
states with power and capacity. On the international level Kurds 
have not earned international backing like those counties of Europe 
and America. Therefore, I believe that it is Kurds right to dream 
about a Kurdish state and work for it. If it is the intention of the 
people of Kurdistan to establish its own state – which is its right—
it has to pave the way for it from now. The Kurds have to secure 
the internal, economic and regional basis. In terms of military, if 
Kurds want to settle announce the issues militarily, and if they want 
to defy the Iraqi army and the regional states which is very difficult 
in practical terms, for that, I prefer that Kurds first of all try to 
ensure the unity at home; to establish their economic 
infrastructure; to keep good relations with the neighbours; we can 
take advantage of oil and gas to attract some economic interests 
to Kurdistan so that they defend Kurdistan in case of declaration of 
independence.  
Q.4. about article 140, Some Arabs say it’s dead while some 
opposition Kurdish parties criticise you for doing nothing. In case 
the article is not is not fulfilled, would you accept another option 
for Kirkuk a part from its annexation to Kurdistan Region?  
ABZ. 4. As for article 140, it is a constitutional article. It is the 
enemies who principally do not believe in Kurds rights; those who 
don’t believe in referendum and constitution it is them who say the 
article is dead… 
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4- Mr Ali Bapir, leader (Ameer) of KIG 
Q.1. the issue of independence 
AB.1. in Islamic terms, no human being prioritised over others. All 
nations are equal and no one is favoured over the other. If one 
nation has the right to have a sate so do the others; from Shari ’a 
terms, that is how peoples and nations seen. The right of sel f-
determination which is approved by UN had been there in Islam 
more than 1400 years ago. In terms of reality, how much we can 
do and achieve? It is a different story. According to Islam, Kurdish 
people have the right to statehood. However, how much is 
achievable on the ground? Here in IK, managed federalism. They 
may be satisfied with less than that in Kurdistan of Turkey. The 
same to Kurdistan of Syria; in Kurdistan of Iran, they will accept 
less than that but they have been given less. 
Q. 6. The Peshmerga day 
AB.6. For these things the president of The Region should before 
making such decisions, they should consult people. This and other 
things like national anthem, the flag and all these things, 
Peshmerga day and Martyrs’ day. We all need to get to agree on 
them so that it is not stamped with a particular party. On the other 
side, in the institution and in parliament, there should not only be 
guards from KDP and PUK. Is it how we want to become a state? 
Then for Peshmerga day we have to invite writers, historians and 
artists… as for Ey Reqib anthem, it is a nationalistic anthem not a 
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patriotic one. It is mentioned in Kurdistan constitution that the 
anthem should be patriotic. I told one of the officials, I said it is not 
plausible to say ‘Oh enemy, the Kurds are still alive’. I said you 
should say I want a state. Then, it says’ ‘we are sons of Meds and 
Kaykhusraw’. I asked the guy was not Kaykhusraw a Persian king? 
It says ‘our religion is our homeland’. I said the land cannot made 
religion, the land is prayed on. We have to save the land to practice 
religion on, it cannot made religion of… 
 
5- Mr Abu-Bakir Ali, member of politburo (KIU) 
Q.1. the issue of independence of Iraqi Kurdistan 
AA.1. We have to talk about this in two ways: in terms of principles 
and in terms of reality. In terms of principles, self-determination is 
the right of every nation and we consider the people of Kurdistan a 
nation therefore, self-determination is their right.  
 
6- Miss Najiba Omar Ahmed, co-president (KDSP) 
Q1: we are basically talking about this part of Kurdistan. The 
question is about the issue of independence. In the last two years 
especially, the president of Kurdistan Region has for several times 
talked about the issue of Kurdistan independence and the issue has 
become a question among others. What is your opinion on the 
question of Kurdistan’s independence? Would it be possible for that 
part of Kurdistan to become independent? Or, isn’t federalism 
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enough for this part of Kurdistan? What is your opinion on this 
issue? 
NA.1. undoubtedly the Kurdish question is an important one. 
Undoubtedly, the Kurdish people as an essential nation in the 
Middle East it was as a result of a wider plot from the upper-handed 
states in the Middle east and also on the hands of global upper-
handed states, meaning, in the west, the Kurdistan has been 
partitioned. Especially more after the Lausanne agreement that the 
borders of all parts of Kurdistan have been marked. I can say that 
with the ever deepening the rational of nation-state, especially with 
the ideas of (I can say) the upper-handed western states who put 
the rational of nation-state forward. Therefore those borders were 
further intensified to partition Kurdistan within this framework the 
Kurdish people in all parts of Kurdistan have been facing denial and 
destruction. In this part of Kurdistan, it may be that along the 
history of the struggle Kurdish people in this part of Kurdistan that 
which has been there, it may be for that reason that a policy of 
denial has not been undertaken. However in this part of Kurdistan 
the policy of destruction has been undergoing in an overt manner. 
In other parts of Kurdistan, especially in the North part, we can say 
that the policy of denial has also been undergoing which continues 
so far. Undoubtedly, it is the right of the Kurdish people to strive 
for and achieve all the rights that have been taken away from them, 
both national rights and democratic rights and the Kurdish people 
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like all other nations it is its right to become independent and live 
independent. However, as we have always been saying, just like 
the Kurdish people was first split into two then into four parts, this 
is a strategy and the policy of dominant states in all parts of 
Kurdistan is, more or less the same and they are in favour of Kurds 
neither getting united nor to achieve its legitimate rights. 
Therefore, a shared policy is undergoing. For that we say that the 
destiny of Kurdish people in parts of Kurdistan is tied together. 
Meaning, when in a part of Kurdistan where a level of independence 
and the right of freedom is achieved, unless, a comprehensive 
solution is achieved in all parts of Kurdistan the rights of no part of 
Kurdistan can be properly guaranteed. From this point we say that 
the Kurdish question requires a national union. Based on this, just 
like no matter how much rivalries may be there among the 
dominant states in Kurdistan are in agreement on the Kurdish 
question and on their enmity towards the Kurdish people. Even the 
dominant states in the world do the politics as such. Therefore the 
Kurdish people need to have a national union. In this part of 
Kurdistan, as the result of the struggle of Kurdish people since 1991 
there is, to some level a kind of federalism, meaning there is a kind 
of federalism, meaning a region with a level of freedom or national 
independence. Undoubtedly this is tied to…we can also say what is 
there it was there in 1971 one way or another in the Autonomy or 
what they called autonomy for the Kurdistan Region it had been 
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established. It is approximately the same borders that was 
delineated which is being worked with so far. This is important, for 
example...or… it has its importance for all Kurds in other parts of 
Kurdistan. However, if we look geographically, so far 42 percent of 
southern Kurdistan’s geography does not fall into the Kurdistan 
Region because Kurdistan Region is only the three provinces of 
Erbil, Sulaymanya and Duhok. But Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Mandali, 
Shangal and also until Zummar and others one can say are its 42 
percent. This, we believe that, once again, this issue…the settling 
of this issue is tied to other parts of Kurdistan; this is once again a 
shared policy of the dominant states an at the meantime the 
dominant global superpower states who are not with annexation of 
what has been cut off from Kurdistan or ‘those disputed places’ as 
it has been written so in the constitution. The Kurdish people in all 
parts…not only in the southern Kurdistan, in all parts of Kurdistan, 
it is their right to become independent and to have an independent 
administration to run its own affairs by themselves. We as KDSP 
not only are with the independence of Kurdistan and we believe 
that the central authority be reduced to the end and the regional 
authority be increased. Because in democracy, when we are talking 
about democracy we need to know that the much local authority is 
there the much democracy will be established. From this view, we 
are in favour that all parts of Kurdistan be independent. However, 
an independence that you internally have…. 
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Q.5. if we look at the Kurdish forces, there is an enemy and a friend 
in the point of view of each of them. For example, in Kurdistan 
Region between the two main forces they are split between two, 
some of them consider Sunnis closer some others consider Shi’ites 
closer. What is your opinion on this issue? 
NA.5. we, I myself has made speeches and also the KDSP has also 
stated that. In principle, both Sunni and Shi’ite have the same 
viewpoint on the Kurdish issue. Each in its own part has a 
chauvinist {nation-worship} rational and do not account for the 
willing of Kurdish people. 
 
6- Osman Haji Marouf, secretary of central committee 
(KCWP) 
Q.1. it has been like two years that the issue of the Kurdish state 
or independence of Kurdistan making a hot topic. You as KCWP 
what is your view on the issue of independence? Are you with 
independence? Or is the federalism in place in Iraq and Kurdistan 
is enough and it is still not the time for independence?  
OM.1. let me first distinguish between two different things, first 
Kurdish state, that which the Kurdish nationalist parties advocate 
for and the second one ‘independent state in Kurdistan’, it was an 
issue that was forwarded by the Iraqi Communist Workers Party or 
rather by the Communists and the question was not that the Kurds 
should have a state or Kurds need a state. 
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7- Mr Dana Said Sofy, Kurdistan parliament MP 
Q.1. a couple of years ago Masoud Barzani triggered the Issue of 
independence. In your opinion is the Kurdish state and the 
independence of Kurdistan Region a necessity or not? Isn’t 
federalism enough for the region? 
DS.1. officially, on the political level, I can say that Kurds have not 
overtly demanded a state. But it does not mean that there is not 
such an intention, desire and dream from the side of the political 
forces. 
 
8- Mr Balen Abdulla, the secretary of central committee, KTP 
Q.2. isn’t federalism enough for the region? 
BA.2. the federalism in Iraq proved to be a failure. You can’t have 
only one federal region in Iraq which is Kurdistan. They didn’t let 
other parts of Iraq to establish their other similar federal regions. 
They in Baghdad are against federalism of Kurdistan they don’t 
want us to stand on our feet. There have been a number of issues 
that would prove that like the issue of oil and gas which they don’t 
give us the right to exploit our own natural resources. After all 
those years the people of Kurdistan should have come to 
understand that this framework of Iraq doesn’t contain us 
anymore, we should look for other windows. The only way is the 
way that has also been paved for by the universal declaration of 
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human rights. This has given Kurds the right to decide whether 
they want to stay within Iraq or not.  
 
9- Mr Samir Saleem, member of politburo, KIU 
Q.1. the president has stimulated the issue of independence of 
Kurdistan Region. What is your opinion first on the issue of 
independence and then whether federalism is not enough for the 
region? 
SS.1. it is the right of Kurds, like any other nation to have its own 
state and its own independence. It is true in the legal and human 
rights terms as it is true in the religious terms. I think the Kurdish 
people did desire independence from the beginning but the 
circumstances were not suitable. Kurds after 2003 were among the 
first people who worked on rebuilding the Iraqi state but on 
different new basis where their own demands are accommodated 
as you cannot remove a nationalist state to replace it with another 
nationalist state. It is Kurds natural right to have a state of their 
own. I think now the opportunity has come up more than ever 
before for the issue of independence especially after the Arab 
spring. The conditions for independence are there and there are 
fewer obstacles before it.  
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10.4 Appendix 4. 
Supervisor’s support letter to potential interviews 
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10.5 Appendix 5. 
The online survey questions 
Q1: what is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
Q2: what is your age group? 
 13-35 years old 
 36-50 years old 
 50 and above years old 
Q3: where are you from? 
 Erbil province and surroundings 
 Duhok province and surroundings 
 Slemany province and surroundings 
 Halabja and surroundings 
 Kirkuk and other disputed areas 
  From KRI but residing abroad 
 Kurd from other parts of Kurdistan residing in KRI 
Q4: what is your education level? 
 Primary school 
 Secondary and preparatory school 
 College and university 
 Masters and PhD 
 Religious education 
Q5: which ethnic and national group do you belong to? 
 Kurd 
 Arab 
 Chaldean-Assyrian 
 Turkmen 
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Q6: what is your religion? 
 Islam 
 Christianity (skips Q7) 
 Kakaiy (skips Q7) 
 Zoroastrian (skips Q7) 
 Yezidism (skips Q7) 
 Other religions (please specify bellow) (skips Q7) 
 I have no religious belief (skips Q7) 
Q7: if you consider yourself a Kurd and Muslim, how would you 
describe yourself? 
 Kurdish Muslim 
 Muslim Kurdish 
 Kurd 
 No difference between the above 
Q8: what of the following describes you best? 
 Iraqi Kurd 
 Iraqi 
 Kurd 
 Kurdistani 
Q9: How would you consider the Ey Reqib anthem? 
 I consider it the national anthem of all Kurds and accept it  
 I consider it the national anthem of KRI and accept it 
 I consider it the national anthem of Kurds but I do not accept 
it as it contains nonreligious expressions 
 I consider it the national anthem of Kurds but I do not accept 
it as it does not represent me 
Q10: Which of the following Kurdish dialects or languages would 
you prefer as the official language in KRI? 
 Kurdish Sorani (Middle Kirmanji) 
 Kurdish Badini (Northern Kirmanji) 
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 The prevalent dialect or language in any area. 
 Arabic 
 Other answers (please write bellow) 
Q11: How would you see this flag?  
 
 It is the flag of all Kurds and I accept it as the national flag 
of KRI 
 It is the national flag of KRI and I accept it 
 It is the Kurdish national flag bit I do not consider it my 
national flag 
 Other answers (please write bellow) 
Q12: what is your view on Newroz feast? 
 It is a national feast for all Kurds and I accept as my national 
feast 
 It’s the national feast in KRI and I accept it as my national 
feast 
 It is the national feast of Kurds but I do not consider it my 
national feast 
 It is the beginning of Spring but I don’t consider it my own 
feast 
 Other answers (write bellow)  
Q13: which of the following ethnic or national groups in Iraq would 
you consider close to you? 
 Sunni Arab 
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 Shi’ite Arab 
 Muslim Kurds 
 Chaldean-Assyrian 
 Kakaiy Kurds 
 Yezidi Kurds 
 Turkmen 
 All of them 
 None of the above 
Q14: do you support the independence of KRI?7 
 Yes 
 No 
 I do not know yet 
 Other answers (please write bellow) 
Q15: Which of the following expressions would you prefer? 
 I am with the independence of Kurdistan prior to anything 
else 
 I am with freedom, social justice and democracy prior of 
anything else 
 I am with the establishment of Shari ’a law prior to anything 
else 
Q16: which of the following historical events do you consider the 
most unpleasant? Choose three 
 Death of Mela Mustafa Barzani in 1979 
 The collapse of September Revolution in 1975 
 The chemical attack on Halabja in 1988 
 The of Barzanis in 1983 
 The Kurdish fratricide 
 The major campaigns of 1987 
 The arrest of Abdulla Ocalan in 1999 
Q17: which of the following historical events do you consider the 
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most pleasant? Choose three 
 March 11th 1970 accord 
 Resumption of armed struggle in 1976 
 Uprising of March 1991 
 The end of Kurdish fratricide in 1998 
 Execution of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 2006 
  The toppling of the Iraqi regime in 2003 
Q18: which of the following historical leaders do you consider your 
national leader? Choose three 
 Salahaddin Ayyubu 
 Sheikh Ubaudulla  
 Sheikh Said Piran 
 Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji 
 Ghazi Muhammed 
 Mela Mustafa Barzani 
 Abdulla Ocalan 
 Jalal Talabani 
 Masoud Barzani 
Q19: How would you consider the September revolution of 1961? 
 It was the revolution of all Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan 
 It was the revolution of all Kurds in Iraq 
 It was the revolution of Kurds and all other components in 
Iraqi Kurdistan 
 It was the revolution of a particular Kurdish political party 
Q20: Which ethnic or national group yoi belong to? 
 Kurdish 
 Chaldean-Assyrian (skips Q21) 
 Turkmen (skips Q21) 
 Arab(skips Q21) 
Q21: would you accept if a Turkman, Chaldean-Assyrian or an Arab 
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citizen of KRI takes a high ranked post in KRG like the post of 
president of the Prime Minister? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I do not know yet 
Q22: Which of the following countries do you consider closer to the 
national interest of KRI? 
 The USA and Western countries 
 Iran 
 Turkey 
 Syria 
 None of them 
 Al of them 
Q23: Which of the following resolutions would you prefer for the 
condition of Kirkuk? 
 To annex the city to KRI without returning to Article 140 
 To try to implement Article 140 
 To stay as part of the central Iraq 
 To become a separate region 
 Other answers (please write) 
Q24: Which of the following political parties do you support? 
 Assyrian Democratic Party 
 Movement for Change 
 Iraqi communist Party 
 Iraqi Turkmen Front 
 Islamic Movement in Kurdistan 
 Kurdistan Democratic Party 
 Kurdistan democratic Solution Party 
 Kurdistan Future Party 
 Kurdistan Islamic Group 
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 Kurdistan Islamic Union 
 Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party 
 Kurdistan Toilers Party 
 Kurdistan Workers Communist party 
 Kurdistan Workers Party 
 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
 I support no political party 
 Other political parties of fronts 
 
10.6 Appendix 6. 
Survey questionnaire in Kurdish 
پ١؟ەیەماک تنەمەت یپورگ : 
 ١٦-٣٥ 
 ٣٦-٥٠ 
 ٥١ ەوەرەس ۆب 
پ٢؟ەییچ تزەگەڕ : 
 رێن 
 ێم 
پ٣؟ەییچ تیراوەدنێوخ یتسائ : 
 ییاتەرەس 
 یدنەواناود و یدنەوان 
 ۆکناز واگنامیەپ 
 ارۆتکد و رەتسام 
پ٤؟یەچوان ماک یووتشیناد : 
 یرەبوروەد ورێلوەه 
 یرەبوروەد و کۆهد 
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 سلێمانی و دەوروبەری 
 کەرکوک و دەوروبەری 
 هەڵەبجەو دەوروبەری 
 خەڵکی هەرێمی کوردستان بەڵام دانیشتووی دەرەوەی هەرێم 
 خەڵکی پارچەکانی تری کوردستان بەڵام دانیشتووی هەرێمی کوردستان 
 دانیشتووی موسڵ و ناوچە جێناکۆکەکانی تر 
 شوێنی تر.................. 
 : سەر بەکام گروپی ئیتنیکی (قەومی)٥پ
 کوردی موسوڵمان 
 کوردی یەزیدی 
 کوردی کاکەیی 
 کلدو ئاشووری (مەسیحی) 
 تورکمان 
 : سەر بەچ ئاینێکی؟٦پ
 موسوڵمان 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ) مەسیحی 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ)یەزیدی 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ)کاکەیی 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ)زەردەشتی 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ)اینێک نیمشوێنکەوتەی هیچ ئ 
 (پرسیاری هەشتەم تێدەپەڕێنێ)وەڵامی تر 
 : چۆن پێناسەی خۆت دەکەی؟٧پ
 عێراقی 
 کوردی عێراقی 
 کورد 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
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 زیاتر بنووسە.............. 
لەمانەی خوارەوە وەسفی ئەگەر سەر بەنەتەوەی کوردی و شوێنکەوتەی ئایینی ئیسلامی  کام  :٨پ
 تەواوی تۆیە؟
 کوردی موسوڵمان
 موسوڵمانی کورد
 جیاوازی لەنێوان ئەم دوانەدا نییە
 کورد
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە)
 زیاتر بنووسە.....................
 :  ئایا چۆن لە سرودی 'ئەی ڕەقیب' دەڕوانی؟٩پ
 سرودێکی نەتەوەیی کوردیەو قبوڵمە
 یشتیمانی هەرێمی کوردستانەو قبوڵمەسرودی ن
 سرودێکی نەتەوەیی کوردیەو قبوڵم نییە
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە)
 زیاتر بنووسە..............
 : چۆن دەڕوانیە ڕۆژی نەورۆز؟٠١پ
 جەژنی نەتەوەیی هەموو کوردەو بە جەژنی نەتەوەیی خۆمی دەزانم 
 ردستانەو بە جەژنی خۆمی دەزانمجەژمی نەتەوەیی/نیشتیمانی هەرێمی کو 
 جەژنی نەتەوەیی کوردەو بە ژەجنی خۆمی نازانم 
 سەرەتای بەهارە بەڵام بەجەژنی نەتەوەیی خۆمی نازانم 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 وەڵامی تر.............................. 
 : چۆن دەڕوانیە ئەم ئاڵایە؟١١پ
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 ئاڵای هەرێمی کوردستان وبقڵمەئاڵای هەموو کوردەو وەکوو  
 تەنها ئاڵای هەرێمی کوردستانەو قبووڵمە 
تەعبیر لە هەموو پێکهاتەکانی هەرێمی کوردستان ناکات و وەکوو ئاڵای نەتەوەیی خۆم قبوڵی  
 ناکەم
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 وەڵامی تر.............................................. 
 :٢١پ
 لەکام لەم گروپانە بە نزیکتر دەزانی؟ خۆت
 کوردی موسوڵمان 
 کوردی یەزیدی 
 کوردی کاکەیی 
 عەرەبی سوننی 
 عەرەبی شیعە 
 مەسیحی 
 تورکمان 
 هەموویان 
 هیچیان 
 : ئایا لەگەڵ سەربەخۆیی هەرێمی کوردستانی یان نا؟٣١پ
 بەڵێ 
 نەخێر 
 زیاتر بنووسە...................
 کوردیانە بەباش دەزانی بکرێت بە زمانی فەرمی هەرێمی کوردستان؟: کام لەم دیالێکتە ٤١پ
 کوردی سۆرانی/ کرمانجی ناوەڕاست 
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 کوردی بادینی/کرمانجی سەروو 
 لەهەر ناوچەیەک دیالێکتی سەرەکی ناوچەکە بکرێت بە زمانی فەرمی 
 عەرەبی 
 وەڵامی تر 
 وەڵامی تر.......................................
 یتنی یان نەتەوەیی؟ئام گروپی : سەر بەک٥١پ
 کلدوئاشووری (پرسیاری شازدە تێدەپەڕێنێ) 
 تورکمان (پرسیاری شازدە تێدەپەڕێنێ) 
 کورد 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) (پرسیاری شازدە تێدەپەڕێنێ) 
 وەڵامی زیاتر...............................
مەسیحی یان تورکمانی هەرێمی کوردستان پۆستێکی گەورەی : ئایا لەگەڵ ئەوەدای کە هاوڵاتیەکی ٦١پ
 پێبدرێ؟بۆ نموونە پۆستی سەرۆکی هەرێم یان سەرۆکی حکومەت
 بەڵێ 
 نەخێر 
 زیاتر بنووسە............
 : کام لەم ڕێگەچارانەی خوارەوەت پێىاشە بۆ دۆخی کەرکوک؟٧١پ
 کوردستانبگەڕینرێتەوە سەر هەرێمی  ٠٤١بەبێ گەڕانەوە بۆ ماددەی  
 جێبەجێ بکرێت ٠٤١هەوڵبدرێت ماددەی  
 بکرێت بە هەرێمێکی سەربەخۆ 
 هەر سەر بە عێراق بێت 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 وەڵامی تر................................... 
 : کام لەم وڵاتانە بە نزیکتر دەزانی لە بەرژەوەندی هەرێمی کوردستان؟٨١پ
 ئێران 
 تورکیا 
 ریکاو ڕۆژاوائەم 
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 هیچیان  
 هەموویان 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 وەڵامی تر............... 
 : کام لەم سەرکردە مێژوویانە بە رەمزی نەتەوەیی خۆت دەزانی؟٩١پ
 سەلاحەدینی ئەییوبی 
 شێخ عوبەیدوڵای نەهری 
 شێخ سەعیدی پیران 
 شێخ مەحمود 
 قازی محمد 
 مەلا موستەفای بارزانی 
 جەلال تاڵەبانی 
 مەسعود بارزانی 
 هەموویان 
 هیچیان 
 زیاتر بنووسە...............
 
 کام لەم ڕوداوانە لە پەنجا ساڵی ڕابردودا بەلای تۆوە ناخۆشترینە؟تەنها سێ هەڵبژێرە -٠٢پ
 دا٤٧٩١هەرەەسی شۆڕشی ئەیلول لەساڵی  
 ٢٨٩١ئەنفالی بارزانیەکان لە ساڵی  
 شەڕی براکوژی 
 ەوە-٦٨٩١ل لەدوای ساڵی هێرشەکانی ئەنفا 
 کیمیابارانکردنی هەڵەبجە 
 کارەەساتی شەنگال و قەتڵ و عامی یەزیدیەکان 
 دا-٩٩٩١دەستگیرکردنی عەبدوڵلا ئۆجەلان لەساڵی  
 
 کام لەم ڕواداوانە لەپەنجا ساڵی رابردودا خۆشترینە بەلای تۆوە؟ تەنها سێ دانە هەڵبژێرە-١٢پ
 ٠٧٩١بەیانی یازدەی ئازاری  
 ەوە-٦٧٩١ردنەوەی شۆڕش لەدوای ساڵی دەستپێک 
 ١٩٩١ڕاپەڕینی  
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 دا-٣٠٠٢ڕوخاندنی ڕژێمی بەعس لەساڵی  
 دا٦٠٠٢لەساڵی   لەسێدارەدانی سەرۆکی پشووی عێراق سەدام حوسێن 
 ٢٩٩١دا لەساڵی -یەکەم هەڵبژادن لە هەرێمی کوردستان 
 یەکگرتنەوەی هەردوو ئیدارەی حکومەتی هەرێمی کوردستان 
 ؟١٦٩١دەڕوانیە شۆڕشی ئەیلولی . چۆن ٢٢پ
 شۆڕشی هەموو کورد بوو لە هەرچوارپارچەی کوردستان 
 شۆڕشی کوردو هەموو پێکهاتەکانی تری کەردستانی عێراق بوو 
 شۆڕشێ هەموو کورد بوو لە کوردستانی عێراقدا 
 تەنها شۆڕسی پارتێکی سیاسی دیاریکراو بوو 
 وەڵامی تر (تکایە لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 تر..............................وەڵامی  
 . یەکێک لەم دەربڕینانەی خوارەوە هەڵبژێرە٣٢پ
 دام بەر لە هەر شتێکی تر-من لەگەڵ دەوڵەتی سەربەخۆی کوردستان 
 من لەگەڵ دیموکراسیەت و دادی کۆمەڵایەتی و ئازادی ڕادەربڕیندام بەر لەهەر شتێکی تر 
 بەر لەهەر شتێکی تر دام-من لەگەڵ جێبەجێکردنی شەریعەتی ئیسلام 
 : لایەنگر یان هەواداری کام لەم پارت و حیزبانەی خوارەوەی؟٤٢پ
 پارتی دیمکراتی کوردستان 
 یەکێتی نیشتیمانی کوردستان 
 یەککگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان 
 حیزبی زەحمەتکێشانی کوردستان 
 حیزبی ئایندەی کوردستان 
 بزوتنەوەی گۆڕان 
 کوردستانپارتی چارەسەری دیمکراتی  
 حیزبی شیوعی کوردستان 
 حیزبی کۆمۆنیستی کرێکاری عێراق 
 پارتی دیمکراتی ئاشووری 
 کۆمەڵی ئیسلامی کوردستان 
  693
 
 بزوتنەوەی ئیسلامی لە کوردستان 
 حیزبی سۆشیالیستی دیموکراتی کوردستان 
 بەرەی تورکمانی عێراقی 
 حیزبی شیوعی عێراقی 
 لایەنی تر (لەخوارەوە بینووسە) 
 پارتێکی سیاسی نیم لایەنگری هیچ 
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